New York Law Review

Tag: Building Code Violations

  • Lesocovich v. 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 982 (1993): Landlord Liability and Foreseeability of Harm on Unsecured Roof

    81 N.Y.2d 982 (1993)

    A landlord can be held liable for injuries sustained on an unsecured portion of a building if the use of that area and the resulting harm were reasonably foreseeable, and the landlord failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the harm.

    Summary

    Lesocovich sued 180 Madison Avenue Corp. after falling from a flat roof owned by the corporation, alleging negligence due to the lack of a railing. The plaintiff was a guest of a tenant who used the roof for recreation with access through a bedroom window. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment to the landlord, finding triable issues of fact regarding foreseeability and the applicability of statutes and building codes. The court emphasized the landlord’s duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm, and the potential applicability of building codes based on the extent of alterations and repairs made to the property.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Lesocovich fell from a flat roof of a building owned by defendant 180 Madison Avenue Corporation, sustaining severe injuries. The roof covered a one-story section of a three-story building. The plaintiff was visiting a tenant who accessed the roof through a bedroom window for recreational purposes. The window screen was removed, and cinder blocks were present on the roof when the tenant moved in. The tenant had not sought permission to use the roof but had done so previously. The landlord never explicitly prohibited the tenant’s roof access.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued, alleging negligence. The defendant moved for summary judgment, which the motion court denied. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact regarding foreseeability. A dissenting opinion argued triable issues existed regarding foreseeability and statutory violations. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the denial of summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant exercised reasonable care to prevent the use of or access to the roof and porch.

    2. Whether it was foreseeable that persons might use the roof and porch for outdoor recreational purposes.

    3. Whether, under the applicable law, the failure to install a railing or parapet wall constitutes a violation.

    4. Whether the alterations and repairs made to the premises brought it within the purview of the Code.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record presents triable issues of fact regarding the precautions taken by the landlord to prevent roof access.

    2. Yes, because a reasonable jury could conclude that the landlord should have foreseen tenants and guests using the roof for recreation.

    3. Undetermined, because the applicable law and facts surrounding the roof’s characteristics must be determined at trial.

    4. Undetermined, because there are issues of fact whether the extent of alterations to the property invoked the State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, citing Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853. The court emphasized that summary judgment requires eliminating material issues of fact, referencing Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 and Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404. The court found triable issues concerning the landlord’s reasonable care to prevent roof access, the foreseeability of recreational use, and whether the failure to install a railing violated applicable law. The court noted the evidence of a substantial loan and extensive repairs, questioning whether these brought the premises under relevant statutes or codes. The court reasoned that reasonable persons could disagree on whether the landlord should have foreseen the roof’s recreational use and the risk of falls due to the absence of a railing. The dissent in the Appellate Division highlighted the tenant’s testimony and the extensive repairs as evidence of foreseeability and potential code violations. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversing the grant of summary judgment.

  • People v. Reyes, 75 N.Y.2d 590 (1990): Landlord’s Liability for Illegal Building Alterations Leading to Fatality

    People v. Reyes, 75 N.Y.2d 590 (1990)

    A landlord who participates in creating dangerous conditions on a property, retains control over the property, and has a continuing statutory duty to maintain the property safely, can be held criminally liable for injuries or death resulting from those conditions.

    Summary

    Defendant Reyes, the owner of a building, was indicted on multiple felonies after a fire in his building, illegally converted into a single-room occupancy (SRO) dwelling without permits, resulted in a tenant’s death and another’s injury. The illegal conversion created numerous Building Code violations, including electrical deficiencies causing the fire. The Court of Appeals held that the Grand Jury had legally sufficient evidence to indict Reyes because he participated in creating the fire-producing conditions and retained control of the premises despite a triple net lease that delegated operational responsibility to another party. Reyes’ actions and omissions, combined with his continuing statutory duty as the building’s legal owner, established a basis for criminal liability.

    Facts

    Reyes owned a building from March 1983 until the fire in December 1985. He illegally converted the commercial office space into an SRO dwelling without proper permits, leading to electrical deficiencies. From July 1983 to October 1985, Velez managed the building under a net lease, collecting rents and covering repairs, maintenance, taxes, and utilities. Velez sublet the building to Arias, who allowed Troncoso and Dume to manage a grocery store on the ground floor and collect residential rents for Velez. The fire originated in a second-floor kitchen due to overloaded electrical wiring, causing one death and one injury.

    Procedural History

    The Grand Jury indicted Reyes and Velez for manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, assault, and reckless endangerment. The trial court dismissed the indictment against both, citing a lack of evidence that either defendant created the illegal conditions or had control over the premises when the conditions were created. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the indictment. Only Reyes appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Grand Jury had legally sufficient evidence to indict Reyes for crimes related to the fire, given his participation in creating the dangerous conditions and his retained control over the building.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Grand Jury had enough evidence to conclude that Reyes participated in creating the fire-producing conditions and failed in his continuing duty as the legal owner to eliminate those conditions. The creation and continuance of the dangerous conditions presented a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or injury in a fire.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the Grand Jury had sufficient evidence to indict Reyes based on his direct involvement in creating the dangerous conditions and his failure to fulfill his ongoing statutory duty as the building’s owner. The evidence showed numerous electrical hazards, including overloaded extension cords, exposed wires, and improperly grounded equipment. The court highlighted Reyes’ personal supervision of the illegal conversion of the building into an SRO, which violated multiple building codes and created a fire hazard. The Court cited Multiple Dwelling Law § 78, which states that “[e]very multiple dwelling * * * shall be kept in good repair” and “[t]he owner shall be responsible for compliance with the provisions of this section”. The Court found that even though Reyes leased the building, he retained control through the lease agreement, which required his consent for any alterations. Further, Reyes continued to receive rent, respond to tenant complaints, and carry insurance for the building. The Court also noted that Reyes received notice of electrical violations months before the fire and failed to address them. Taken together, these factors provided legally sufficient evidence for the Grand Jury to indict Reyes. The Court emphasized that the events leading to the fire were a “sufficiently direct cause” to justify holding Reyes criminally responsible, distinguishing this case from situations where the causal link is more attenuated (citing People v. Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407, 412-413). The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order reinstating the indictment.