R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects v. McKinsey & Company, 473 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1984)

In architectural malpractice cases, expert testimony is generally required to establish the applicable standard of care and whether the architect deviated from that standard, unless the alleged malpractice falls within the competence of a lay jury to evaluate.

Summary

R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects sued McKinsey & Company for architectural malpractice, alleging unreasonable delays in responding to building department objections. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that expert testimony was necessary to establish architectural malpractice in this case because the alleged negligence involved delays in responding to objections rather than defective plans, which is outside the competence of a lay jury. The court found that the plaintiff’s expert testimony was insufficient to establish proximate cause between the delays and the project’s failure.

Facts

R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects (plaintiff) sued McKinsey & Company (defendant) alleging architectural malpractice. The claim was based on protracted delays in responding to objections raised by the New York City Department of Buildings, rather than the submission of defective architectural plans. The plaintiff contended that these delays led to the failure of the construction project.

Procedural History

The trial court dismissed the case at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether expert testimony is required to establish architectural malpractice when the alleged negligence involves protracted delays in responding to building department objections.
2. Whether the expert testimony presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to establish proximate cause between the alleged delays and the failure of the construction project.
3. Whether the defendant guaranteed the plaintiff that they would provide plans acceptable to the Department of Buildings.

Holding

1. Yes, because whether the delays in complying with the building department’s objections constituted architectural malpractice is not within the competence of an untutored layman to evaluate.
2. No, because the expert’s testimony was too vague and did not establish that the delays proximately caused the project’s failure.
3. No, because the defendants never guaranteed that they would provide plans acceptable to the Department of Buildings.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that expert testimony is required to support allegations of malpractice, except where the alleged act falls within the competence of a lay jury to evaluate. The court distinguished this case from those involving defective plans, noting that evaluating the reasonableness of delays in responding to building department objections requires specialized knowledge outside the common experience of jurors. The court stated, “Whether the allegedly inordinate delays of defendants in complying with objections of the building department constituted architectural malpractice is not within the competence of an untutored layman to evaluate. Common experience and observation offer little guidance.”

Regarding the sufficiency of the expert testimony, the court found that the expert’s opinion was too vague to establish proximate cause. The expert stated that there had been “an unusually long delay” between some or many of the objections and the responses. The court found that this left it to conjecture whether those unduly delayed responses in particular proximately caused the failure of the construction project. The court emphasized that the expert testimony did not imply that a competent architect would have timely complied with all the building department objections. The court stated that “the fact finder may not render a factual determination devoid of support. We do not believe that the expert testimony in this case is sufficient to enable the jury to infer reasonably that defendants’ undue delays proximately caused plaintiff’s injury.”

The court also found that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim failed because the defendants never guaranteed that they would provide plans acceptable to the department of buildings.