New York Law Review

Tag: burglary

  • People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174 (1989): Antagonistic Defenses Require Severance in Joint Trials

    74 N.Y.2d 174 (1989)

    Severance in a joint trial is required when the core of each defendant’s defense is irreconcilable with the other, creating a significant risk that the conflict itself will lead the jury to infer guilt.

    Summary

    Houshang Mahboubian and Nedjatollah Sakhai were convicted of conspiracy, attempted grand larceny, and burglary for staging a theft of Persian antiquities to collect insurance proceeds. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants’ antagonistic defenses prejudiced their right to a fair trial, thus requiring severance. Mahboubian’s defense was denial of involvement, while Sakhai admitted involvement but claimed it was a publicity stunt. The court found that the jury could not have believed both defenses, leading to undue prejudice. The court also held that the defendants’ actions constituted attempted grand larceny and burglary.

    Facts

    Mahboubian insured his collection of Persian antiquities for $18.5 million. Suspicions arose regarding the authenticity of some pieces. Mahboubian rented a vault at Morgan Brothers Manhattan Storage in New York. Sakhai contacted individuals, including a police informant named Daniel Cardebat, to arrange the theft of the collection. Sakhai informed them the collection would be shipped from Switzerland to New York. Mahboubian marked the shipping crates with his initials. The crates were then shipped to Regency Worldwide Packing, where the burglary occurred. Cardebat and his accomplices broke into the warehouse, removed the crates, and were subsequently arrested. Sakhai was arrested while attempting to meet Cardebat. Mahboubian was later charged with participation in the crime.

    Procedural History

    Mahboubian and Sakhai were jointly tried and convicted of conspiracy, attempted grand larceny, and burglary in the Supreme Court, New York County. Both defendants moved for severance, arguing undue prejudice due to antagonistic defenses. The trial court denied the motions. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, ordering a new trial, holding that severance was improperly denied.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motions for severance based on antagonistic defenses.
    2. Whether the defendants’ actions constituted an attempt to commit grand larceny.
    3. Whether the defendants’ actions satisfied the intent element for burglary.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the core of each defendant’s defense was irreconcilable with the other, creating a significant risk that the conflict itself would lead the jury to infer guilt.
    2. Yes, because their conduct went beyond mere preparation and came dangerously close to completing the larceny.
    3. Yes, because they intended that the crime of criminal facilitation be committed within the warehouse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendants’ defenses were mutually exclusive and irreconcilable. Mahboubian denied involvement, while Sakhai admitted involvement but claimed it was a publicity stunt. The jury could not have credited both defenses. The court established a standard that severance is compelled where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and where there is a significant danger that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer defendant’s guilt. The court found that Mahboubian was unduly prejudiced because, due to a Bruton problem concerning Sakhai, large portions of his statement to an Assistant District Attorney were redacted. Regarding the attempted grand larceny charge, the court found that the defendants’ actions had gone beyond mere preparation and constituted an attempt to commit grand larceny because they had hired professional burglars, provided them with tools, and caused them to break into a warehouse and steal property in the dead of night. The court also found that the defendants intended that the crimes of criminal facilitation and attempted grand larceny be committed on the warehouse premises, thus satisfying the intent element for burglary. The court noted that “[A] person is guilty of criminal facilitation when, ‘believing it probable that he is rendering aid * * * to a person who intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony’” (Penal Law § 115.00).

  • People v. Ingram, 67 N.Y.2d 897 (1986): Establishing Causation in Felony Murder Cases

    People v. Ingram, 67 N.Y.2d 897 (1986)

    In a felony murder case, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions during the commission of the felony directly caused the victim’s death, but the exact manner of death need not be foreseeable.

    Summary

    Ingram was convicted of felony murder and burglary after Melvin Cooper died of a heart attack shortly after Ingram burglarized his home. Cooper, who had a history of heart trouble, collapsed after confronting Ingram, who had broken into his residence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove that Ingram’s actions during the burglary caused Cooper’s death. The court also noted that the defense failed to preserve objections regarding the foreseeability of the manner of death and the severity of the sentence.

    Facts

    Ingram and his companions surveyed Melvin Cooper’s house before breaking in to determine if anyone was home. Their activities awakened Cooper, who confronted Ingram inside the house with a gun. Cooper ordered Ingram to lie down and then called the police. After the police arrested Ingram, Cooper collapsed and died shortly afterward at the hospital. Cooper had a pre-existing heart condition. The prosecution argued that the stress of the burglary caused Cooper to suffer a fatal myocardial infarction.

    Procedural History

    Ingram was convicted of felony murder and burglary in the trial court. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove causation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Ingram then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People presented sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant caused the victim’s death during the course of a burglary.
    2. Whether the defendant may be guilty of felony murder only if the fact of death and the manner in which it occurred was a foreseeable consequence of the burglary.
    3. Whether the defendant’s sentence constituted cruel and inhuman punishment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the People presented sufficient medical evidence linking the stress of the burglary to the victim’s myocardial infarction.
    2. This issue was not preserved for review because the defense failed to object to the jury charge or request additional instructions.
    3. This issue was not properly before the court because the defendant failed to challenge his sentence before the trial court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution’s medical expert provided sufficient evidence to link the burglary to Cooper’s death. The expert testified that Cooper’s myocardial infarction was precipitated by the stress of finding a burglar in his home. The court stated that the expert’s testimony was not “so baseless or riddled with contradiction that it was unworthy of belief as a matter of law” (citing People v Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 281; People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 699). The court found it insignificant that there was a lack of postmortem clinical signs of an infarction. The expert clarified that such signs do not appear unless death occurs at least 12 hours after the incident.

    Regarding foreseeability, the Court found that the defendant’s argument wasn’t preserved, because his counsel didn’t challenge the given charge or request supplementary directions. Similarly, his claim that the sentence was cruel and inhumane wasn’t reviewed as it wasn’t raised initially in the trial court.

  • People v. Burgin, 40 N.Y.2d 724 (1976): Corroboration Requirements for Accomplice Testimony

    People v. Burgin, 40 N.Y.2d 724 (1976)

    Accomplice testimony requires independent corroboration connecting the defendant to the crime; merely placing the defendant in the company of the accomplice on the day of the crime is insufficient corroboration.

    Summary

    Defendant Burgin was convicted of burglary based largely on accomplice testimony. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, vacating convictions on some counts due to insufficient corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony. The court emphasized that while accomplice testimony can be used, it must be supported by independent evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Simply showing the defendant was with the accomplice is inadequate. The case highlights the importance of corroborating evidence when relying on testimony from individuals involved in the crime itself, to ensure the reliability of the conviction.

    Facts

    Burgin was convicted of six counts of burglary related to two separate incidents: burglaries at Dan’s MiniMart and Rosh’s Roost Tavern. The prosecution’s key witnesses were Robert Gates and John Rutherford, both co-defendants who had pleaded guilty to reduced charges. Rutherford provided a detailed account of Burgin’s involvement in both burglaries. Gates testified only that Burgin was with him on the day of the crime.

    Procedural History

    Burgin was convicted by a jury. He appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Burgin then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Rutherford was an accomplice as a matter of law, thereby requiring corroboration of his testimony under CPL 60.22.
    2. Whether there was sufficient independent corroborating evidence to connect Burgin to both burglaries, particularly the one at Dan’s MiniMart.

    Holding

    1. Yes, Rutherford was an accomplice as a matter of law because he was an actual participant in the crimes charged.
    2. No, there was sufficient corroborating evidence for the tavern burglary, but not for the Dan’s MiniMart burglary because the only evidence was Gates’ testimony that Burgin was with him on the day of the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Rutherford was an accomplice, necessitating corroboration of his testimony. The court cited CPL 60.22(2), which defines an accomplice. The court explained that the corroborating evidence must connect the defendant to the crime, although it does not need to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As the court stated, “The People’s evidence had to establish that defendant was connected with the crimes, not to the extent of proving him guilty of them, but sufficiently to satisfy the jury that Rutherford was telling the truth.”

    Regarding the Rosh’s Roost Tavern burglary, the court found sufficient corroboration through a Sheriff’s assistant who tracked Burgin from the scene with a bloodhound and found him with Gates in a nearby field, and also evidence that Burgin possessed the same amount of money stolen from the tavern.

    However, for the Dan’s MiniMart burglary, the court found the corroboration lacking. The only evidence was Gates’ statement that Burgin was with him on the day of the crime. The court cited People v. Kress, 284 N.Y. 452, 460, stating that such evidence is insufficient. Therefore, the court modified the order, vacating the convictions related to the Dan’s MiniMart burglary.

  • People v. Blim, 63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984): When a Lesser Included Offense Instruction is Not Required

    63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984)

    A trial court is not required to charge a lesser included offense to the jury if there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    Defendant Blim was convicted of burglary in the third degree. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the third degree, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the lesser included offense should have been submitted to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that under no reasonable view of the evidence could the jury have found that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The court reasoned that the key witness’s testimony could not be rationally dissected to accept the unlawful entry but reject the intent to commit a crime therein.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours, Sergeant Avery responded to a burglar alarm at the Moose Lodge. He saw two people running, one of whom he recognized as the defendant, Blim. James Lewis, the other individual, was apprehended. Avery found crowbars, a flashlight, and damage to the door, indicating forced entry. Lewis testified that he and Blim entered the lodge with the intent to open the safe and steal money. They left briefly after noticing a flashing red light but returned. Lewis took $12 from a metal box, while Blim went to the room containing the safe. They fled when they saw a Sheriff’s car and were ordered to halt. A barmaid testified that $11 was missing from the metal box. The lodge governor confirmed the money was present a day or two prior and missing after the incident.

    Procedural History

    The Schuyler County Court convicted Blim of burglary in the third degree. Blim appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the third degree. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge criminal trespass in the third degree as a lesser included offense of burglary in the third degree.

    Holding

    No, because under no reasonable view of the evidence could the jury have found that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that criminal trespass in the third degree is a lesser included offense of burglary in the third degree because burglary requires all the elements of criminal trespass, plus an intent to commit a crime inside the premises. However, a lesser included offense instruction is only required if there is a “rational basis on which the jury could reject a portion of the prosecution’s case which is indispensable to establishment of the higher crime and yet accept so much of the proof as would establish the lesser crime” (citing People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d 364, 369-370). The court found no such rational basis here. The testimony of Lewis, the accomplice, established both the unlawful entry and the intent to commit a crime. Discrediting Lewis’s testimony due to his plea bargain would impact his entire testimony, not just the element of intent. The Court stated, “There is no rational basis for rejecting his testimony concerning their intent to commit a crime in the lodge while accepting his testimony with respect to their unlawful entry into the lodge.” Sergeant Avery’s testimony only established Blim’s presence near the lodge, not that he unlawfully entered or remained inside. Thus, the prosecution’s case established either burglary or nothing, making the lesser included offense instruction unnecessary.

  • People v. King, 61 N.Y.2d 550 (1984): Definition of ‘Entry’ and ‘Building’ for Burglary

    People v. King, 61 N.Y.2d 550 (1984)

    For the crime of burglary, entry into a building occurs when a person or any part of their body intrudes within the building, and a recessed entry area of a store, enclosed by display windows, a door, a roof, and a security gate, can be considered part of the ‘building’.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the element of ‘entry’ in burglary is satisfied when any part of a person’s body intrudes into the building. The Court also determined that a recessed vestibule enclosed by display windows, a roof, and a security gate constitutes part of the ‘building’ for burglary purposes. The defendant was observed tampering with a metal gate covering a jewelry store vestibule, creating a hole. The Court affirmed the conviction for attempted burglary, finding that the defendant’s actions constituted an attempted entry into a building.

    Facts

    Two police officers observed the defendant in front of a jewelry store at 4:30 a.m. The store had a recessed vestibule behind a metal security gate. The officers saw the defendant crouched down, pulling and pushing at the gate while holding an object. After noticing the officers, the defendant fled. The officers apprehended him, and upon returning to the store, found that the gate had been cut, creating a one-foot square hole. The defendant had a claw hammer in his pocket.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of attempted burglary in the third degree and possession of burglar’s tools. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment without opinion. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the ‘entry’ element of burglary requires the intrusion of the entire body into the building?

    2. Whether the recessed vestibule of the jewelry store constitutes a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Penal Law?

    Holding

    1. No, because the ‘entry’ element of burglary is satisfied when any part of a person’s body intrudes within the building.

    2. Yes, because the recessed vestibule, enclosed by the security gate and other structures, is functionally part of the building under the Penal Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the ‘entry’ element, the court noted that while the Penal Law does not explicitly define ‘entry’, the common law definition, which requires only the insertion of any part of the body, should still apply unless there’s a clear legislative intent to change it. The court stated, “The presumption is that no change from the rule of common law is intended, ‘unless the enactment is clear and explicit in that direction’.” Since the legislature did not indicate an intent to narrow the definition of “entry,” the common-law definition was upheld.

    As to whether the vestibule constitutes a ‘building’, the court referenced Penal Law § 140.00(2), which defines a building as including “any structure… used by persons for carrying on business therein.” The court reasoned that the presence of the security gate, enclosing the vestibule, makes the vestibule “functionally indistinguishable from the space inside the display cases or the rest of the store.” Therefore, it falls within the statutory definition of a building.

    The Court emphasized that the defendant was in a position to reach into the vestibule and steal goods, and his inability to fit his entire body through the hole did not negate the attempted burglary charge. The court reasoned that a successful burglary was within his capability.

  • People v. Blim, 63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984): Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses When Evidence Supports It

    People v. Blim, 63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984)

    A court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense if a reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of burglary. At trial, the court denied the defense’s request to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser-included offense because, based on the defendant’s intoxication, a reasonable jury could have concluded that he committed trespass but lacked the specific intent required for burglary. The court emphasized that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant when determining whether to give a lesser included offense instruction.

    Facts

    Shortly after midnight on December 18, 1979, police arrested the defendant as he fled from an auto supply store. He was charged with third-degree burglary. The defendant testified that he had been drinking heavily in the 12 hours leading up to his arrest and did not remember being at the store. Other witnesses corroborated the defendant’s intoxicated state on the evening of his arrest and immediately thereafter.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defense’s request to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of third-degree criminal trespass. The jury convicted the defendant of burglary. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, stating the reversal was based on the law, even though the order mentioned the facts. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass in the third degree, given the evidence presented at trial regarding the defendant’s intoxication.

    Holding

    Yes, because a reasonable jury could have concluded that the defendant committed the act of trespass but, due to intoxication, lacked the specific intent required for a burglary conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that trespass in the third degree is a lesser-included offense of burglary in the third degree, citing People v. Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233, 235. The court stated the rule: “the trespass count should have been charged if, under any reasonable view of the evidence, a jury could find that defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater (see CPL 300.50, subds 1, 2; see, also, People v. Scarborough, 49 NY2d 364; People v. Johnson, 45 NY2d 546).” The court emphasized that when determining whether a reasonable view of the evidence exists, it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, citing People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302. The Court reasoned that the jury could have found that the defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in the building (committing trespass) but also concluded that he was too intoxicated to form the specific intent to commit a crime within the building, which is a prerequisite for burglary. Therefore, it was error to refuse the lesser-included offense instruction. The court implied that the Appellate Division correctly identified the error of law, despite also alluding to facts in their decision, and affirmed their decision to order a new trial.

  • People v. Borrello, 52 N.Y.2d 952 (1981): Jury Instructions on Intent for Burglary

    52 N.Y.2d 952 (1981)

    In a burglary trial, where the court instructs the jury that the defendant must have entered the premises with the intent to commit a crime, the court’s refusal to specify that the intended crime must be a felony or misdemeanor is not reversible error, absent a specific request to charge that trespass cannot be the underlying intended crime.

    Summary

    John Borrello and Efrain Arroyo were convicted of third-degree burglary. On appeal, they argued that the trial court erred by not specifying to the jury that the crime they intended to commit upon entering the premises had to be a felony or misdemeanor, and by failing to instruct that the lesser included offense of trespass could not be the underlying intended crime for burglary. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the trial court charged the jury that the defendants needed to have intent to commit a crime when entering the building, its refusal to further specify the nature of the crime was not reversible error. The court also held that the defendants failed to preserve the argument regarding trespass for appellate review because they did not specifically request such a charge.

    Facts

    The defendants, John Borrello and Efrain Arroyo, were tried and convicted of burglary in the third degree. During the trial, the court instructed the jury that to convict the defendants, they had to find that the defendants entered the premises with the intent to commit a crime. The defendants requested the court specify that the intended crime must be a felony or a misdemeanor, a request which the court denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of burglary in the third degree in the trial court. They appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed their convictions. The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing the defendants’ request to specify that the intended crime for burglary had to be a felony or misdemeanor, given that the court instructed the jury that the defendants needed to have intent to commit a crime when entering the building?

    2. Whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that trespass could not be the underlying intended crime for burglary?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court charged the jury that the defendants needed to have intent to commit a crime when entering the building, its refusal to further specify the nature of the crime was not reversible error.

    2. No, because the defendants failed to preserve the argument regarding trespass for appellate review by not specifically requesting such a charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court’s instruction that the defendants had to enter the premises with the intent to commit a crime was sufficient. The court noted that the defendants’ request for further specification was refused, but this refusal did not constitute reversible error in light of the initial charge. The court emphasized that the core element of burglary is the intent to commit a crime within the premises.

    Regarding the issue of trespass as the underlying intended crime, the court found that the defendants failed to properly preserve this argument for appellate review. Although defense counsel alluded to the point during a colloquy with the trial judge after the charge, he never formally requested a specific instruction that trespass could not be the underlying crime. Because the defense did not make a clear and explicit request for this specific charge, the Court of Appeals declined to consider the argument on appeal. The court thus applied the general rule that a party must make their position known to the trial court to preserve an issue for appellate review.

    The court does not provide specific quotes, but the holding relies on established principles of criminal law regarding the elements of burglary and the preservation of legal arguments for appeal.

  • People v. Marner, 47 N.Y.2d 982 (1979): Justification for Vehicle Stops Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    47 N.Y.2d 982 (1979)

    A police officer may stop a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the occupants have been, are, or are about to be engaged in criminal conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s suppression order, holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a van. The officers observed the van near the scene of a recent burglary at 4:30 AM in an area known for burglaries. An individual hurriedly entered the van. The driver appeared nervous and gave an inconsistent statement about his destination. These circumstances, combined with the nearby burglary, provided reasonable suspicion for the stop and subsequent search of the van, which revealed burglar’s tools and stolen property. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for a review of the facts.

    Facts

    At 4:30 AM, police officers discovered a broken storefront at a department store in Brooklyn and observed property scattered outside. The area was deserted but known for store burglaries. After securing the scene, the officers saw an unmarked, closed van, the only vehicle on the street, turning onto Fulton Street about 200 feet from the burglarized store. An unidentified man quickly entered the van as a passenger. The van then proceeded along a route that brought it near the location where the police had initially seen it.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with burglary-related offenses. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the van. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to suppress. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the van based on the totality of the circumstances?

    Holding

    Yes, because the officers had reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the occupants of the van were engaged in criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the police had sufficient justification to stop the van. The court relied on the following factors: the early morning hour, the proximity to a recent burglary, the area’s history of burglaries, the unmarked nature of the van, the hurried entry of the passenger, and the driver’s nervous demeanor and inconsistent statement about his destination. The court stated that “the actions of the van’s driver and the fleeing passenger together with the knowledge that a burglary had only recently been committed in the area gave the police reason to suspect that the van’s occupants had been engaged in conduct in violation of the law.” The passenger’s flight further strengthened the predicate for a more thorough search of the van, leading to the discovery of incriminating evidence. The court distinguished this case from situations involving random stops without any reasonable suspicion. Judge Jones dissented, arguing that there was no probable cause to justify the stop, emphasizing that merely observing a man entering a van suddenly is not inherently suspicious.

  • People v. Irby, 47 N.Y.2d 894 (1979): Defining ‘Immediate Flight’ in Felony Murder

    People v. Irby, 47 N.Y.2d 894 (1979)

    Under New York’s felony murder statute, liability extends to deaths caused during the immediate flight from a felony, not just during the commission of the underlying felony itself; the determination of whether the killing occurred during the immediate flight is generally a question of fact for the jury.

    Summary

    Irby was convicted of felony murder after her accomplice shot and killed a police officer during their escape from a burglary. Irby argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the burglary had to be ongoing at the time of the shooting for her to be guilty of felony murder, and that if she was in custody, she could not be guilty. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Irby’s conviction, holding that the jury instructions failed to adequately explain that felony murder liability extends to the immediate flight from the underlying felony and improperly removed from jury consideration the crucial factual question of whether the shooting occurred during the immediate flight.

    Facts

    Irby and her accomplice, MacKenzie, burglarized a clothing boutique. Irby acted as a lookout while MacKenzie entered the store and passed stolen merchandise to her through a window, which she placed in the trunk of their car. Police officers on patrol noticed the suspicious activity and approached Irby. While the officers questioned Irby, MacKenzie broke out of the front of the store and, in an attempt to escape, shot and killed an officer who tried to stop him. Irby was subsequently convicted of felony murder.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Irby of felony murder. The Appellate Division sustained the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed, but on reargument, reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the felony of burglary had to be ongoing at the time of the shooting for Irby to be guilty of felony murder.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that if Irby was in custody at the time of the shooting, she could not be guilty of felony murder.
    3. Whether the trial court improperly removed from the jury the factual question of whether the shooting occurred during the immediate flight from the burglary.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the charge, as a whole, was inadequate in that it did not provide for proper consideration by the jury of whether the shooting took place during the immediate flight from the burglary.
    2. The court did not reach this conclusion explicitly, but the reversal implies that this too was improperly presented to the jury.
    3. Yes, because the charge failed to submit to the jury for resolution the crucial factual question of whether, when the fatal shot was fired, MacKenzie was in immediate flight from the scene of the burglary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory language of New York’s felony murder statute, which extends liability to deaths caused “in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom.” The court emphasized that the trial court’s instructions failed to adequately explain this concept of “immediate flight” to the jury. Specifically, the court found that the charge was deficient for failing to require the jury to determine whether MacKenzie was in “immediate flight” from the burglary when he shot the officer. The court stated, “[t]he charge failed to submit to the jury for resolution the crucial factual question of whether, when the fatal shot was fired, MacKenzie was in immediate flight from the scene of the burglary.”

    The court distinguished this case from others where the issue of immediate flight was so clear that it could be decided as a matter of law. Here, the court found that the facts presented a question for the jury to determine. Because the jury instructions did not adequately guide the jury in making this determination, the court reversed Irby’s conviction and ordered a new trial.

    The dissent argued that the majority was inappropriately interpreting the felony murder statute and ignoring precedent. The dissent emphasized that Irby willingly participated in the burglary and should be held responsible for the consequences, including the death of the officer during the escape. The dissent stated that the jury was properly instructed on the law, and there was no reason to reverse the conviction. The dissent cited People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440 (1967) as precedent.

  • People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394 (1978): Effective Assistance of Counsel and Defendant’s Absence from Trial

    People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394 (1978)

    A defendant’s voluntary absence from trial, while not waiving the right to effective assistance of counsel, significantly impacts the assessment of counsel’s effectiveness, particularly where counsel’s actions are strategic responses to the defendant’s absence.

    Summary

    Aiken was convicted of burglary after voluntarily absenting himself from his trial. On appeal, he argued ineffective assistance of counsel, citing his lawyer’s limited participation in the trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while a defendant’s absence does not automatically waive the right to effective counsel, it must be considered when evaluating counsel’s performance. The court found that the attorney’s actions, including limited cross-examination and foregoing opening and closing statements, appeared to be a strategic decision in response to Aiken’s absence, aimed at securing a mistrial, and did not constitute ineffective assistance under the circumstances.

    Facts

    Police responded to a burglary call and found Aiken at the scene, attempting to hide. A windowpane was broken, and the master bedroom was in disarray. Aiken was charged with burglary in the second degree. He attended the first day of jury selection but failed to appear on subsequent days. The trial court determined his absence was willful and voluntary and proceeded with the trial in absentia.

    Procedural History

    Aiken was convicted of burglary in the second degree. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s limited participation in the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Aiken then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, by voluntarily absenting himself from trial, is denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney makes strategic decisions, such as limiting cross-examination and foregoing opening and closing statements, in response to the defendant’s absence.

    Holding

    No, because while a defendant’s absence does not waive his right to effective counsel, the court must consider that absence in assessing counsel’s effectiveness, and strategic decisions made in response to that absence do not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions, but noted that the standard for evaluating effectiveness is not precisely defined. The court shifted away from the older “mockery of justice” standard to a more flexible, fact-specific inquiry, considering whether counsel’s representation was “adequate or effective in any meaningful sense.” The court emphasized that a defendant’s absence from trial significantly impacts counsel’s ability to provide effective representation. The court found that the attorney’s actions were a strategic attempt to obstruct the trial and pressure the court into declaring a mistrial. Waiver of opening and closing statements, failure to cross-examine, and failure to call witnesses were all seen as strategic choices, not necessarily indicative of ineffectiveness, given the defendant’s absence and the strength of the prosecution’s case. The court explicitly stated that “a defendant who absents himself from trial may not succeed on appeal by raising counsel’s purported ineffectiveness where counsel affirmatively, as a matter of trial strategy, sought to obstruct the trial of his client.” Ultimately, the court reasoned that allowing the appeal would permit the defendant to benefit from his own misconduct. The court also rejected the argument that retained counsel should be held to a different standard than appointed counsel, finding this distinction irrelevant to the core issue of effective representation.