New York Law Review

Tag: Catu Violation

  • People v. Pignataro, 22 N.Y.3d 381 (2013): Constitutionality of Resentencing Statutes After Catu Violation

    People v. Pignataro, 22 N.Y.3d 381 (2013)

    Penal Law § 70.85, which allows resentencing to the original determinate sentence without post-release supervision (PRS) after a Catu violation, is a constitutional legislative remedy that does not violate a defendant’s right to vacate an involuntary plea.

    Summary

    Defendant Pignataro pleaded guilty to attempted assault but was not informed of the mandatory PRS. After People v. Catu established this as a constitutional defect, the legislature enacted Penal Law § 70.85, allowing resentencing to the original term without PRS. Pignataro challenged his resentencing under this statute, arguing it unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to withdraw his plea. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute is constitutional because it addresses the Catu violation by ensuring the defendant receives the sentence contemplated during the plea, making the plea knowing and voluntary.

    Facts

    In 2000, Anthony Pignataro pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree assault. The trial court stated he would receive a 5-to-15-year determinate sentence but did not mention the mandatory PRS term. In 2001, Pignataro was sentenced to 15 years without PRS. Following the 2005 decision in People v. Catu, which found that failure to inform a defendant of mandatory PRS renders a plea involuntary, Pignataro challenged his plea in state and federal courts. In 2010, the prosecution sought resentencing under Penal Law § 70.85, which permitted reimposing the original sentence without PRS. Pignataro argued the new statute was unconstitutional, but the court resentenced him to 15 years without PRS.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court resentenced Pignataro under Penal Law § 70.85. The Appellate Division affirmed. Pignataro appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Penal Law § 70.85 was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penal Law § 70.85 is unconstitutional because it denies a defendant the right to vacate a guilty plea that was defective under People v. Catu.

    Holding

    No, because Penal Law § 70.85 is a constitutionally permissible legislative remedy that ensures a defendant, no longer subject to PRS, pleaded guilty with awareness of the direct consequences of the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that under People v. Catu, a guilty plea made without informing the defendant of a mandatory PRS term violates the State Constitution. The Court distinguished the case from its prior holdings rejecting resentencing schemes. Previously, courts lacked statutory authority to impose a determinate sentence without PRS, leading to unauthorized creative sentencing. Penal Law § 70.85 provides this authority.

    The Court reasoned that the legislature has the power to amend sentencing laws. Because the legislature changed the sentencing laws, Pignataro’s plea became knowing and voluntary. Section 70.85 ensures a defendant whose plea is vulnerable to a Catu challenge is sentenced without PRS, consistent with the initial plea agreement and the defendant’s understanding. The Court stated, “Section 70.85 ensures that defendant, who is no longer subject to PRS, pleaded guilty with the requisite awareness of the direct consequences of his plea.”

    The Court explicitly rejected the argument that section 70.85 was merely a statutory version of previously rejected remedies. Instead, it found the statute was a valid legislative response addressing the constitutional defect identified in Catu.

  • People v. McAlpin, 17 N.Y.3d 936 (2011): Consequences for Violating a Plea Agreement Must Be Accurately Stated

    17 N.Y.3d 936 (2011)

    When a court advises a defendant of the potential consequences of violating a plea agreement, it must accurately describe all possible penalties, including post-release supervision (PRS), to ensure the defendant’s plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    Summary

    McAlpin pleaded guilty to robbery with the understanding he’d be a youthful offender and receive probation if he met certain conditions. The court warned that violating the agreement could lead to a prison sentence. McAlpin violated the agreement, and the court imposed a prison sentence with post-release supervision (PRS). On appeal, McAlpin argued the court failed to mention PRS when outlining the potential consequences of violating the agreement, thus violating the Catu rule. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, holding that because the court failed to mention PRS when outlining the possible penalties, McAlpin’s plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    Facts

    McAlpin was arrested for forcibly taking an electronic game console from a subway passenger. He was indicted on robbery charges. He pleaded guilty to one count of robbery. The court placed him on interim probation, stating that if he adhered to the probation conditions, he would be treated as a youthful offender and receive probation. The court also stated that if he failed to meet these conditions, he would receive a prison sentence between 3 ½ and 15 years. The court did not mention post-release supervision at the plea proceeding.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially accepted McAlpin’s guilty plea with the conditions for youthful offender status. After McAlpin violated the conditions, the Supreme Court imposed a prison sentence with PRS. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment, vacated the plea, and reinstated the indictment, finding a Catu violation. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court’s failure to mention post-release supervision (PRS) during a plea proceeding when outlining the potential consequences of violating a plea agreement requires reversal and vacatur of the plea.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a court elects to advise a defendant of the consequences of violating a plea agreement, it must reference all potential penalties, including PRS, to ensure the defendant’s plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the court referenced only a prison term and omitted the possibility of post-release supervision, McAlpin was given an inaccurate impression of the sentencing options available to the court. The court distinguished this case from People v. Murray (15 N.Y.3d 725 (2010)), where the defendant had ample opportunity to object to the sentence before it was formally imposed. In this case, the court first mentioned PRS moments before imposing the sentence. The court was also unconvinced that a brief remark by the court at sentencing about previously advising McAlpin about PRS conclusively established that McAlpin was properly advised before accepting the plea. The court reasoned, “There is no indication in the record that the court or either counsel had reviewed the plea transcript or had focused specifically on whether, during the plea proceeding, the court had discussed the possibility of postrelease supervision—a potential sentence that was not part of the original agreement.”