New York Law Review

Tag: Business Records

  • People v. Foster, 52 N.Y.2d 911 (1981): Defining ‘Business Records’ Under New York Penal Law

    People v. Foster, 52 N.Y.2d 911 (1981)

    ‘Business records,’ as defined in New York Penal Law § 175.00(2), include writings maintained by an enterprise to reflect its condition or activity, regardless of their eventual destination.

    Summary

    The defendant, an employee of the Genesee County Automobile Bureau, was convicted of falsifying business records and grand larceny. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the forms the defendant falsified, which were used to account for missing registration plates and stickers to the Department of Motor Vehicles, qualified as ‘business records’ under Penal Law § 175.00(2). The court also found no error in requiring the defendant to appear before the grand jury, even though she intended to claim privilege, and deemed the testimony of other employees admissible and the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant was an employee of the Genesee County Automobile Bureau. Her duties involved preparing forms to account for missing or mutilated registration plates and validation stickers, which were then submitted to the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. The defendant was found to have falsified these records. Some validation stickers certified as missing were actually issued. The numbers of the missing stickers appeared in her handwriting on vehicle owners’ checks. The office cash showed no shortage or overage during the relevant period. She admitted to preparing all of the falsified documents.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on seven counts of falsifying business records and two counts of grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether requiring a grand jury target to appear before the grand jury and claim privilege constitutes constitutional error?
    2. Whether the forms prepared by the defendant constituted ‘business records’ within the meaning of Penal Law § 175.00(2)?
    3. Whether the testimony of other employees of the Genesee Bureau was improperly admitted as self-serving and irrelevant?
    4. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction?

    Holding

    1. No, because requiring a grand jury target to appear and claim privilege does not constitute constitutional error.
    2. Yes, because the forms were writings maintained by an enterprise (the Genesee Bureau) to reflect its activity.
    3. No, because the testimony was relevant to the issue of the defendant’s guilt, especially considering the circumstantial nature of the evidence.
    4. Yes, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to permit the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed each of the defendant’s claims of error.

    First, the court stated that requiring a grand jury target to appear and claim privilege is not a constitutional error, citing United States v. Wong and Matter of Cunningham v. Nadjari. While acknowledging that it may be better practice not to do so, the court held that the prosecutor’s actions did not warrant dismissal of the indictment.

    Second, the court addressed the definition of ‘business records’ under Penal Law § 175.00(2), which includes writings maintained by an enterprise for the purpose of evidencing or reflecting its condition or activity. The court found that the forms falsified by the defendant met this definition because they were required to account for missing items and transactions, thus reflecting the activity of the Genesee Bureau. The court emphasized that the subsequent transfer of the documents to the Department of Motor Vehicles did not negate their status as business records of the Bureau.

    Third, the court rejected the argument that the testimony of other employees was self-serving and irrelevant. The court clarified that the defendant’s argument was a misconception of the meaning of self-serving in the law of evidence. Furthermore, the court found the testimony relevant as the defendant had argued the evidence against her was weak due to the presence of other employees. It was up to the jury to weigh the credibility of those witnesses.

    Fourth, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court emphasized that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the People, citing People v. Benzinger. The court noted that the defendant was present on the days in question, arrived early, admitted to preparing the falsified documents, and that some validation stickers certified as missing were actually issued. Additionally, the defendant’s handwriting appeared on vehicle owners’ checks associated with the missing stickers, and there were no cash discrepancies. Considering all this, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The case against the defendant was circumstantial, and the People had to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

  • People v. Jones, 43 N.Y.2d 110 (1977): Admissibility of Breathalyzer Test Certificates

    People v. Jones, 43 N.Y.2d 110 (1977)

    Certificates offered to establish the proper functioning of breathalyzer equipment and the accuracy of chemical solutions used in the tests are inadmissible hearsay unless they fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, such as the business records exception.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of certificates used to demonstrate the proper functioning of breathalyzer equipment and the accuracy of the chemical solutions utilized in breathalyzer tests. The Court of Appeals held that these certificates, offered to lay a foundation for breathalyzer test results, were inadmissible hearsay because they did not qualify as business records under CPLR 4518 or any other hearsay exception. The court suggested that establishing a standardized testing procedure with contemporaneous record-keeping could satisfy CPLR 4518. The court also noted that with the widespread use and demonstrated reliability of breathalyzers, a relaxation of the initial rigorous foundational requirements may be appropriate, shifting the focus to the persuasive weight of the evidence.

    Facts

    The prosecution sought to introduce certificates to show that breathalyzer equipment was in proper working order and that the ampoules used contained properly compounded chemicals. These certificates, signed by various individuals from the State Police scientific laboratory, the Stiefel Research Institute, and Wilson Memorial Hospital, certified the results of analyses of ampoules and simulator solutions. The certificates were offered to support the admissibility of breathalyzer test results in drunk driving cases.

    Procedural History

    The County Court, Broome County, convicted the defendants of violating subdivision 2 of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The defendants appealed, arguing that the certificates used to lay the foundation for the breathalyzer test results were inadmissible. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine the admissibility of these certificates.

    Issue(s)

    Whether certificates offered to show that breathalyzer equipment was in proper working order and that the ampoules used contained properly compounded chemicals are admissible as evidence to lay a foundation for the introduction of breathalyzer test results.

    Holding

    No, because the certificates did not fall within the scope of CPLR 4518 (the business records exception to the hearsay rule), nor did they otherwise fall within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the certificates were inadmissible hearsay because their source was not shown to be records made in the regular course of business of the issuing agencies, as required by CPLR 4518. The Court emphasized that the certificates did not fall within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. To meet the requirements of CPLR 4518, the Court suggested that testing agencies or corporations establish standardized testing procedures with contemporaneous record-keeping, including details such as date, tester, material tested, tests conducted, and results. Such records would then qualify as business records. The Court also addressed the evolving understanding and acceptance of breathalyzer technology, suggesting that a relaxation of the initial rigorous foundational requirements may be appropriate. The Court stated: “Based on a wealth of practical experience greater dependence can now properly be placed on according full opportunity, through pretrial discovery and other means, to test and challenge the probative worth of the evidence. Thus, emphasis may be shifted from technical issues of admissibility of evidence to means for measuring its persuasive weight.” However, the Court declined to set precise guidelines, noting that the requirements in each case would depend on its particular circumstances. The court did not address whether authentication of certificates of analysis of ampoules by the Director of the New York State Police Scientific Laboratory would suffice under CPLR 4518(c), leaving resolution of that issue for a future case with a more fully developed record.