New York Law Review

Tag: Buy and Bust

  • People v. Mendoza, 95 N.Y.2d 721 (2001): Adequacy of Description for Probable Cause in ‘Buy and Bust’ Arrests

    95 N.Y.2d 721 (2001)

    In a ‘buy and bust’ operation, a defendant challenging probable cause for arrest based on a transmitted description must provide available details about their appearance and others present at the scene to warrant a suppression hearing, especially when the description was not disclosed prior to the motion.

    Summary

    Mendoza was arrested for selling cocaine to an undercover officer. He moved to suppress evidence, arguing the description relayed to the backup team was insufficient for probable cause. The court summarily denied the motion. The Court of Appeals held that while a defendant isn’t required to deny participation to challenge probable cause based on description inadequacy, they must provide available factual details about their appearance and others present to warrant a hearing, especially when the description wasn’t disclosed beforehand. The order was affirmed because Mendoza failed to provide his own description or describe others present.

    Facts

    An undercover officer allegedly purchased cocaine from Mendoza in a ‘buy and bust’ operation. Mendoza was arrested by a backup team based on a description radioed by the undercover officer. Prior to trial, Mendoza moved to suppress physical evidence, including prerecorded ‘buy money,’ arguing the description given to the backup team was insufficient to establish probable cause for his arrest.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court summarily denied Mendoza’s motion. Mendoza was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant in a ‘buy and bust’ case must deny participating in the drug transaction to challenge the legality of their arrest based on an inadequate description transmitted to the arresting officer.

    2. Whether a defendant is entitled to a suppression hearing when challenging probable cause based on an inadequate description, even without specific knowledge of that description.

    Holding

    1. No, because a defendant can challenge the legality of an arrest based on an inadequate description without denying participation in the crime, as long as they suggest other grounds for suppression.

    2. No, because the defendant must still provide factual averments of pertinent facts to which he has access, such as a description of himself at the time of the arrest and descriptions of others present at the scene.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals referenced CPL 710.60(1), which necessitates sworn factual allegations supporting suppression grounds, and People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993), dictating that factual allegation sufficiency is evaluated by pleadings, motion context, and defendant’s access to information. A general denial of criminal activity is insufficient, but the Court clarified that a defendant can challenge an arrest and search independent of denying criminal culpability, challenging the description relayed to the arresting officer, citing People v. Dodt, 61 N.Y.2d 408 (1984), which mandates a reviewing court have the description to independently determine probable cause. The Court stated, “Although defendant’s participation in the sale— even if expressly admitted — would not foreclose all possible challenges to the subsequent search and arrest.” However, the Court emphasized the defendant’s responsibility to present available factual details, noting “defendant should have submitted facts as to the presence and general description of such other persons in the vicinity at the time of the arrest” and a “description of his own appearance at the time of the arrest.” Because Mendoza had not provided a description of himself or others present, the Court affirmed that he was not entitled to a suppression hearing. The Court noted, “suppression motions would be more expeditiously handled if the People were to disclose the description outright to a defendant within the time in which a motion to suppress must be made.”

  • People v. Gethers, 86 N.Y.2d 159 (1995): Suppression of Identification Evidence After Illegal Arrest

    People v. Gethers, 86 N.Y.2d 159 (1995)

    An identification of a suspect made immediately following an illegal arrest and detention, where the arrest was for the purpose of the identification, is a product of the illegal arrest and must be suppressed.

    Summary

    Gethers was arrested for selling cocaine as part of a buy and bust operation. A pretrial suppression hearing revealed that the arresting officer lacked probable cause. The physical evidence was suppressed, but the identification evidence was allowed. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the identification was tainted by the illegal arrest and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the confirmatory identification made immediately after the illegal arrest should have been suppressed because it was a direct result of the illegal seizure and detention. The court distinguished this case from situations involving suggestive identification procedures, focusing instead on the causal link between the illegal arrest and the identification.

    Facts

    Undercover Detective Rye purchased cocaine from two sellers. She transmitted a description of the sellers to Officer Bell. Bell located and arrested Gethers and another man. Immediately after the arrest, Bell walked the two men to a street corner. Detective Rye then performed a drive-by identification, confirming Gethers as one of the sellers.

    Procedural History

    At the pretrial suppression hearing, the court suppressed physical evidence due to a lack of probable cause for the arrest. However, the court denied the motion to suppress the identification evidence. Gethers was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Detective Rye’s on-the-scene confirmatory identification must be suppressed as a product of the illegal arrest.

    2. Whether Detective Rye’s in-court identification of defendant was improperly admitted in the absence of evidence at the suppression hearing of an independent source.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the identification was made immediately following the illegal arrest and detention, and the illegal seizure and detention of the defendant made the identification possible, and was done for the purpose of displaying him to the undercover officer.

    2. Yes, because there was no evidence at the suppression hearing of an independent source upon which the hearing court could rely to find that the in-court identification was come at by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the identification of Gethers was a direct product of the illegal arrest. It stated that evidence obtained through the exploitation of illegal police conduct must be suppressed, citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The court found that the causal link between the arrest and identification was clear. The illegal seizure made the identification possible, and the purpose of the arrest was to display Gethers to the undercover officer. The court distinguished this case from People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989), which dealt with the suggestiveness of identification procedures, a due process issue, while this case concerned the Fourth Amendment protection against illegal seizures. The court stated, “[A]n identification derived from exploitation of an illegal arrest is equally tainted whether made by a trained officer or a lay person.” Regarding the in-court identification, the Court emphasized that there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing regarding an independent source for the identification, as required by People v. James, 67 N.Y.2d 662 (1986).

  • People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989): Warranting a Wade Hearing for Undercover Officer Identifications

    People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989)

    A pretrial Wade hearing is not automatically required when a trained undercover officer identifies a defendant shortly after a drug transaction, but the specific facts of the encounter must be examined to determine if the identification procedure was unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    Wharton was convicted of drug sale and possession based on an undercover officer’s identification. The officer bought drugs from Wharton, radioed a description to a backup team who arrested him, and then identified Wharton at the precinct three hours later. Wharton’s motion for a Wade hearing to suppress the identification was denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while a Wade hearing isn’t automatically precluded for police identifications, the circumstances here didn’t suggest undue suggestiveness because the officer was trained, the viewing was close in time to the arrest, and it served to confirm the correct person was arrested. The dissent argued for a hearing to explore potential suggestiveness, emphasizing the fleeting nature of the initial encounter.

    Facts

    An undercover police officer purchased cocaine from Wharton in a “buy and bust” operation. The officer radioed Wharton’s description to a backup team, who arrested Wharton at the scene. Within five minutes, the undercover officer drove past and saw Wharton being detained. Approximately three hours later, the same undercover officer identified Wharton through a one-way mirror at the police precinct.

    Procedural History

    Wharton moved to suppress the identification testimony, seeking a Wade hearing. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Wharton was convicted by a jury. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a pretrial station house identification of the defendant by an undercover police officer, who purchased drugs from the defendant in a “buy and bust” operation, requires a Wade hearing to determine if the identification was tainted by unnecessarily suggestive factors.

    Holding

    No, because the identification was made by a trained undercover officer shortly after the drug transaction as a completion of an integral police procedure and to ensure that the correct person was detained, and the circumstances did not suggest undue suggestiveness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the identification was made by a trained undercover officer who observed Wharton during a face-to-face drug transaction, knowing Wharton would be arrested soon after. The station house viewing occurred at a place and time sufficiently connected and contemporaneous to the arrest, constituting the ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure. This ensured an innocent person was not mistakenly detained. The officer’s participation in the operation was planned, and he was experienced and expected to observe Wharton carefully for later identification. The court distinguished this situation from show-up identifications by civilian witnesses, which are more prone to misidentification. The court emphasized they were not creating a categorical rule exempting police officer identifications from Wade hearings but held that based on the record, the trial court did not err in denying the hearing. Titone, J., dissented, arguing that the fleeting nature of the initial contact warranted a hearing to explore potential suggestiveness, citing CPL 60.25 and 60.30 regarding constitutional rights during identification procedures. The dissent highlighted examples from other cases where suggestive circumstances, revealed during Wade hearings, tainted police officer identifications. The dissent argued that the majority’s approach created an “insuperable threshold” by requiring knowledge of the specific events before granting a hearing.

  • People v. Muriell, 68 N.Y.2d 294 (1986): Probable Cause Based on Undercover Officer’s Report

    People v. Muriell, 68 N.Y.2d 294 (1986)

    Probable cause for an arrest can be established by the arresting officer’s testimony regarding information received from an undercover officer who personally witnessed the crime, without requiring the undercover officer to testify at the suppression hearing, unless the defense raises specific issues necessitating the undercover officer’s testimony.

    Summary

    Muriell was arrested for selling drugs to an undercover officer. At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that the undercover officer radioed him with a description of the seller, the vehicle he entered, and the location of the stash. The trial court suppressed the evidence, requiring the undercover officer’s testimony to establish probable cause. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the arresting officer’s testimony about the undercover officer’s firsthand observations was sufficient to establish probable cause unless the defense presents specific challenges that necessitate the undercover officer’s presence. This decision distinguishes situations where the sending officer’s knowledge is based on unknown or unreliable sources.

    Facts

    A New York City police narcotics team conducted a “buy and bust” operation. An undercover officer purchased heroin from Muriell. The undercover officer radioed Detective McCarthy, a backup officer, describing Muriell (male white, approximately 25, six feet, 150 pounds, blue jacket, black pants), the black Ford vehicle Muriell entered with its license plate number, and that “the stash was in the trunk”. Detective McCarthy followed the vehicle, arrested Muriell, and searched him and the trunk. He found previously reported “buy money” in Muriell’s pocket and heroin in the trunk.

    Procedural History

    Muriell was indicted for criminal possession and sale of a controlled substance and moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court initially denied the motion. Upon reargument, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, citing Appellate Division precedent requiring the undercover officer’s testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People, as a matter of law, failed to meet their burden of showing probable cause for the arrest when the arresting officer testified that he relied on information from an undercover police officer who reported that he had just purchased drugs from the defendant, without the undercover officer also testifying.

    Holding

    No, because when an arresting officer relies on information from another officer who personally witnessed the crime, that testimony, if credited, establishes probable cause for the arrest. The People do not need to produce the undercover officer to support a finding of probable cause unless substantial issues are raised regarding the validity of the arrest, which the undercover officer’s testimony would help resolve.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Lypka and People v. Havelka, where the sending officer’s information was based on unknown or unreliable sources. Here, the undercover officer personally witnessed the crime. Quoting United States v. Ventresca, the court stated, “Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.” The court reasoned that a per se rule requiring the undercover officer’s testimony in every case is unwarranted and could jeopardize the officer or ongoing investigations. The defendant is free to cross-examine the arresting officer and present evidence to challenge probable cause. However, absent a specific showing that raises substantial questions about the legality of the arrest, requiring the People to produce the undercover officer is unnecessary and potentially harmful. The court emphasized a flexible rule to balance the defendant’s interests with the practical needs of “buy and bust” operations. The Court stated that the defendant is not barred from challenging the arrest as “defendant is always free to cross-examine the arresting officer and any other witnesses produced by the prosecution and may, of course, call his own witnesses or testify on his own behalf with respect to his conduct prior to the arrest.”