New York Law Review

Tag: Censure

  • Matter of Shaw, 96 N.Y.2d 7 (2001): Scope of Review for Judicial Conduct Determinations

    96 N.Y.2d 7 (2001)

    The New York Court of Appeals’ review of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct is limited to the record of the proceedings upon which the Commission’s original determination was based; the Court lacks jurisdiction to review subsequent orders, such as a denial of a motion to renew or reconsider based on newly discovered evidence.

    Summary

    A Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County, sought review of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct that sustained a charge of misconduct and censured him for inappropriate conduct toward his secretary. After the Commission’s determination, the Justice moved to reconsider based on new evidence suggesting the secretary fabricated her accusations. The Commission denied the motion. The Court of Appeals held that its review was limited to the original determination and it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to reconsider, even if the evidence suggested perjury. The Court accepted the determined sanction of censure.

    Facts

    Jacqueline Bland, the petitioner’s secretary, alleged that the Justice made inappropriate remarks about her physical appearance and sex life, touched her without consent, and kissed her without consent. Caroline Rucker corroborated some of Bland’s testimony. The Justice denied the allegations, claiming they were retaliatory. His law clerk testified he never saw Bland upset except when disciplined. Fourteen character witnesses testified to the Justice’s good moral character. After the Commission determined censure was appropriate, Shelley Williams provided an affidavit stating that Rucker admitted to fabricating the charges. The Justice moved for reconsideration based on this new evidence.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained one charge of misconduct and censured the Justice. The Justice moved for reconsideration based on new evidence, which the Commission denied. The Court of Appeals dismissed the request to review the denial of the motion to reconsider. The Justice sought review of the original censure determination by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the Commission’s denial of a motion to reconsider its original censure determination based on newly discovered evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the Court of Appeals’ review is limited to the record of the proceedings upon which the Commission’s original determination was based. The Constitution and Judiciary Law do not confer jurisdiction to review orders denying motions to renew or reconsider.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court’s reasoning focused on the constitutional and statutory limitations of its review power. The Court cited Article VI, § 22 (a) and (d) of the New York State Constitution and Judiciary Law § 44, emphasizing that the Court’s review is limited to the Commission’s original determination of admonishment, censure, or removal, based solely on the record before the Commission at the time of that original determination. The Court stated that nothing in these provisions allows the Court to review other orders, such as the denial of a motion to renew or reconsider. The Court stated it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial, regardless of any potential merit in the new evidence. The court emphasized that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. Judge Rosenblatt concurred, expressing concern about the process but agreeing on the jurisdictional issue. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the Court should review the events subsequent to the original decision, especially considering the due process claims concerning the fairness of the proceedings. The dissent argued that the Commission had, in effect, reconsidered its decision and the Court should not ignore that evidence.

  • Matter of Roberts, 87 N.Y.2d 362 (1995): Judicial Misconduct in Setting Bail

    Matter of Roberts, 87 N.Y.2d 362 (1995)

    A judge’s failure to adhere to statutory requirements regarding bail in non-felony cases, even if motivated by compassion or a belief in the defendant’s best interests, constitutes judicial misconduct, though the appropriate sanction depends on the frequency, egregiousness, and underlying intent of the actions.

    Summary

    A judge was investigated for allegedly abusing the bail process in non-felony cases. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that the judge engaged in misconduct by improperly committing defendants to jail without setting bail as required by New York law. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination and, while agreeing that the judge had committed legal errors, found that the Commission overstated the number and nature of the improper acts. Considering the judge’s motivations and contrition, the Court of Appeals reduced the sanction from removal to censure.

    Facts

    A Judge of the Saratoga Springs City Court was investigated regarding his bail decisions in approximately 50 non-felony cases between 1986 and 1989. The investigation revealed instances where the judge committed defendants to jail without setting bail, contrary to the requirement of CPL 530.20 (1) for non-felony offenses. In some instances, bail amounts were set on arrest or bench warrants outside of the presence of the defendant. Representatives from the Public Defender’s office and Sheriff’s department had informed the judge that commitments without bail in such cases were improper.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a formal complaint against the judge, alleging misconduct and violations of judicial conduct rules. The judge and the Commission’s Administrator entered an agreed statement of facts, waiving a formal hearing. The Commission sustained most charges and ordered the judge’s removal from office. The judge sought review by the New York Court of Appeals, which has the authority to review the Commission’s findings and impose a different sanction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Commission’s interpretation of CPL 530.20 mandates recognizance or bail in all nonfelony cases, regardless of whether the defendant applies for it?

    2. Whether the judge’s actions constituted judicial misconduct warranting removal from office, given the specific facts, motivations, and mitigating circumstances?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court has a duty to order bail or recognizance in a non-felony case at the time of arraignment, as indicated by CPL 170.10(7), irrespective of an application by the defendant.

    2. No, because while the judge committed legal errors by failing to set bail in some cases, the Commission overstated the extent and nature of the misconduct, and the judge’s actions were often motivated by compassion, contrition and cooperation merited a less severe sanction than removal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the judge’s argument that CPL 530.20 only requires setting bail upon application by the defendant, citing CPL 170.10 (7) as imposing a duty on the court to order recognizance or bail at arraignment. The court noted that requiring an application would be impractical and that the judge had conceded defendants are generally entitled to recognizance or bail in non-felony cases.

    However, the court found that the Commission overstated the extent of the misconduct, pointing out flaws in the Commission’s methodology, such as treating repeated continuations of a single defendant’s case as separate instances of misconduct. The court also found that the Commission failed to account for instances where the failure to set bail was justified (e.g., post-conviction confinement, tactical maneuvers for the defendant’s benefit, or specific legal provisions authorizing commitment without bail).

    The court acknowledged a category of cases where the judge believed psychiatric examinations were necessary and committed defendants without bail to ensure their attendance, finding that the law was sufficiently debatable as to whether this constituted misconduct. The court gave credence to the judge’s uncontroverted testimony in other cases, concluding that charges of misconduct were not sustained. The court found the judge had acted improperly in approximately 24 cases by failing to set bail without legal justification, including instances where defendants missed court appearances, were homeless or preferred to remain in jail, or lacked proper identification.

    The Court emphasized that the judge’s actions were not motivated by self-interest, vindictiveness, bias, or venality, but primarily by compassion. He was forthright, cooperative, and contrite in the proceedings. The court determined that removal was too harsh a sanction and imposed censure instead.

    The court noted, “Nothing in this record suggests that petitioner acted to advance his own interests over those of the defendants or that he was vindictive, biased, abusive or venal. On the contrary, it appears that, to the extent that petitioner’s actions were improper, they were motivated primarily by compassion for those whose problems do not belong in the criminal courts.”

  • In the Matter of Kelso, 61 N.Y.2d 82 (1984): Judicial Censure for Misconduct Unrelated to Judicial Duties

    In the Matter of Kelso, 61 N.Y.2d 82 (1984)

    A judge may be censured for misconduct, even when the misconduct is unrelated to the judge’s official duties, but removal from the bench is not warranted unless the misconduct erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

    Summary

    Judge Kelso was charged with violating the Code of Judicial Conduct due to misconduct stemming from his private legal practice. Kelso misled a client, Duryea, regarding a personal injury claim, offered Duryea money not to file a grievance, and was suspended from practicing law. The Court of Appeals found Kelso’s actions improper but determined that removal from the bench was too severe. The court considered that Duryea suffered no prejudice, Kelso never profited, Kelso was cooperative, and his judicial performance was unaffected. Instead, the court imposed a censure, finding it sufficient to address the misconduct while preserving Kelso’s judicial service.

    Facts

    Kelso, an Acting Village Justice and Town Court Justice, was retained by Duryea in 1972 for a work-related injury claim. After settling the workers’ compensation claim in 1975, Duryea asked Kelso to file a personal injury lawsuit against his employer. Knowing this was barred by the Workers’ Compensation Law, Kelso filed the suit years later, after the statute of limitations had also expired, without informing Duryea. Kelso misrepresented the case’s progress to Duryea over four years. In 1980, Kelso offered Duryea $10,000 not to file a grievance, which Duryea rejected, leading to Kelso’s one-year suspension from legal practice. Duryea then sued Kelso for malpractice, settling for $1,500.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct served Kelso with a formal complaint in October 1982, alleging violations of Canons 1, 2(A), and 3(A)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission recommended Kelso’s removal from the bench. Kelso appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Judge Kelso’s misconduct in his private legal practice warrants his removal from the bench, considering his violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

    Holding

    No, because while Judge Kelso’s misrepresentations and offer to prevent a grievance were improper, they do not necessitate removal from the bench given the lack of prejudice to the client, Kelso’s cooperation, absence of personal gain, and his continued faithful performance of his judicial duties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the Commission’s recommendation of removal, finding it too harsh a sanction. The court emphasized its power to review facts and determine the appropriate penalty under Judiciary Law § 44(9). The court noted that Canon 3(A)(1) was improperly applied as it pertains to judicial duties, not private conduct. While Kelso’s actions were deemed improper, the court considered mitigating factors: Duryea suffered no actual prejudice because the civil action was barred regardless; Kelso never received fees or retained funds; and Kelso cooperated with the investigation. The court stated, “We consider how and to what extent the wrongful behavior erodes the important interest of protecting the esteemed position which the judiciary must hold before society in order to carry out its duties effectively.” The court also acknowledged Kelso’s past depression and his otherwise unblemished record. Ultimately, the court concluded that censure was sufficient, as Kelso’s conduct “marred the integrity of the Bench, but it does not rise to a level where it must be concluded that petitioner can no longer serve effectively or that his continued services will be contrary to the best interests of the judiciary.” The court distinguished this case from those warranting removal by focusing on the lack of harm to a litigant or the integrity of the judicial process itself.

  • Matter of Cunningham, 57 N.Y.2d 270 (1982): Judicial Censure vs. Removal for Appearance of Impropriety

    Matter of Cunningham, 57 N.Y.2d 270 (1982)

    Judicial removal is an extreme sanction reserved for truly egregious circumstances; the appearance of impropriety, while misconduct, does not automatically warrant removal and may be sufficiently addressed by censure.

    Summary

    Judge Cunningham was found by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct to have engaged in misconduct based on two letters he wrote to another judge regarding appeals of cases from the latter’s court. In these letters, Cunningham appeared to indicate he would always affirm the other judge’s decisions. The Commission ordered Cunningham’s removal from office. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination, finding Cunningham’s actions improper but deemed removal an excessive penalty. The court found his misconduct was rooted in creating the appearance of impropriety, not in actually prejudging cases, and imposed the lesser sanction of censure.

    Facts

    Judge Cunningham, a County Court Judge, wrote two letters to Judge Sardino of the Syracuse City Court concerning appeals from Judge Sardino’s decisions. The first letter involved three cases where Cunningham was quoted criticizing Sardino’s handling. To appease Sardino, Cunningham wrote that he would never change a sentence Sardino imposed and that Sardino could do whatever he wanted and Cunningham would agree. The second letter concerned another appeal where Cunningham, after learning Sardino was upset he signed an order to show cause, wrote he would affirm on a judge’s discretion. Ultimately, Cunningham heard one appeal and reversed Judge Sardino’s determination, criticizing Sardino’s sentencing.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct served a complaint upon Judge Cunningham containing two charges of misconduct. Cunningham and the administrator of the commission signed an agreed statement of facts, waiving the right to a hearing and stipulating that the determination be made by the commission on the agreed facts. The commission determined Cunningham should be removed from the Bench. Cunningham sought review of the commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination to remove Judge Cunningham from office for creating the appearance of impropriety was an appropriate sanction, or whether a lesser sanction, such as censure, was more fitting given the circumstances.

    Holding

    No, because removal is an extreme sanction reserved for truly egregious circumstances, and Cunningham’s actions, while improper, did not warrant such a severe penalty; censure is the appropriate sanction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Judge Cunningham’s letters created the appearance of impropriety and constituted judicial misconduct. However, the court emphasized its authority under Judiciary Law § 44(9) to review the commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo, allowing it to accept or reject the commission’s sanction. The court found that Cunningham’s reversal of Judge Sardino’s decision in People v. Bucktooth indicated he did not completely abdicate his appellate duty. The court stated, “[R]emoval is an extreme sanction and should be imposed only in the event of truly egregious circumstances.” The court found support for censure instead of removal in several factors: Cunningham’s reversal of Sardino’s decision, the fact that the letters were intended only for Judge Sardino’s eyes, and that the public attention to the letters arose from unforeseen circumstances. Ultimately, the court determined that, while Cunningham’s behavior was misconduct, censure was a more appropriate sanction, emphasizing that removal should not be ordered for conduct that amounts simply to poor judgment. The court noted, “[A] Judge must view matters before him on their merits alone, without regard to public or professional disapproval. Moreover, a Judge must also avoid creating the appearance that he would decide a matter before him in any other manner.”

  • Matter of Quinn, 54 N.Y.2d 370 (1981): Sanctions for Judicial Misconduct and Alcoholism

    Matter of Quinn, 54 N.Y.2d 370 (1981)

    When a judge’s misconduct is linked to alcoholism and the judge has already resigned due to ill health, censure and acceptance of resignation may be a more appropriate sanction than removal, balancing the need for public confidence in the judiciary with considerations of disability.

    Summary

    This case concerns a New York Supreme Court Justice, Quinn, facing removal for multiple instances of driving under the influence of alcohol and related misconduct. Prior to the Commission on Judicial Conduct’s recommendation for removal, Quinn resigned due to alcoholism and cancer. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether removal was appropriate given Quinn’s health and resignation, ultimately deciding that censure and acceptance of his resignation better served the public interest. The court emphasized its broad power to determine appropriate sanctions for judicial misconduct.

    Facts

    Justice Quinn was elected as a Justice of the Supreme Court in 1974. In 1975, he had three encounters with the police involving alcohol, including being found asleep behind the wheel. He pleaded guilty to driving while impaired. In 1977, he was formally admonished for his drinking habits by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. In 1979, he was again arrested for driving under the influence; he was abusive to the arresting officer and invoked his judicial office. His blood alcohol content was .18%. He pleaded guilty to driving with greater than .10% alcohol in his blood. He joined an alcoholic rehabilitation program, but initially resisted fingerprinting.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a complaint charging Quinn with judicial misconduct. A referee recommended sustaining the charges and dismissing Quinn’s defenses, including alcoholism. Quinn submitted his resignation and applied for retirement due to ill health (cancer) before the commission determined he should be removed. The Commission ordered Quinn’s removal. Quinn requested review by the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the sanction of removal from judicial office is appropriate for a judge, suffering from alcoholism and cancer, who has engaged in repeated instances of driving under the influence and who had submitted his resignation prior to the commission’s recommended determination of removal?

    Holding

    No, because under the specific circumstances, including the judge’s resignation due to failing health, censure and acceptance of the resignation better served the public interest than outright removal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged its broad constitutional power to determine the facts and appropriate sanction in matters involving judicial conduct. It found no basis to set aside the Commission’s factual findings regarding Quinn’s misconduct. The court stated, “Here the petitioner’s public drinking and notorious involvements with the law over a span of several years, can only have resulted in irretrievable loss of public confidence in his ability to properly carry out his judicial responsibilities.” The court recognized alcoholism as an illness and a type of disability, citing both federal and state laws. It distinguished between removal for cause (misconduct) and mandatory retirement (mental or physical disability). Though the complaint only charged misconduct, the court reasoned it could achieve a similar effect to mandatory retirement by censuring Quinn and acknowledging his resignation. The court also noted that Quinn’s resignation, tendered due to his inability to perform his duties because of ill health, offered a satisfactory solution. Giving effect to the resignation did not undermine the policy against judges resigning to avoid removal because of the particular circumstances of this case. The court ultimately imposed the lesser sanction of censure and acknowledged Quinn’s resignation, allowing him to retire.

  • In the Matter of ROGERS, 51 N.Y.2d 224 (1980): Sanction for Failure to Respond to Judicial Commission Inquiries

    In the Matter of ROGERS, 51 N.Y.2d 224 (1980)

    A judge’s failure to respond to inquiries from the Commission on Judicial Conduct and failure to report or remit moneys, while constituting misconduct, may warrant censure rather than removal, especially when the judge has addressed the issues and demonstrates a commitment to fulfilling their duties.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed a determination by the Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove petitioner Rogers from his position as a Town Justice. Rogers admitted to failing to respond to commission inquiries and to failing to report or remit moneys during a specified period. The court, while acknowledging the misconduct, found the sanction of removal too harsh. Considering Rogers’ circumstances as a dairy farmer serving his community, his subsequent efforts to rectify the reporting issues, and his demonstrated commitment to the position, the court determined that censure was the more appropriate sanction. The court emphasized the importance of the voters’ choice and the judge’s demonstrated willingness to fulfill his responsibilities.

    Facts

    Rogers, a dairy farmer, was elected as a Town Justice at the request of both political parties. He initially filed required reports but struggled to balance his judicial duties with his farming responsibilities. He failed to respond to inquiries from the Commission on Judicial Conduct and failed to report or remit moneys from June 1978 through August 1979. Rogers considered resigning but decided against it due to personal and financial sacrifices already made, and a belief that someone living and working in the community should hold the office. Rogers filed the overdue 1978 and 1979 reports in October 1979 and filed the September through November 1979 reports late in December 1979.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that Rogers should be removed as a Town Justice. Rogers challenged the commission’s procedures. The Court of Appeals reviewed the commission’s determination and Rogers’ arguments.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the appropriate sanction for a Town Justice who failed to respond to inquiries from the Commission on Judicial Conduct and failed to report or remit moneys is removal from office or a lesser sanction, such as censure, when the judge has taken steps to rectify the issues and demonstrates a commitment to fulfilling the duties of the office.

    Holding

    No, because considering the circumstances, Rogers’ demonstrated commitment to his judicial role, and his efforts to rectify his reporting deficiencies, censure is the more appropriate sanction than removal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged Rogers’ misconduct in failing to respond to commission inquiries and failing to report or remit moneys. However, the court considered mitigating factors, including Rogers’ initial difficulties balancing his judicial and farming duties, his decision not to resign despite the challenges, his belief in serving his community, and his subsequent efforts to rectify the reporting issues. The court noted that Rogers had filed the overdue reports before the commission’s sanction determination. The court distinguished this case from cases involving failures to deposit moneys received in an official account. The Court emphasized that Rogers was the elected choice of the voters and his difficulties appeared to have been overcome. The court stated that while it did not condone the failures, Rogers’ decision not to resign and his bringing of the review proceeding suggested a willingness to discharge the responsibilities of office. The court concluded that censure was a more appropriate sanction than removal. The court referenced Judiciary Law, §44, subd 9 as providing for alternative sanctions. Dissenting and concurring opinions were not explicitly mentioned in the opinion.