Matter of Cassidy v. Municipal Civil Service Commission of the City of New Rochelle, 37 N.Y.2d 526 (1975)
New York Civil Service Law § 61, allowing appointment of any one of the top three candidates on an eligible list, is constitutional because the New York Constitution mandates appointments based on merit and fitness ascertained by examination “as far as practicable,” not solely by examination scores.
Summary
Cassidy, the highest-ranking candidate on a promotional examination for Housing Code Enforcement Supervisor, challenged the Municipal Civil Service Commission’s appointment of the second-highest-ranking candidate. Cassidy argued that Article V, Section 6 of the New York Constitution mandates appointment of the highest-scoring candidate and that Civil Service Law § 61, which allows selection from the top three, is unconstitutional. The court upheld the constitutionality of § 61, reasoning that the Constitution’s “as far as practicable” language acknowledges that factors beyond examination scores are relevant to determining merit and fitness for civil service positions.
Facts
Cassidy achieved the highest score on a promotional examination for the position of Housing Code Enforcement Supervisor.
The Municipal Civil Service Commission (the “Commission”) appointed the candidate who received the second-highest score.
Cassidy initiated an Article 78 proceeding, arguing the Commission was obligated to appoint him due to his higher score and that Civil Service Law § 61 was unconstitutional.
Procedural History
The case was brought directly to the New York Court of Appeals from Special Term on constitutional grounds.
Special Term declared Civil Service Law § 61 constitutional and dismissed Cassidy’s petition.
Issue(s)
Whether Civil Service Law § 61 violates Article V, Section 6 of the New York Constitution by allowing the appointment of someone other than the highest-scoring candidate on a civil service examination.
Whether the petitioner’s due process rights were violated.
Holding
1. No, because the New York Constitution mandates appointments based on merit and fitness “as far as practicable,” acknowledging factors beyond exam scores. 2. No, because the petitioner does not possess any mandated right to appointment or any other legally protectible interest.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the phrase “as far as practicable” in Article V, Section 6 of the New York Constitution demonstrates that examination scores are not the sole determinant of fitness. It emphasizes that other factors can be considered in civil service appointments. The Court stated, “The Constitution provides that to an extent those questions [of merit and fitness] are to be determined by an examination, but it is obvious that it was understood at that time that it would be impracticable to fully determine the merit and fitness of an employee or appointee by a mere examination whether competitive or otherwise.” (quoting People ex rel. Sweet v Lyman, 157 NY 368, 376).
The court noted that an individual’s ability to achieve a high examination score does not necessarily demonstrate their capacity to perform the actual duties of the position, nor can it reveal possible defects of personality, character or disposition.
The Court also rejected the due process claim, stating that Cassidy did not possess a mandated right to appointment, but merely a “hope” of appointment. Citing Hurley v Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 270 NY 275, 279, the court noted that even successfully passing a test does not create a vested right to the position.