New York Law Review

Tag: burglary

  • People v. Rodriguez, 40 N.Y.2d 834 (1976): Admissibility of In-Court Identification After Suggestive Pre-Trial Confrontation

    People v. Rodriguez, 40 N.Y.2d 834 (1976)

    An in-court identification is admissible if it is based on an independent source and not tainted by a suggestive pre-trial identification procedure.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of in-court identifications of the defendant, Rodriguez, by two witnesses. The Court held that one witness’s identification had an independent source, untainted by any suggestive station house identification. The court also determined the other witness’s in-court identification was based on her own independent recollection, despite a suggestive confrontation during the suppression hearing. The Court emphasized the trial judge’s opportunity to observe the witness and the lack of contemporaneous objection to the in-court identification procedure.

    Facts

    The defendant, Rodriguez, was accused of burglary. Witness Carmen Jiminez had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the burglary. Both Carmen and Norma Jiminez identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the in-court identifications of the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the in-court identifications were tainted by suggestive pre-trial identification procedures.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the in-court identification by witness Carmen Jiminez was tainted by a suggestive identification at the station house, thereby rendering it inadmissible.

    2. Whether the in-court identification by witness Norma Jiminez was tainted by a suggestive confrontation during the identification suppression hearing, thereby rendering it inadmissible.

    Holding

    1. No, because the witness had ample opportunity to observe the defendant at the time of the burglary, providing an independent source for her in-court identification.

    2. No, because the hearing judge found that her identification was the product of her own independent recollection and was not tainted by any improper confrontation; this finding was affirmed by the Appellate Division.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the finding that Carmen Jiminez had “ample opportunity to observe the defendant at the time of the burglary,” thus establishing an independent source for her in-court identification. This independent source negated any potential taint from the suggestive station house identification.

    Regarding Norma Jiminez’s identification, the Court deferred to the hearing judge’s finding that her identification stemmed from her independent recollection, not from the suggestive confrontation during the suppression hearing. The Court also noted the lack of contemporaneous objection to the in-court identification procedure when it occurred, suggesting defense counsel did not perceive it as unduly suggestive at the time. The court implicitly highlighted the importance of the trial judge’s ability to assess the witness’s credibility firsthand.

    The Court distinguished this case from *People v Bell, 38 NY2d 116* regarding the defendant’s claim about the trial judge improperly marshaling the evidence and rejected that claim.

  • People v. Basch, 36 N.Y.2d 154 (1975): Determining Accomplice Status When Inferences Differ

    People v. Basch, 36 N.Y.2d 154 (1975)

    When evidence regarding a witness’s potential involvement in a crime allows for different reasonable interpretations, the question of whether that witness is an accomplice is a factual determination for the jury, not a legal determination for the court.

    Summary

    Defendants Basch and Bruno were convicted of burglary and petit larceny. A key issue at trial was whether John Clee, who was present with the defendants, was an accomplice. Clee testified he was told to act as a “lookout” but claimed he did not participate in the burglary. The trial court instructed the jury that Joslyn (another participant) was an accomplice as a matter of law but left it to the jury to decide whether Clee was an accomplice. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the evidence allowed for different reasonable inferences about Clee’s involvement, the trial court properly submitted the accomplice question to the jury.

    Facts

    On January 9, 1972, Basch, Bruno, John Clee, and Tom Joslyn were snowmobiling. Joslyn testified that he and the defendants broke into the Kiwanis Club property and stole items. Clee testified that he was with the group but did not enter the clubhouse. Clee stated that he was told by one of the others to act as a “lookout” while the others went to “get some stuff.” He admitted that he waited with others at the top of a hill about 100 yards from the house, and that the others returned with stolen items, one of which Clee bought.

    Procedural History

    Basch and Bruno were indicted for burglary in the third degree and petit larceny. Joslyn, also indicted, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At trial, the court instructed the jury that Joslyn was an accomplice as a matter of law, but left the determination of Clee’s status as an accomplice to the jury. The defendants were convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in submitting the question of Clee’s accomplice status to the jury.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in submitting to the jury, as a question of fact, whether John Clee was an accomplice.

    Holding

    No, because different inferences could reasonably be drawn from the evidence regarding Clee’s complicity in the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals referenced CPL 60.22 (subd. 2), which defines an “accomplice” as a witness who “may reasonably be considered to have participated in: (a) The offense charged; or (b) An offense based upon the same or some of the same facts or conduct which constitute the offense charged.” The court clarified that if the undisputed evidence establishes that a witness is an accomplice, the jury must be so instructed. However, if different inferences may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the question of complicity should be left to the jury. The court distinguished this case from situations where a “lookout” is, by prearrangement, keeping watch to avoid detection. Here, while Clee was told to act as a lookout, there was no proof he agreed to do so or actually acted in that capacity. The court noted the absence of proof that Clee aided in the preparation or execution of the crimes. The fact that Clee purchased one of the stolen items (the telephone) merely created “a question of whether he had participated in the burglary or larceny.” The court also considered whether Clee could be considered an accomplice as a matter of law for criminal facilitation or trespass, but found the evidence insufficient to establish either offense beyond dispute. Because the evidence allowed for different reasonable inferences regarding Clee’s role and level of involvement, the trial court properly submitted the question of his accomplice status to the jury. The court emphasized that the jury is best positioned to weigh conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses when different conclusions can be drawn from their testimony.

  • People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157 (1973): Burglary Predicate for Felony Murder

    People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157 (1973)

    A burglary based on the intent to commit assault can serve as the predicate felony for a felony-murder conviction, particularly when the assault occurs within a dwelling.

    Summary

    The case concerns whether a burglary predicated on the intent to commit assault can support a felony-murder conviction. Miller unlawfully entered an apartment, armed with a knife and spray can, and attacked one of the occupants, subsequently killing another who came to the victim’s aid. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the burglary, based on the intent to assault, satisfied the requirements for felony murder. The court reasoned that the heightened risk of homicide within a dwelling during the commission of a felony justifies including such burglaries as a predicate for felony murder.

    Facts

    On October 25, 1970, Miller went to the apartment below his, armed with a butcher knife and a spray can. When Robert Pennell opened the door, Miller sprayed Pennell’s face and stabbed him in the arm. Miller followed Pennell into the apartment, continuing the attack. Rasul Aleem, Pennell’s roommate, attempted to help Pennell. Miller then stabbed Aleem in the chest, killing him.

    Procedural History

    Miller was indicted for felony murder and common-law murder of Aleem, and attempted murder of Pennell. He was convicted of felony murder for Aleem’s death, manslaughter in the second degree under the common-law murder count, and assault in the first degree for the attempted murder of Pennell. The trial judge set aside the felony-murder conviction, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the underlying felony of burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The People then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a burglary, predicated upon the intent to commit an assault, can serve as the underlying felony for a felony-murder conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Legislature recognized that individuals within their homes are at greater risk when someone enters with criminal intent, and the felony-murder statute aims to reduce accidental homicides during the commission of enumerated felonies; thus, burglary based on intent to assault falls within the statute’s purview.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the felony-murder statute includes burglary as a predicate felony. Burglary requires knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein. The evidence supported the finding that Miller unlawfully entered Pennell’s apartment with the intent to assault him, thus satisfying the elements of burglary. The court rejected extending the merger doctrine, which prevents an assault from serving as the predicate felony for felony murder when the assault is integral to the homicide. The Court emphasized that the revised Penal Law specifically lists felonies involving violence or substantial risk of physical injury as predicates for felony murder. The legislative intent was to exclude accidental fatalities during non-violent felonies, not to exclude burglaries involving the intent to commit violent crimes such as assault. The court stated, “Where, as here, the criminal act underlying the burglary is an assault with a dangerous weapon, the likelihood that the assault will culminate in a homicide is significantly increased by the situs of the assault.” The court further reasoned that victims within their homes are more likely to resist and less likely to escape, increasing the risk of homicide. Quoting the Practice Commentary, the court noted that the definition of burglary is satisfied “if the intruder’s intent, existing at the time of the unlawful entry or remaining, is to commit any crime.” The court explicitly rejected the reasoning of People v. Wilson, a California case reaching a contrary conclusion.

  • People ex rel. Zakrzewski v. Fay, 18 N.Y.2d 403 (1966): Double Jeopardy and Defective Indictments

    People ex rel. Zakrzewski v. Fay, 18 N.Y.2d 403 (1966)

    A trial on an indictment that alleges all the elements of a lesser-included offense places the defendant in jeopardy, and a subsequent indictment for the same conduct, even with an added element to charge a higher offense, violates double jeopardy protections.

    Summary

    Zakrzewski sought habeas corpus relief, arguing his sentence as a multiple felony offender was based on a prior conviction obtained in violation of double jeopardy. He was initially tried for first-degree burglary under an indictment that was later dismissed due to a perceived defect. A new indictment, alleging the same conduct with a minor addition, led to a conviction for second-degree burglary. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial indictment, even if defective for first-degree burglary, was sufficient for second-degree burglary, thus the first trial placed him in jeopardy. The subsequent indictment and conviction were deemed unconstitutional, warranting his release.

    Facts

    In 1924, Zakrzewski was indicted for first-degree burglary, accused of breaking into an occupied dwelling at night with another person, Jaruszewski. The jury found him guilty as charged. The district attorney moved to dismiss the indictment before sentencing, claiming it lacked the essential allegation that Zakrzewski was “assisted by a confederate actually present,” a requirement for first-degree burglary under the applicable penal law. The court dismissed the indictment and resubmitted the case to the grand jury.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury issued a second indictment, adding the clause that each defendant had been “aided by the other actually present.” Zakrzewski pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary under this second indictment, which later served as the basis for his treatment as a second felony offender. In 1955, he was convicted of third-degree burglary and sentenced as a multiple felony offender. He then sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing the second indictment and conviction were void due to double jeopardy. The lower courts denied the writ, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial on an indictment, which may be defective in alleging all elements of the highest crime charged but does allege all elements of a lesser included offense, places a defendant in jeopardy, thus barring a subsequent trial on a new indictment alleging the same conduct with a slightly different element.

    Holding

    Yes, because the original indictment contained all the elements of second-degree burglary, the crime for which Zakrzewski was ultimately convicted, and the trial had progressed to a verdict. Therefore, double jeopardy applied, and the second indictment was unconstitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy prevents a person from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Jeopardy attaches when a defendant is put on trial before a competent court with a sufficient indictment. However, if the initial indictment is so defective that it couldn’t support a conviction, a retrial is permissible. Here, the court reasoned that the original indictment contained all essential elements of second-degree burglary, even if it lacked a critical element of first-degree burglary. The court cited People v. Oliver, 3 N.Y.2d 684, where an indictment for first-degree burglary lacking the element of “nighttime” was deemed sufficient for second-degree burglary. The court stated, “The misnomer in describing the offense as in the first instead of the second degree is of no moment”. Since the initial trial progressed to a verdict on an indictment sufficient for second-degree burglary, Zakrzewski was in danger of a valid judgment. Permitting the district attorney to terminate proceedings after a verdict and procure a new indictment violated double jeopardy. The court concluded that the second indictment was unconstitutional, and the conviction based on it could not serve as a predicate for multiple felony offender status, entitling Zakrzewski to release.