Matter of La Pietra, 89 N.Y.2d 311 (1996)

A judicial candidate’s use of the phrase “law and order” in campaign literature, without more, does not automatically constitute judicial misconduct warranting disciplinary action.

Summary

A Justice of the Esopus Town Court, sought review of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, which sustained a charge of misconduct against her and imposed a sanction of admonition. The charge stemmed from the Justice’s campaign literature, where she identified herself as a “Law and order Candidate.” The Commission believed this phrase committed her to a pro-prosecution bias. The Court of Appeals reversed the Commission’s finding on the “law and order” charge, holding that the use of the phrase in judicial campaign literature, without more, does not amount to misconduct. The Court upheld the admonition based on a separate charge related to misrepresenting her educational background.

Facts

The petitioner, a Justice of the Esopus Town Court, was subject to a charge by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct based on her campaign activities. The first allegation was that she misrepresented her academic credentials in campaign literature, stating she was a “graduate” of “Judicial Law Course[s]” at various institutions, when in reality, she only had a high school diploma and had taken continuing education courses for court clerks. The second allegation was that she identified herself as a “Law and order Candidate” in her campaign literature.

Procedural History

The Referee who initially heard the complaint determined that the petitioner misled voters regarding her academic credentials, but found that the “law and order” allegation did not warrant disciplinary action. The Commission affirmed the Referee’s finding on the misrepresentation charge but rejected the Referee’s finding on the “law and order” charge, concluding that the phrase created the appearance that the petitioner would favor the prosecution. The Court of Appeals granted review.

Issue(s)

Whether a judicial candidate’s use of the phrase “law and order” in campaign literature constitutes an impermissible pledge or promise of conduct in office or a statement that commits or appears to commit the candidate with respect to cases likely to come before the court, in violation of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR 100.5 [A] [4] [d] [i], [ii]).

Holding

No, because the phrase “law and order” is widely and indiscriminately used in everyday parlance and election campaigns and does not, by itself, represent a commitment or pledge of conduct in office that compromises judicial impartiality.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Commission’s determination that the phrase “law and order” in judicial campaign literature amounted to misconduct. The court reasoned that the phrase is widely used and understood and should not automatically be treated as a commitment or pledge of conduct in office. The court acknowledged the Commission’s argument that the phrase, in light of its historical and political context, might convey the image of a criminal law conservative. However, the Court stated that even if this interpretation were accurate, the Commission had not sufficiently shown that the phrase inherently compromises judicial impartiality.

The Court distinguished between a general statement of being a “law and order” candidate and making specific pledges or promises about how one would rule in particular cases. The Court emphasized that the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct aim to prevent candidates from pre-committing themselves on issues likely to come before the court or from making promises that undermine the faithful and impartial performance of their duties. The Court found that the petitioner’s use of the phrase “law and order” did not rise to this level of prohibited conduct.

The Court did, however, uphold the admonition based on the unchallenged finding that the petitioner misrepresented her educational background, stating, “Reasonable voters viewing petitioner’s advertisements would be led to believe that the courses trained enrollees in judging, and voters would not have suspected that the last formal educational institution to have graduated petitioner was her high school.”