New York Law Review

Tag: California Supreme Court

  • Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976): Duty to Protect Third Parties from Patient Threats

    Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)

    When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of the profession should determine, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, the therapist incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim.

    Summary

    This landmark case established a therapist’s duty to protect third parties from a patient’s threatened violence. Prosenjit Poddar, a patient, informed his therapist at the University of California that he intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff. The therapist informed the police, who briefly detained Poddar but released him. No one warned Tarasoff or her family. Poddar later killed Tarasoff. Her parents sued, alleging the therapists and the University had a duty to warn Tatiana. The California Supreme Court held that mental health professionals have a duty to protect individuals from a patient’s credible threats of violence, even if it means breaching patient confidentiality.

    Facts

    Prosenjit Poddar was a patient at the University of California, Berkeley’s counseling center. He told his therapist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, that he intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff. Dr. Moore, believing Poddar was a danger to Tarasoff, contacted the police. The police interviewed Poddar, who appeared rational, and released him. Dr. Moore’s supervisor directed that no further action be taken to detain Poddar. Neither Dr. Moore nor anyone else warned Tarasoff or her family about Poddar’s threats. Poddar subsequently killed Tarasoff.

    Procedural History

    Tarasoff’s parents sued the Regents of the University of California, the therapists, and the police. The trial court dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed, and the California Supreme Court initially reversed, finding a duty to warn. After a rehearing, the court modified its ruling, establishing a duty to protect. The case was remanded for trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a therapist has a duty to protect a third party from a patient’s threats of violence, even when doing so requires breaching patient confidentiality?

    Holding

    Yes, because when a therapist determines, or should determine, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, the therapist incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim. This duty may be discharged by warning the intended victim, warning others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, notifying the police, or taking other steps reasonably necessary under the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court balanced the importance of patient confidentiality with the public interest in safety from violence. The court acknowledged the therapist’s duty to act with reasonable care to protect the intended victim, reasoning that “the protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.” The court stated, “When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case. Thus, it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.” The court emphasized that the therapist’s actions must be reasonable under the circumstances and consistent with the standards of the profession. The court rejected the argument that imposing such a duty would unduly burden therapists or undermine the therapeutic relationship. The dissenting justices argued that the ruling would create an unworkable standard for therapists and would compromise patient confidentiality, thus hindering effective treatment.

  • Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 176 (1957): Mitigation of Damages and the Duty to Accept Substitute Employment

    Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 176 (1968)

    An employee wrongfully discharged is not required to mitigate damages by accepting employment of a different or inferior kind.

    Summary

    Shirley MacLaine Parker (Plaintiff) sued Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (Defendant) for breach of contract after Defendant cancelled a film project and offered Plaintiff a role in a different film, which Plaintiff deemed inferior. The key issue was whether Plaintiff’s refusal to accept the substitute role constituted a failure to mitigate damages, thereby barring her recovery. The court held that because the substitute role was different and inferior, Plaintiff was not required to accept it to mitigate damages. This case illustrates the principle that an injured party need not accept substantially different employment to mitigate damages.

    Facts

    Plaintiff contracted with Defendant to star in a musical film titled “Bloomer Girl” for a guaranteed salary of $750,000. Prior to production, Defendant decided not to produce the film. Defendant offered Plaintiff the lead in a western film, “Big Country, Big Man,” with the same guaranteed salary and similar billing and directorial provisions. However, “Big Country, Big Man” was not a musical, and it was to be filmed in Australia, while “Bloomer Girl” was to be filmed in Los Angeles. Plaintiff refused the substitute role and sued for breach of contract, seeking the full contract price.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing that Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by refusing the substitute role. The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the offer of the lead in “Big Country, Big Man” did not have to be accepted as mitigation, and upheld the summary judgment for Parker.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employee wrongfully discharged is required to mitigate damages by accepting employment of a different or inferior kind.

    Holding

    No, because the substitute employment offered was both different and inferior, the Plaintiff was not required to accept it to mitigate damages.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the general rule requiring mitigation of damages only applies when the substitute employment is substantially similar to the original employment. The court articulated the rule: “The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment.” However, this rule is qualified. The court stated, “before projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or accepted are allowable in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived; the employee’s rejection of or failure to seek other available employment of a different or inferior kind may not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages.” Here, the substitute role in “Big Country, Big Man” was deemed different and inferior because it was a western rather than a musical, and it involved filming in Australia instead of Los Angeles. Therefore, Plaintiff was not obligated to accept it to mitigate damages. The dissenting opinion argued that the majority’s interpretation of the mitigation principle placed a premium on ignorance of the law. The dissent contended that if the plaintiff knew the exclusive employment provision of the contract was void, she would have sought other work regardless of the defendant’s refusal to release her. The dissent further argued that the case was tried on a different theory than that on which the reversal was sought and granted.