New York Law Review

Tag: challenge for cause

  • People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d 84 (2011): Disqualifying Jurors with Close Witness Relationships

    People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d 84 (2011)

    A prospective juror with personal and professional relationships with numerous potential witnesses must be disqualified for cause, even if they claim impartiality, due to the risk of implied bias.

    Summary

    Scott Furey was convicted of kidnapping and burglary. During jury selection, a prospective juror, Mrs. Comerford, revealed close relationships with several police officer witnesses, including frequent professional and some personal contact. The defense challenged her for cause, arguing implied bias. The trial court denied the challenge, relying on Mrs. Comerford’s assurance of impartiality. Furey used a peremptory challenge to remove her and eventually exhausted all peremptory challenges. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not disqualifying Mrs. Comerford for cause because her relationships with the witnesses created an unacceptable risk of bias, irrespective of her assurances.

    Facts

    Defendant Scott Furey was charged with burglary and kidnapping of his former girlfriend. During jury selection, Mrs. Comerford, the wife of a police captain, was a prospective juror. She knew several potential prosecution witnesses, who were police officers working with her husband. Specifically, she had frequent professional and some personal contact with at least two officers and knew them for several years. She also knew the assistant district attorney on the case. In total, she was acquainted with 8 of the 14 potential witnesses for the prosecution.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defense’s challenge for cause against Mrs. Comerford. Furey used a peremptory challenge to remove her. Furey was convicted in County Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law when it denied the defendant’s challenge for cause of a prospective juror who had personal and professional relationships with several of the witnesses expected to testify at the defendant’s trial, despite the juror’s assurances of impartiality?

    Holding

    Yes, because Mrs. Comerford’s familiarity with numerous witnesses satisfied the implied bias standard, necessitating her removal for cause, irrespective of her assurances of impartiality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 270.20(1)(c) allows a challenge for cause if a prospective juror’s relationship with a witness is likely to preclude an impartial verdict, creating an “implied bias.” Such bias cannot be cured by an expurgatory oath because the risk of prejudice is too great. The Court emphasized the need for caution, leaning towards disqualification when impartiality is dubious. While not all relationships require disqualification, the frequency and nature of the relationship are crucial. Here, Mrs. Comerford’s close professional and social relationships with many witnesses (including those involved in the investigation) created a considerable risk she could unwittingly give undue credence to their testimony. The court emphasized that such a situation creates the perception that the defendant might not receive a fair trial. The court stated, “[T]he risk of prejudice arising out of the close relationship… [is] so great that recital of an oath of impartiality could not convincingly dispel the taint.” Therefore, denying the challenge for cause was an abuse of discretion.

  • People v. Hedrick, 99 N.Y.2d 445 (2003): Excusing Jurors for Cause Based on Potential Bias

    99 N.Y.2d 445 (2003)

    Prospective jurors who indicate potential bias but do not provide an unequivocal assurance of impartiality must be excused for cause.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court erred by not excusing prospective jurors for cause who indicated a potential bias in favor of police officer testimony without providing unequivocal assurances of impartiality. The defense challenged these jurors for cause, but the challenges were denied, forcing the defense to use peremptory challenges. Because the defense exhausted its peremptory challenges, the error was reversible.

    Facts

    During voir dire, prospective jurors indicated, through raised hands and affirmative nods, that they might be inclined to believe a police officer’s account simply because of their position. Defense counsel specifically asked if anyone felt they would have a tendency to believe a police officer’s account, and several jurors responded affirmatively. The defense later clarified whether those jurors would be “leaning towards accepting a police officer just because of the title or the uniform,” to which the jurors nodded affirmatively.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court erred in denying the defense’s challenges for cause. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, reversing the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause against prospective jurors who indicated a potential bias in favor of police testimony but did not provide unequivocal assurances of impartiality.

    Holding

    Yes, because potential jurors who express possible bias must be excused unless they provide “unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of ensuring an impartial jury. CPL 270.20 (1) (b) allows a prospective juror to be challenged for cause if they evince “a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial.” The Court relied on precedent, stating that potential jurors who express possible bias must be excused unless they provide “unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.” The Court noted that although the record could have been more definitive, the jurors’ demonstrative responses sufficiently indicated possible bias. The trial court should have obtained unequivocal assurances of impartiality but failed to do so. Because the defense exhausted its peremptory challenges after the trial court denied the challenges for cause, the error was reversible. The court referenced CPL 270.20 [2] to reinforce the ruling on reversible error.

  • People v. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644 (2001): Excusing Jurors for Cause Based on Impartiality

    People v. Bludson, 97 N.Y.2d 644 (2001)

    A prospective juror who expresses doubt about their ability to be impartial based on the law must be excused unless they unequivocally state on the record that they can be fair.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial. The court held that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding two prospective jurors who expressed doubts about their ability to render an impartial verdict. One juror indicated that they would require the defense to prove the defendant’s innocence, and another stated that the defendant’s failure to testify would negatively influence their decision. Because the trial court failed to obtain unequivocal assurances of impartiality from these jurors, the defendant was prejudiced, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    During jury selection, defense counsel questioned prospective jurors about their ability to presume the defendant’s innocence, the prosecution’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify. One prospective juror stated that they would require the defense to prove the defendant’s innocence to return a not-guilty verdict. Another prospective juror indicated that the defendant’s failure to testify would make it difficult for them to find the defendant not guilty. The trial court did not take any corrective action after these statements. The defense challenged these jurors for cause, but the challenges were denied. The defendant then used peremptory challenges to remove both jurors, exhausting all of their peremptory challenges during jury selection.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding two prospective jurors who expressed doubts about their ability to render an impartial verdict.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prospective jurors’ statements cast serious doubt on their ability to render a fair verdict under the proper legal standards, and the trial court failed to obtain unequivocal assurances from them that they could reach a verdict based entirely on the court’s instructions on the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Criminal Procedure Law § 270.20 (1) (b), which allows a party to challenge a prospective juror for cause if the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence at the trial.” Citing People v. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358, 362, the court reiterated that “a juror who has revealed doubt, because of prior knowledge or opinion, about [his or] her ability to serve impartially must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that [he or] she can be fair.” The court found that the prospective jurors’ statements indicated a predisposition that would prevent them from fairly considering the evidence and following the court’s instructions. The court emphasized that the trial court had a duty to elicit an unequivocal assurance of impartiality from the jurors, and the jury panel’s earlier collective acknowledgement was insufficient. The court stated, “We conclude that the prospective jurors’ statements cast serious doubt on their ability to render a fair verdict under the proper legal standards. The trial court therefore was required to elicit some unequivocal assurance from the two prospective jurors that they were able to reach a verdict based entirely upon the court’s instructions on the law. The jury panel’s earlier collective acknowledgment that they would follow the court’s instructions was insufficient to constitute such an unequivocal declaration”. Because the defendant was forced to use peremptory challenges to remove these biased jurors, and because he subsequently exhausted all his peremptory challenges, the error was not harmless and a new trial was required.

  • People v. Bowling, 89 N.Y.2d 993 (1997): The Effect of Erroneous Denial of Challenges for Cause on Jury Selection

    People v. Bowling, 89 N.Y.2d 993 (1997)

    An erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error when the defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges before the jury selection is complete, even if the court offers an additional peremptory challenge at the end of the selection process.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause of two prospective jurors. He further argued that because he exhausted his peremptory challenges, the erroneous denial requires reversal. One juror expressed doubt about impartiality due to the nature of the victim’s injuries. The other was a law student interning at the prosecutor’s office. The Court of Appeals held that when a defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges after an erroneous denial for cause, reversal is required, even if an additional challenge is offered, especially where the initial denials were questionable. This decision reinforces the importance of impartial jury selection and protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Facts

    During jury selection, a prospective juror stated the victim’s injuries would likely prevent an impartial verdict and that she could not guarantee she would follow instructions regarding the justification defense. The defendant challenged her for cause, but the court denied the challenge. The defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove her.

    Another prospective juror was a law student interning at the Queens District Attorney’s Office, the prosecuting agency in this case. The defendant challenged this juror for cause, arguing her employment created an appearance of impropriety. The court denied the challenge after the juror asserted she could be impartial. The defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove her.

    The defendant exhausted his statutorily allotted peremptory challenges before the end of jury selection.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial court improperly denied his challenges for cause and that because he exhausted his peremptory challenges, reversal was required. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause regarding the two prospective jurors?

    2. Whether the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause constitutes reversible error when the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges, even if the court offers an additional peremptory challenge?

    Holding

    1. The dissenting justice argued yes, because one juror demonstrated actual bias, and the other had professional ties to the prosecutor’s office.

    2. Yes, because an erroneous ruling denying a challenge for cause constitutes reversible error when the defendant exhausts his peremptory challenges before the jury selection is complete, and offering an additional challenge at the last second does not cure the error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting Justice Smith argued that the trial court erred by denying the challenges for cause. He reasoned that the first juror did not provide adequate assurance of impartiality, and the second juror’s connection to the prosecutor’s office created an appearance of impropriety.

    The dissent further reasoned that under CPL 270.20(2), an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error if the defendant exhausts their peremptory challenges. The dissent emphasized that offering an additional peremptory challenge after the defendant has exhausted their statutory allotment does not negate the error, particularly when challenges for cause should have been granted in the first place.

    The dissent cited People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 97, stating: “It is well settled that an erroneous ruling by the court, denying a challenge for cause, constitutes reversible error when the defendant peremptorily challenges the prospective juror and his peremptory challenges are exhausted before the jury selection process is complete.”

    The dissent argued that it was an abuse of discretion to offer an extra peremptory challenge after eleven jurors had already been selected and the defendant had exhausted his challenges, suggesting this was an attempt to circumvent CPL 270.20(2). The dissent emphasized that reversal is necessary to ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.

  • People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000): Obtaining Unequivocal Assurance of Juror Impartiality

    People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000)

    When potential jurors express doubts about their ability to be impartial, trial judges must obtain an unequivocal assurance of their impartiality or excuse them for cause.

    Summary

    This case consolidates appeals concerning jury selection. The central issue is whether a challenge for cause should be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt about their impartiality, absent an unequivocal indication of their ability to set aside predispositions and fairly evaluate evidence. The Court of Appeals held that in such circumstances, the challenge for cause must be granted. The Court reasoned that the right to an impartial jury is fundamental, and when a juror expresses doubt, an explicit assurance of impartiality is required. Failure to obtain such assurance constitutes reversible error.

    Facts

    In People v. Johnson and Sharper, the defendants were tried for robbery. A prospective juror stated he had a friend in the DA’s office, dealt with prisoners and police officers, and had a great deal of trust and respect for police officers. He admitted he would favor police testimony more than civilian testimony. In People v. Reyes, the defendant was tried for selling heroin. A prospective juror expressed concern about drug activity near her son’s park, stating her emotional feelings might color her views and that she might have difficulty being open-minded due to the defendant’s prior convictions.

    Procedural History

    In Johnson and Sharper, the trial court denied the challenge for cause, the defendants used a peremptory challenge, exhausted all challenges, and were convicted. The Appellate Division reversed. In Reyes, the trial court denied challenges for cause and the defendant again used peremptory challenges, exhausted them, and was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a challenge for cause may properly be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt as to their impartiality in the case.
    2. Whether an unequivocal indication of a prospective juror’s ability to set aside any predisposition and fairly appraise the evidence is necessary before denying a challenge for cause.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.
    2. Yes, because in cases of “actual bias,” an unambiguous assurance of impartiality is required before a challenge for cause may be denied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that an accused’s right to trial by an impartial jury is a fundamental constitutional right. When potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must in some form give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence. The Court emphasized that the elimination of the “talismanic expurgatory oath” requirement in the Criminal Procedure Law gave trial judges both “greater flexibility and a greater responsibility” in determining which venirepersons should be excused for cause.

    The Court distinguished People v. Blyden, where a juror’s statement was deemed insufficient, and People v. Williams, where the jurors never expressed doubt that they could serve impartially. The Court quoted People v. Torpey, stating that “the prospective juror should be dismissed if there appears to be any possibility that his impressions might influence his verdict.” (People v Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361). The Court held that a bright-line standard exists: “a prospective juror who expresses partiality towards [one side] and cannot unequivocally promise to set aside this bias should be removed for cause.”

    In the cases at bar, the Court found that the potential jurors had openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case. The Court also noted that despite the Trial Judge stating that the jurors had expressed that they could be fair, the record did not support this statement. Therefore, the judges erred in failing to obtain unequivocal assurances, or excusing potential jurors for cause, when they openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case.

  • People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361 (1984): Actual Bias and Juror Impartiality Based on Defendant’s Reputation

    People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361 (1984)

    A prospective juror’s unfavorable impression of a defendant, stemming from hearing or reading about the defendant’s reputation apart from the specific crimes charged, can create actual bias and warrant a challenge for cause.

    Summary

    Thomas Torpey was convicted of criminal mischief, coercion, attempted assault, and conspiracy. The central issue on appeal was the trial court’s refusal to grant a challenge for cause against a prospective juror, Mrs. Raleigh, who had prior knowledge of Torpey’s alleged involvement with the Mafia and had formed a negative opinion of him based on media reports and information from her husband, a sheriff’s department investigator. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Mrs. Raleigh’s statements indicated a state of mind likely to preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that a juror’s bias can stem from a defendant’s reputation, not just opinions about the charged crime, and that general assurances of impartiality may not overcome such bias.

    Facts

    Thomas Torpey was indicted for crimes stemming from an incident at a bar, allegedly part of a conspiracy to extort money. During jury selection, Mrs. Raleigh revealed she had heard of Torpey before the incident, both through media reports linking him to organized crime and through her husband’s work as a sheriff’s department investigator. She admitted to forming a negative opinion of Torpey, associating him with the Mafia and hearing that he might be a “hit man.” She also conceded that it would “probably not” be fair to have someone with her frame of mind judging him.

    Procedural History

    Following a jury trial, Torpey was convicted of several charges. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause against Mrs. Raleigh. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Torpey appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on the denial of his challenge for cause and exhaustion of peremptory challenges.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause against a prospective juror who admitted to having a negative impression of the defendant based on prior media reports and information linking him to organized crime, thus creating a state of mind likely to preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict.

    Holding

    Yes, because Mrs. Raleigh’s statements demonstrated a state of mind likely to prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict based on the evidence. Her declarations aimed at purging her expressed bias revealed uncertainty and did not overcome the bias.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPL 270.20(1)(b) allows a challenge for cause when a prospective juror has a state of mind likely to preclude an impartial verdict. The court emphasized that this provision reflects the fundamental right to trial by an impartial jury. While prior cases often involved jurors expressing opinions on the defendant’s guilt for the charged crimes, the court clarified that actual bias isn’t limited to such situations, citing People v. Blyden, where a juror’s prejudice against minorities was grounds for a challenge for cause.

    The court found that Mrs. Raleigh’s association of Torpey with the Mafia and her impression that he was a “hit man” indicated a substantial risk that her predispositions would affect her ability to discharge her responsibilities. Even though the expurgatory oath is not automatically available under CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [b]), the court stated that a trial judge should require a prospective juror with a prima facie showing of actual bias to “expressly state that his prior state of mind * * * will not influence his verdict, and * * * that he will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence” (People v Biondo, 41 NY2d 483, 485).

    The court distinguished between jurors holding opinions about the charged crime (which might be addressed by trial evidence) and jurors holding negative impressions of the defendant’s overall reputation (which trial evidence might not alter). In the latter case, the court stated, “the prospective juror should be dismissed if there appears to be any possibility that his impressions of the defendant might influence his verdict.” Because Mrs. Raleigh’s declarations revealed uncertainty and did not overcome her expressed bias, the trial court erred in denying the challenge for cause. The court reiterated the importance of erring on the side of disqualification to ensure impartiality.

  • People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882 (1984): When Juror’s Bias Requires Removal for Cause

    People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882 (1984)

    A juror’s expression of abstract feelings about a defendant’s circumstances does not automatically require removal for cause if the juror expresses confidence in their ability to be fair and impartial.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a prospective juror’s biases require dismissal for cause. During jury selection for a case involving a Black defendant who had a child with a white girlfriend, two jurors expressed discomfort with interracial relationships but affirmed their ability to render a fair verdict. The defense’s challenge for cause was denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that abstract biases, without concrete evidence of an inability to be impartial, do not warrant removal for cause, especially when jurors affirm their capacity to be fair. The court emphasized the trial judge’s role in evaluating juror impartiality.

    Facts

    The defendant, a Black man, was on trial. During jury selection, two prospective jurors stated they did not associate with Black people and disapproved of interracial marriages. The defendant had a white girlfriend, and they had a child together, although they were unmarried. The jurors stated that these circumstances would not interfere with their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. Defense counsel did not pursue further questioning of the jurors after being given the opportunity.

    Procedural History

    The defense counsel’s application to excuse the two prospective jurors for cause was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s application to excuse two prospective jurors for cause, given their expressed disapproval of interracial relationships and the fact that the defendant had a child with a white girlfriend.

    Holding

    No, because the jurors expressed confidence in their ability to be fair and impartial, and there was no concrete indication that their feelings would affect their ability to serve on the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Blyden, where a juror volunteered a specific, individualized opposition to minorities and expressed uncertainty about his ability to be impartial. In this case, the jurors only expressed abstract feelings and affirmed their ability to be fair. The court stated, “It is only when it is shown that there is a substantial risk that such predispositions will affect the ability of the particular juror to discharge his responsibilities… that his excuse is warranted.” The court deferred to the trial judge’s judgment, emphasizing the judge’s opportunity to evaluate the jurors’ demeanor and sincerity. The court recognized that jurors bring predispositions to the jury box, but not every predisposition warrants removal for cause. A potential juror who discloses anything but total absence of prejudice with respect to racial differences should not be removed if he demonstrates a readiness to lay his feelings aside in the discharge of his duties as a juror.

  • People v. Provenzano, 50 N.Y.2d 420 (1980): Determining Juror Impartiality Based on Limited Political Association

    People v. Provenzano, 50 N.Y.2d 420 (1980)

    A potential juror’s generalized support for a political party or attendance at rallies does not automatically create a relationship likely to preclude impartial jury service; a more direct and personal connection is required.

    Summary

    Anthony Provenzano and Harold Konigsberg were convicted of murder. The Appellate Division reversed, citing the trial court’s refusal to dismiss a juror, Mrs. Thomas, who had campaigned for the prosecutor in a prior election. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the limited political association between the juror and prosecutor did not, as a matter of law, create a relationship likely to preclude impartial jury service. The court distinguished this case from situations involving direct and personal relationships, emphasizing that generalized political support is insufficient to mandate disqualification. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider other arguments raised by the defendants.

    Facts

    Anthony Castellito, a union official, disappeared in 1961. Fifteen years later, Anthony Provenzano and Harold Konigsberg were charged and convicted of his murder based on circumstantial evidence, admissions, and accomplice testimony.

    During jury selection, a potential juror, Mrs. Thomas, revealed she had met the trial prosecutor, Michael Kavanagh, at political rallies and belonged to the same political club. She had campaigned for Kavanagh when he ran for District Attorney, as part of her support for her entire party’s ticket.

    The defense challenged Mrs. Thomas for cause, but the trial court denied the challenge. The defense then used a peremptory challenge to remove her, eventually exhausting all peremptory challenges.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Provenzano and Konigsberg of first-degree murder.

    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction based solely on the trial court’s refusal to dismiss juror Thomas for cause and ordered a new trial.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the relationship between a potential juror and the trial prosecutor, based on limited political association and generalized support during an election campaign, is of such a nature that it is likely to preclude the juror from rendering an impartial verdict, thus requiring dismissal for cause under CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [c]).

    Holding

    No, because the relationship was not of such a direct and personal nature that it was likely to preclude the juror from rendering an impartial verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [c]) disqualifies potential jurors who bear a relationship to the defendant, victim, witness, or attorneys that is “likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict.” The court distinguished this case from People v. Branch, where a juror’s close professional and social relationship with the prosecuting attorney warranted disqualification.

    The court emphasized the difference between generalized political support and direct, personal involvement. Mrs. Thomas’s limited association with the prosecutor, stemming from shared political affiliation and campaign support for the party ticket, did not demonstrate a relationship that would likely bias her. The court stated, “Merely generalized support for the candidates of one party or attendance at political rallies does not signal a relationship which would preclude fairness on the part of a prospective juror.”

    While the District Attorney conceded that he would consent to the challenge in similar circumstances, and the trial judge perhaps should have erred on the side of caution, the Court of Appeals found that the failure to disqualify Mrs. Thomas was not, as a matter of law, reversible error. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for consideration of the defendants’ other arguments.

  • People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d 645 (1979): Disqualification of Juror Due to Relationship with Prosecutor

    People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d 645 (1979)

    A prospective juror’s professional and personal relationship with the prosecuting attorney can disqualify them from serving on a jury if the relationship is likely to preclude them from rendering an impartial verdict, regardless of the juror’s declaration of impartiality.

    Summary

    Defendants Vernon and Vraden Branch were convicted of murder and robbery. During jury selection, a prospective juror, Scott, revealed he was a part-time police officer who had worked closely with the prosecutor and had socialized with him. The defense challenged Scott for cause, arguing his relationship with the prosecutor would compromise his impartiality. The trial court denied the challenge after Scott stated he could be impartial. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions, holding the denial was reversible error. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling Scott’s relationship with the prosecutor made him unsuitable for jury service, and an expurgatory oath was insufficient to overcome this disqualification.

    Facts

    James Scott, a prospective juror, was a part-time police officer in Poestenkill for three years.

    In his capacity as a police officer, Scott worked in conjunction with the Rensselaer County District Attorney’s office, including the trial attorney in the case.

    Scott and the prosecutor had developed a personal relationship, occasionally socializing together.

    Despite these relationships, Scott stated he could render an impartial verdict.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree in a joint jury trial.

    On appeal to the Appellate Division, the defendants argued the trial court erred in denying their challenge for cause to excuse a venireman from the jury.

    The Appellate Division reversed the judgments of conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the denial of the challenge for cause constituted reversible error.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in allowing Scott, a part-time police officer with a personal relationship with the prosecutor, to participate as a juror in the case.

    Holding

    Yes, because Scott’s professional and personal relationship with the People’s trial attorney rendered him unsuitable for jury service under CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [c]), and the expurgatory oath is unavailable where this statutory provision disqualifies a juror.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [c]), which disqualifies a juror if “he bears some other relationship to any such person [e.g., the defendant or either counsel] of such nature that it is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict.”

    The court found that Scott’s relationship fell squarely within this provision. As a part-time police officer who had direct contact with the District Attorney’s office and had worked directly with the prosecutor, their professional contact had grown into a personal relationship. This established, as a matter of law, that the nature of this relationship was “likely to preclude [Scott] from rendering an impartial verdict.”

    The court rejected the People’s argument that Scott’s expurgatory declarations allowed the court discretion in allowing him to serve, explaining that under the prior law, an expurgatory oath was not available where “implied bias” was shown. The court reasoned that the risk of prejudice arising out of the close relationship between the prospective juror and one of the key participants in the trial was so great that recital of an oath of impartiality could not convincingly dispel the taint.

    The court noted that the trial court should lean toward disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, stating, “Nothing is more basic to the criminal process than the right of an accused to a trial by an impartial jury…unless those who are called to decide the defendant’s guilt or innocence are free of bias.”

  • People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90 (1973): Excusing Jurors for Cause Based on Bias

    People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90 (1973)

    A prospective juror should be excused for cause if their statements or background demonstrate a state of mind that would prevent them from impartially trying the case, and the statutory oath designed to address potential bias must be administered completely and unequivocally.

    Summary

    Culhane and McGivern were convicted of felony murder. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions due to the trial court’s erroneous refusal to excuse four prospective jurors for cause after they expressed bias or demonstrated a background that suggested partiality. The court emphasized that when a defendant’s peremptory challenges are exhausted, an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error. The court found that the expurgatory oath, designed to remove bias, was either not properly administered or was contradicted by the jurors’ subsequent statements, thus warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Culhane, Bowerman, and McGivern, prisoners, were being transported when an incident occurred resulting in the death of Deputy Sheriff Fitzgerald and prisoner Bowerman. Culhane and McGivern were subsequently charged with felony murder. Prior to and during the trial, the case received extensive local media coverage. During jury selection, many prospective jurors admitted to having knowledge of the case and forming opinions about the defendants’ guilt. Several potential jurors were also correction officers, as were the victim and a key witness.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in Ulster County Court after a second trial, the first having resulted in a hung jury. They appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals because the death penalty was imposed. The Appellate Division had previously denied their motions for a change of venue. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to excuse certain prospective jurors for cause, thereby violating the defendants’ right to an impartial jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prospective jurors demonstrated actual bias or a background suggesting partiality, and the expurgatory oath was either not properly administered or was contradicted by subsequent statements, thus warranting a new trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to excuse four prospective jurors for cause. The court noted that under the law at the time (Code Crim. Pro., § 376), a juror could be challenged for “actual bias,” defined as a state of mind that would prevent them from trying the issue impartially. While prior opinions were not automatically disqualifying if the juror declared on oath that the opinion would not influence their verdict and the court was satisfied, the court found these jurors demonstrated bias that was not properly addressed.

    Specifically, the court examined the voir dire of each juror. Some jurors openly admitted to having formed opinions about the defendants’ guilt, while others, like corrections officer Davis, expressed views suggesting they would be less likely to believe testimony from prisoners. Regarding the expurgatory oath, the court emphasized that it must be administered completely and unequivocally. “It is not enough to be able to point to detached language which, alone considered, would seem to meet the statute requirement, if, on construing the whole declaration together, it is apparent that the juror is not able to express an absolute belief that his opinion will not influence his verdict”. In this case, the oath was either not administered at all, administered incompletely, or contradicted by the jurors’ subsequent statements. As an example, “Venireman Davis, the corrections officer who found it ‘rather difficult’ to believe prisoners or to accept the possibility that the defendants had not attempted to escape, was never given an oath whatsoever, either in whole or in part.” Because the trial court failed to ensure an impartial jury, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The court also suggested that a change of venue might be advisable for the new trial, given the extensive pre-trial publicity.