New York Law Review

Tag: burglary

  • People v. Lewis, 5 N.Y.3d 546 (2005): Clarifying ‘Intent to Commit a Crime Therein’ for Burglary

    5 N.Y.3d 546 (2005)

    The ‘intent to commit a crime therein’ element of burglary is not satisfied solely by a defendant’s intent to violate an order of protection by entering a dwelling that the order of protection declares off-limits; however, the element is satisfied if the defendant intended to engage in other conduct prohibited by the order while inside the premises.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary. The central issue was whether his intent to violate an order of protection by entering a prohibited dwelling alone satisfied the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, but the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit another crime beyond the unlawful entry. The court reasoned that unlawful entry alone cannot elevate every order of protection violation to burglary, but other evidence demonstrated intent to harass or menace the complainant within the dwelling. The Appellate Division’s order affirming the conviction was upheld.

    Facts

    The complainant allowed the defendant to live with her despite having him arrested for damaging her property. An order of protection was issued requiring him to stay away from her and her home. The complainant allowed the defendant to return, but after another incident where defendant struck her, another order of protection was issued. Subsequently, the complainant took her keys and left. Defendant entered her apartment without her knowledge while both orders were in effect, seemingly by tampering with a window and fire escape. Upon her return, the defendant kicked her and swore at her as she tried to call the police. Her belongings were scattered outside the apartment.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree burglary and criminal contempt. At trial, he requested a jury instruction that intent to enter the banned premises alone cannot satisfy the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. The trial court refused. The jury found him guilty of criminal contempt but was hung on the burglary charge initially. After a supplemental instruction, the jury convicted him of burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary can be satisfied solely by the defendant’s intent to violate an order of protection by entering the dwelling prohibited by the order?

    Holding

    No, because unlawful entry, standing alone, cannot be the predicate crime to satisfy the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. However, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit a crime in the apartment other than the trespass itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that if unlawful entry alone sufficed, every violation of a do-not-enter provision in an order of protection would be burglary. However, the Court noted that there was evidence that the defendant intended to commit other crimes within the apartment beyond the unlawful entry, such as harassment, menacing, or intimidation, which were separately prohibited by the order of protection. The court cited People v. Mackey, 49 NY2d 274 (1980), stating that the People need only allege and prove a knowing and unlawful entry coupled with an intent to commit a crime therein. The court emphasized that they do not need to allege or establish what particular crime was intended, citing People v. Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174 (1989). The Court found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant intended to “harass, menace, intimidate, threaten or interfere with complainant in her apartment” in violation of the order of protection. Judge R.S. Smith dissented, arguing that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury and that the defendant did not forfeit his right to appeal this error.

  • People v. Calabria, 94 N.Y.2d 519 (2000): Sufficiency of Eyewitness Identification for Conviction

    People v. Calabria, 94 N.Y.2d 519 (2000)

    A conviction based solely on eyewitness identification is sufficient if a rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime, considering the witness’s opportunity to view the defendant, the accuracy of the prior description, and the level of certainty demonstrated at the identification.

    Summary

    This case addresses the sufficiency of eyewitness identification in securing a conviction. Diane Chappelle, a teacher, was robbed at gunpoint in a church. She identified Calabria as the perpetrator. The first conviction was reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct. At the second trial, Calabria was again convicted based on Chappelle’s identification. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that despite the brief observation period and other potentially mitigating factors, a rational jury could have found Calabria guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence, including the witness’s certainty and opportunity to observe.

    Facts

    Diane Chappelle, preparing for class at a church school, encountered a gunman. She observed him for 5-10 seconds before being instructed to close her eyes. The gunman robbed her and tied her up. Chappelle later identified Calabria in a lineup as the perpetrator.

    Procedural History

    Calabria was initially convicted of robbery and burglary. The conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals due to prosecutorial misconduct during the first trial. Calabria was retried and again convicted of the same charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the second conviction. This appeal to the New York Court of Appeals followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial, specifically the eyewitness identification by the victim, was legally sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Calabria was the perpetrator of the robbery and burglary.

    Holding

    Yes, because a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Calabria committed the crime, based on the witness’s opportunity to view him, her level of certainty in the identification, and the overall circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases: whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that eyewitness testimony alone can be sufficient for a conviction. The court considered factors such as the witness’s opportunity to view the defendant, the accuracy of the prior description, and the certainty of the identification.

    The Court acknowledged that the observation period was brief and the witness was under duress. However, the Court noted that the witness testified she observed the defendant for more than a glimpse. The Court also noted the witness’s firm identification of Calabria in the lineup and at trial. The court distinguished this case from others where the identification was deemed insufficient, noting the absence of contradictory evidence that would undermine the reliability of the identification. The dissent argued that the identification was unreliable due to the brief observation time, the witness’s emotional state, and a discrepancy between the defendant’s build and the initial description. The dissent also pointed to the lack of other corroborating evidence, such as matching fingerprints. Despite these concerns, the majority found that the jury’s verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence, emphasizing that it is the jury’s role to weigh the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence. The court stated, “Great weight is given to the determination of the jury (citations omitted).”

  • People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14 (2003): Burglary as an Aggravating Factor in Intentional Murder

    2 N.Y.3d 14 (2003)

    A burglary conviction cannot be used as an aggravating factor to elevate intentional murder to first-degree murder under Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) when the burglary’s sole intent is to commit the murder itself.

    Summary

    James Cahill was convicted of first-degree murder for killing his wife. One aggravating factor alleged was that he committed the murder during a burglary. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the burglary’s sole purpose was to commit the murder, it could not serve as an aggravating factor. The court also reversed on the aggravating factor of witness elimination due to the prosecution not proving the victim was murdered to prevent her testimony, but due to her marriage falling apart. The Court reduced the conviction to second-degree murder, since intentional murder was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and ordered resentencing.

    Facts

    James and Jill Cahill were in the process of divorcing. James severely assaulted Jill with a baseball bat, leading to an indictment for assault and a protective order barring him from contacting her. While Jill was hospitalized, James, disguised as a maintenance worker, entered her room and poisoned her with cyanide, causing her death. Evidence showed he had researched cyanide and forged documents to obtain it. He was subsequently indicted for first-degree murder, with the aggravating factors being witness elimination (preventing her testimony in the assault case) and murder during the commission of a burglary.

    Procedural History

    The trial court consolidated the assault and murder indictments. At trial, Cahill was convicted of first-degree murder based on both aggravating factors, along with other charges. Cahill appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals due to the death sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed the first-degree murder convictions, reduced it to second-degree murder, and remitted the case for resentencing, finding errors in jury selection, and insufficient evidence for both aggravating factors.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in its rulings concerning potential jurors, specifically jurors Nos. 23 and 855.

    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the first-degree murder conviction based on witness elimination under Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(v).

    3. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the first-degree murder conviction based on burglary under Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the trial court should have dismissed juror 23 for cause and improperly granted the People’s challenge to juror 855, with these errors relating only to the penalty phase and not warranting a new guilt phase trial.

    2. No, although the evidence was legally sufficient, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because witness elimination was not proven to be a substantial motive for the murder.

    3. No, because the burglary lacked an intent separate from the intentional murder itself, thus not satisfying the requirements of Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the trial court made errors in jury selection, relating only to jurors’ ability to serve impartially during the penalty phase. Regarding the witness elimination charge, the Court acknowledged the prosecution’s timeline theory as legally sufficient but found it against the weight of the evidence. The Court emphasized that the prosecution failed to prove that defendant killed his wife to prevent her from testifying against him, rather than because of marital issues. The evidence suggested that defendant procured potassium cyanide long before Jill’s condition suggested she could testify. As for the burglary charge, the Court reasoned that the aggravating factor of burglary requires an intent to commit a separate crime within the burglarized premises. The Court distinguished the case from felony murder jurisprudence, emphasizing that Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) requires an intent independent of the intentional murder. Citing out-of-state cases, the Court sided with the view that the burglary must have an objective independent of the murder to elevate the crime to capital murder status. The Court reasoned that the trespass was merely a prerequisite to the murder, lacking a separate purpose.

  • People v. Barney, 99 N.Y.2d 369 (2003): Defining ‘Dwelling’ for Burglary After Occupant’s Death

    People v. Barney, 99 N.Y.2d 369 (2003)

    A building retains its character as a ‘dwelling’ for purposes of burglary statutes even shortly after the death of its sole occupant, provided it was usually occupied for lodging, is furnished, and retains the indicia of a residence.

    Summary

    Barney was convicted of second-degree burglary for entering the home of a man who had died three days prior, intending to steal marijuana. The central issue was whether the house still qualified as a ‘dwelling’ under New York Penal Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the house, which was furnished, had utilities connected, and was recently occupied, retained its character as a dwelling. The Court reasoned that a short period after the occupant’s death doesn’t automatically strip the house of its dwelling status, especially considering the potential harm to grieving relatives and friends.

    Facts

    The sole occupant of a house died on August 21, 1999. Defendant Barney, aware of the death and that the decedent kept marijuana in the house, entered the unlocked house to search for drugs. Unable to find the drugs, Barney began collecting other items from the house. Police arrived, summoned by a neighbor, and arrested Barney. The utilities were still connected, and the house was furnished. The decedent’s mother owned the house but lived elsewhere and had given a friend of her son a key to care for the property after his death.

    Procedural History

    Barney was indicted for second-degree burglary and attempted petit larceny. The trial court denied Barney’s request to submit lesser included offenses (third-degree burglary, criminal trespass) to the jury and denied his motion to dismiss the second-degree burglary charge. Barney was convicted of both charges. The Appellate Division affirmed. One of the dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that the house Barney entered was a ‘dwelling’ within the meaning of Penal Law § 140.25 (2) when its sole occupant had died three days prior to the entry?

    2. Whether Barney was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of third-degree burglary?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, a jury could reasonably conclude that the house was ‘usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night’ as required by the statute.

    2. No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding of burglary in the third degree without also finding second-degree burglary; the house was, in fact, a dwelling.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the statutory definition of ‘dwelling’ as a building ‘usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night’ (Penal Law § 140.00 [3]). The Court emphasized the Legislature’s intent to enact a flexible standard. Considering the surrounding facts and circumstances, the Court noted the house was a furnished residence suitable for habitation and had been occupied until three days before the burglary. Quoting People v. Quattlebaum, 91 N.Y.2d 744 (1998), the court noted the importance of looking to the ‘nature of the structure’ to determine if it was normal and ordinary that it was ‘used as a place for overnight lodging’ and had ‘the customary indicia of a residence and its character or attributes’. The Court distinguished this case from situations involving prolonged absence or abandonment, emphasizing that immediate past use is a relevant factor. The Court rejected a rule that a house automatically loses its dwelling character upon the occupant’s death. The Court stated: ‘The death of its sole occupant three days earlier did not, on its own, transform decedent’s house from a dwelling into a building for the purposes of the burglary statute.’

  • People v. Campney, 94 N.Y.2d 307 (1999): Admissibility of Adoptive Admissions Based on Circumstantial Evidence

    94 N.Y.2d 307 (1999)

    Circumstantial evidence can establish that a defendant heard and understood a statement, thus laying the foundation for admitting the statement as an adoptive admission.

    Summary

    Randy Campney was convicted of burglary based on his brother Burton’s confession and Randy’s subsequent statement. After Burton confessed to police that he and Randy committed the burglary, he asked to speak with Randy. After their private conversation, Randy told Burton he “might as well sign it.” The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly allowed the jury to determine whether Randy adopted Burton’s statement as his own, based on the circumstantial evidence. The court reasoned that a jury could infer Randy had read the statement. This case clarifies the use of circumstantial evidence in determining the admissibility of adoptive admissions.

    Facts

    A Stewart’s convenience store was burglarized. Randy Campney and his brother, Burton, were arrested. Randy invoked his right to counsel and was placed in a room handcuffed. Burton gave a statement detailing the burglary, implicating both himself and Randy. Before signing the statement, Burton asked to speak with Randy. The police allowed the brothers to confer privately for 10-15 minutes. Afterward, officers observed Randy holding Burton’s written statement. Burton asked Randy if he should sign it, and Randy replied, “You might as well sign it, you already told them all about what happened.” Burton then signed the statement.

    Procedural History

    Randy was indicted for burglary. He moved to suppress his statement. The trial court denied the motion, ruling a foundation was laid for admission. At trial, an officer testified about Randy’s statement, and Burton’s written confession was admitted as an adoptive admission. Burton testified he alone committed the crime, and the prosecution impeached him with his prior statement. The jury convicted Randy, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether circumstantial evidence can be used to establish that a defendant heard and understood a statement, thus allowing that statement to be admitted as an adoptive admission.

    Holding

    Yes, because based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court had enough evidence before it to deduce that the defendant had read or been informed of the contents of the statement, understood its implications, and affirmatively adopted the statement as his own.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an adoptive admission occurs when a party acknowledges and assents to something already uttered by another, effectively making it the party’s own admission. While the Court has cautioned against admitting reactions to accusatory queries without demonstrating that the person heard and understood the assertion, it also recognized that circumstantial evidence may be used to determine whether a defendant apprehended a statement and understood its implications. Here, Randy and Burton conferred privately for 10-15 minutes after Burton confessed. Randy was observed holding Burton’s statement and advised Burton to sign it. This evidence supports the inference that Randy read or was informed of the statement’s contents, understood its implications, and adopted it as his own. The Court distinguished this case from situations involving silence, where the potential for manufactured evidence and ambiguity are greater. The court stated, “When an adoptive admission involves defendant’s acquiescence by silence, this Court has noted that ‘[t]here are circumstances in which the declarations of persons made in the presence of an accused are competent; but they are regarded as dangerous and should always be received with caution and should not be admitted unless the evidence clearly brings them within the rule’ (People v Conrow, 200 NY 356, 367).” Because Randy’s statement was spontaneous and not the product of interrogation, it was admissible even though he had invoked his right to counsel.

  • People v. $mathrm{Li}$, 91 N.Y.2d 987 (1998): Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentencing for Separate Acts

    People v. $mathrm{Li}$, 91 N.Y.2d 987 (1998)

    Consecutive sentences are permissible when multiple offenses are committed through separate and distinct acts, even if a common element, such as the use of a firearm, is involved in each offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for robbery, burglary, and related charges and upheld the imposition of consecutive sentences. The defendant argued that a biased juror should have been removed and that concurrent sentences were required because the use of a firearm was an element of each conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court appropriately addressed the juror issue and that consecutive sentences were proper because the robbery convictions stemmed from separate acts, distinct from the initial burglary.

    Facts

    The defendant and others entered a doctor’s office and robbed both the doctor and his wife. Before the robbery, the doctor called the police, leading to the defendant’s and his companions’ arrest at the scene. During the trial, the defendant’s wife made a threatening remark in Chinese to a complaining witness. The defense moved for a mistrial, which was initially denied. One juror stated he might blame the defendant for the remark and was excused. Another juror made a statement that the court interpreted as a reflection on the defendant. The defense did not request further questioning or removal of the juror, instead requesting and receiving a cautionary instruction to the jury.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of robbery, burglary, and related charges. The defense appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not removing a potentially biased juror and by imposing consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s failure to remove a juror who made a potentially biased statement constituted a fundamental error requiring reversal, even without further objection from the defense.

    2. Whether Penal Law § 70.25(2) required concurrent sentences because the use of a firearm was an element of both the burglary and robbery convictions.

    Holding

    1. No, because the error was not so adverse to fundamental trial procedures as to taint the entire trial, and the defense attorney did not seek further questioning or removal of the juror.

    2. No, because the robbery convictions were based on separate acts distinct from the act of burglary, even though a firearm was involved in each crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the juror issue, the Court of Appeals held that the error did not fall into the limited category of “mode of proceedings” errors that are so fundamental they do not require preservation. The court emphasized that the defense attorney did not pursue further questioning or removal of the juror, suggesting a strategic decision to rely on a cautionary instruction. As for the sentencing, the court relied on Penal Law § 70.25(2), which mandates concurrent sentences only when offenses are committed through a single act or omission, or when one act is a material element of the other. The court reasoned that the burglary was complete when the defendant entered the office with a firearm and the intent to commit a crime. The subsequent robberies of the doctor and his wife were separate and distinct acts. The court cited People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 361, and People v. Ramirez, 89 N.Y.2d 444, to support the proposition that robbery constitutes a separate act when it involves distinct victims or events. Therefore, the consecutive sentences were deemed proper because the robbery convictions were based on acts separate from the initial burglary. The court effectively distinguished the act of entering the premises with intent to commit a crime (burglary) from the subsequent acts of robbing the individuals inside. The key takeaway is that “When more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission… [the sentences must run concurrently].”

  • People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497 (1993): Jury Instructions Must Not Mislead on Elements of Burglary

    People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497 (1993)

    A conviction for burglary requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered the premises with the contemporaneous intent to commit a crime therein; jury instructions that mislead the jury into believing that a non-criminal act could satisfy the intent element are prejudicial and require a new trial.

    Summary

    Defendant Ryan was convicted of burglary after entering a service station and stealing money. At trial, Ryan claimed he entered only to find a hose for his bicycle tire and decided to steal the money only after seeing the open cash register. The jury asked if the intent to take the hose, even temporarily, could satisfy the intent element of burglary. The trial court’s response implied that temporary use of the hose could be a crime, thus satisfying the intent element. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jury instruction was prejudicially misleading because temporary use of the hose, if not a service the station charged for, was not a crime, and thus could not provide the necessary intent for burglary.

    Facts

    Ryan entered a service station at 2:00 a.m. and stole money from the cash register. He was charged with burglary in the third degree, among other crimes. At trial, Ryan testified he entered the station solely to find a missing hose from an air compressor to inflate his bicycle tire. He claimed the intent to steal the money arose only after he found the open cash register.

    Procedural History

    Ryan was convicted of burglary in the third degree in the County Court, Onondaga County. He appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed. Ryan then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury instruction that allows the jury to conclude that the defendant’s intent to commit a non-criminal act upon entry can satisfy the “intent to commit a crime upon entry” element required for a burglary conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the jury instruction improperly allowed the jury to base a burglary conviction on the defendant’s intent to commit an act (temporary use of the air hose) that was not necessarily a crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s supplemental instruction was prejudicially misleading. The court reasoned that the jury instruction erroneously allowed the jury to determine whether temporary use of the air hose was a crime, which is a question of law reserved for the court. “Absent any proof that use of the air was a service for which the station charged, temporary use of the hose would not amount to any crime”. The court cited Penal Law § 165.15 [4] (theft of services) and Penal Law § 155.00 [1], [8]; § 155.05. Because the jury could have based the burglary conviction on the intent to temporarily use the hose, which may not have been a crime, the conviction was improper. The court stated that the instruction improperly allowed the jury to conclude that defendant’s intent to temporarily use the air hose could establish the “intent to commit a crime upon entry” predicate for a burglary conviction, therefore necessitating a new trial. The court reaffirmed the principle that “the crime of burglary is committed when a person knowingly and unlawfully enters a building with the contemporaneous intent to commit a crime therein”.

  • People v. De Sair, 61 N.Y.2d 839 (1984): Limits on Justifiable Use of Deadly Force in Burglaries

    People v. De Sair, 61 N.Y.2d 839 (1984)

    A homeowner cannot claim justification for using deadly force to terminate a burglary under Penal Law § 35.20(3) when they invited the person onto their premises knowing the person intended to commit a crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the justifiable use of deadly physical force to terminate a burglary. The defendant, who shot and killed an acquaintance during an altercation in his home, could not invoke Penal Law § 35.20(3) because he invited the acquaintance into his home knowing the acquaintance intended to commit a crime. The court reasoned that the law is meant to protect victims of intrusion by individuals with criminal intent, not those who willingly participate in criminal activity. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with second-degree murder for shooting and killing Rodney Marsh during a violent altercation in the defendant’s home. The defendant testified that he and Marsh had a heated argument and agreed to settle their dispute at the defendant’s home. At Marsh’s urging, the defendant retrieved his gun from his bedroom. Marsh entered the room and approached the defendant, leading to a struggle. After the struggle, the defendant demanded Marsh leave. Marsh refused and walked toward the defendant, stating, “You got your gun, use it, if you don’t, I will.” Marsh attempted to take the defendant’s gun, but the defendant pushed him off. Marsh approached again, and the defendant shot him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense but refused to instruct on justifiable use of deadly force to terminate a burglary under Penal Law § 35.20(3). The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on § 35.20(3). The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a homeowner who invites another onto their premises, knowing the person intends to commit a crime, can invoke Penal Law § 35.20(3) to justify the use of deadly force to terminate what could technically be considered a burglary when the invited person refuses to leave.

    Holding

    No, because Penal Law § 35.20(3) is intended to protect individuals who are victims of an intrusion by someone with criminal intent, not someone who willingly participates in the criminal endeavor.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed Penal Law § 35.20(3), which authorizes the use of deadly physical force to terminate a burglary. The court emphasized that the legislative history indicates the statute was intended to protect individuals who are victims of an intrusion by someone with criminal intent. The Court stated, “Section 35.20 (3) — as its legislative history makes clear — was intended to protect those individuals who suddenly find themselves the victim of an intrusion upon their premises by one bent on a criminal end.” However, the court found no indication that the law was meant to protect someone like the defendant, who invited another person into his home knowing they intended to commit a crime. The court reasoned that such an individual is just as responsible for the invasion of security and cannot claim the protection of § 35.20(3). The court essentially applied a principle of equity, stating that one cannot benefit from a law designed to protect victims when they themselves contributed to the situation requiring the use of force. The Court emphasized that the defendant was “no less responsible for any ensuing invasion of his or her own security than the would-be burglar, and therefore cannot claim the protections of section 35.20 (3).” There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted in the memorandum opinion.

  • People v. Muniz, 74 N.Y.2d 464 (1989): Determining Predicate Felonies Based on Out-of-State Convictions

    People v. Muniz, 74 N.Y.2d 464 (1989)

    When determining if an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a predicate felony in New York, courts generally compare the statutory elements of the crimes, and may only consider the factual allegations in the foreign accusatory instrument when the foreign statute criminalizes multiple acts, some of which would be felonies and others misdemeanors in New York.

    Summary

    Muniz pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree burglary in New York. The prosecution sought to classify him as a second felony offender based on a prior New Jersey burglary conviction. The New Jersey statute defined burglary as entering with intent to commit any “offense,” while New York required intent to commit a “crime” (felony or misdemeanor). The Court of Appeals held that the New Jersey conviction could not serve as a predicate felony because “offense” was broader than “crime,” including acts that would only be violations in New York. The court further clarified that the accusatory instrument from the New Jersey case could not be considered, as the statute was not divisible in the way that would allow the court to use the charging document to determine the specific crime.

    Facts

    Defendant, Muniz, was charged in Bronx County with attempted second-degree burglary and fourth-degree criminal mischief.
    The People filed predicate felony statements, alleging Muniz was a second felony offender based on a prior New Jersey burglary conviction.
    The accusatory instrument from New Jersey alleged that Muniz committed third-degree burglary by breaking and entering premises with the intent to commit a theft.
    Defense counsel argued that the New Jersey conviction should not qualify as a predicate felony because the New Jersey statute criminalized unlawful entries with the intent to commit any “offense,” whereas New York burglary provisions require intent to commit a “crime.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court rejected Muniz’s arguments and found that his prior New Jersey burglary conviction qualified as a predicate felony, sentencing him as a second felony offender.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the “intent to commit an offense” in the New Jersey statute was equivalent to the “intent to commit a crime” required by New York burglary provisions.
    Muniz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New Jersey crime of third-degree burglary, which requires intent to commit any “offense,” is the equivalent of a New York felony, which requires intent to commit a “crime,” for the purpose of determining predicate felony status under Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i)?
    If not, whether the trial court could properly consider the factual allegations in the New Jersey accusatory instrument to elucidate the nature of Muniz’s prior crime?

    Holding

    No, because the New Jersey statute’s definition of “offense” is broader than New York’s definition of “crime,” encompassing acts that would not constitute felonies or misdemeanors in New York.
    No, because the New Jersey statute defines a single crime, and is not divisible in such a way that would allow the court to use the charging document to determine the specific crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i) requires the foreign conviction to have an equivalent among New York’s felony-level crimes.
    Generally, this determination is made by comparing the elements of the crimes as defined in the foreign and New York penal statutes, and the accusatory instrument underlying the foreign conviction is ordinarily not considered.
    However, the accusatory instrument may be considered when the foreign statute criminalizes several different acts, some of which would constitute felonies and others misdemeanors if committed in New York.
    New Jersey’s definition of “offense” includes acts that are the equivalent of petty offenses or violations in New York, while New York’s definition of “crime” encompasses only felonies and misdemeanors.
    Therefore, it is possible to violate the New Jersey third-degree burglary provisions by acting with the intent to commit a petty offense, without necessarily acting with the level of intent required for a felonious burglary in New York.
    The court distinguished this case from cases like People ex rel. Gold v. Jackson, where the foreign crime could be committed in several different, alternative ways, some of which would constitute felonies if committed in New York and others of which would constitute only misdemeanors. Here, the foreign crime was rendered a felony because of a particular aggravating circumstance (criminal intent), which included, but was broader in coverage than, the analogous aggravating element of the New York felony.
    Quoting People v. Olah, the court stated that “ ‘the controversy did not turn upon [them]’ ” and that it is improper to look to the factual allegations in the accusatory instrument as a means of clarifying the nature of the defendant’s claimed predicate crime.

  • People v. Gaines, 74 N.Y.2d 358 (1989): Burglary Requires Intent to Commit a Crime at the Time of Unlawful Entry

    People v. Gaines, 74 N.Y.2d 358 (1989)

    To be convicted of burglary in New York, a defendant must have intended to commit a crime at the time of unlawfully entering a building; intent formed after the unlawful entry is insufficient to establish burglary.

    Summary

    Gaines was convicted of burglary. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that, for a burglary conviction based on unlawful entry, the intent to commit a crime must exist at the moment of entry. The Court of Appeals held that the intent to commit a crime must exist at the time of unlawful entry. The Court reasoned that burglary is treated as a serious felony due to the heightened danger when someone unlawfully enters a building with criminal intent. The court reversed Gaines’s conviction because the jury instructions could have misled the jury.

    Facts

    Gaines was arrested while exiting a building supply company through a window. He was wearing coveralls and a jacket belonging to a company employee, with company pens in the jacket pocket. Inside, desks were in disarray, but nothing else was missing. Gaines testified that he entered the building to seek shelter from the cold and snow after finding his friend was not home. He claimed he put on the jacket and coveralls to stay warm and denied touching anything else.

    Procedural History

    Gaines was convicted of burglary at trial. He appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were inadequate. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Gaines then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, for a burglary conviction based on unlawful entry, the jury must be instructed that the intent to commit a crime inside the building must exist at the time of the unlawful entry.

    Holding

    Yes, because burglary requires contemporaneous intent to commit a crime at the time of unlawful entry; intent formed after the entry is insufficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that burglary is considered a serious felony due to the heightened danger posed by an unlawful intrusion by someone with criminal intent. “A defendant who simply trespasses with no intent to commit a crime inside a building does not possess the more culpable mental state that justifies punishment as a burglar.” The court highlighted that the addition of “remains unlawfully” in the statute was intended to address situations where a person lawfully enters a building but remains after their authorization terminates (e.g., a shoplifter remaining after closing). The Court stated, “[t]he word ‘remain’ in the phrase ‘enter or remain’ is designed to be applicable to cases in which a person enters with ‘license or privilege’ but remains on the premises after termination of such license or privilege.” The court stated that the jury should have been instructed that they must find that he intended to commit a crime at the time he entered the premises unlawfully. Because the instructions given could have misled the jury into thinking that any illegal entry coupled with a subsequent crime constitutes burglary, the conviction was reversed.