New York Law Review

Tag: Building Code Violation

  • R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects v. McKinsey & Company, Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 538 (2004): Statute of Limitations for Architectural Malpractice Claims

    R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects v. McKinsey & Company, Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 538 (2004)

    When a claim against an architect arises from their failure to exercise due care in performing professional services, the claim is governed by the three-year statute of limitations for malpractice, regardless of whether the claim is framed as a breach of contract based on an express contractual provision mirroring the architect’s professional obligations.

    Summary

    McKinsey & Company hired R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects (K&H) for office design. After the project’s completion, McKinsey alleged K&H failed to comply with fire protection requirements mandated by the Connecticut Building Code, breaching an express contractual clause. McKinsey demanded arbitration more than three years after project completion. K&H sought a stay, arguing the three-year malpractice statute of limitations barred the claim. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the claim fundamentally alleged professional negligence, the three-year statute applied, even with an express contract term mirroring professional obligations, thus barring the claim.

    Facts

    In January 1998, McKinsey & Company, Inc. contracted with R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects (K&H) for architectural and interior design services. A clause in the contract required K&H to ensure all plans complied with applicable building codes. The Stamford Building Department issued a certificate of occupancy in November 1998. In April 2002, McKinsey claimed K&H failed to provide code-compliant fire protection, necessitating McKinsey to incur costs to remedy the defect. McKinsey then sought arbitration.

    Procedural History

    K&H initiated a special proceeding to stay arbitration, arguing the claim was time-barred under the three-year malpractice statute of limitations. The Supreme Court denied the petition, characterizing the claim as a breach of contract and subject to a six-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the claim was subject to the three-year malpractice statute of limitations, irrespective of being framed as a contract breach. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a claim against an architect for failing to comply with building codes, based on an express contractual provision requiring such compliance, is governed by the three-year statute of limitations for malpractice, or the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract.

    Holding

    No, because the essence of the claim is that the architect failed to perform services in a professional, non-negligent manner, which falls under the definition of malpractice, and is therefore subject to the three-year statute of limitations regardless of whether the claim is based on an express contractual provision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPLR 214(6) was amended to ensure that malpractice claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations, irrespective of whether the underlying theory is contract or tort. The legislative intent was to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the malpractice statute by framing malpractice claims as contract breaches. The Court noted that while McKinsey argued the case differed due to an express contractual provision, compliance with building codes is inherent in an architect’s professional obligations. The Court reasoned that “Making such ordinary obligations express terms of an agreement does not remove the issue from the realm of negligence…nor can it convert a malpractice action into a breach of contract action.” Allowing the claim would undermine the legislative purpose of the amendment to CPLR 214(6). The pertinent inquiry is whether the claim is essentially a malpractice claim. Because K&H did not guarantee a particular result beyond its professional obligations, the claim remained a malpractice action and was time-barred. As the court stated, “where the underlying complaint is one which essentially claims that there was a failure to utilize reasonable care or where acts of omission or negligence are alleged or claimed, the statute of limitations shall be three years if the case comes within the purview of CPLR Section 214 (6), regardless of whether the theory is based in tort or in a breach of contract”.

  • Hyman v. Queens County Bancorp, Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 743 (2004): Establishing Proximate Cause and Building Code Violations in Negligence Claims

    3 N.Y.3d 743 (2004)

    A plaintiff opposing summary judgment in a premises liability case must present admissible evidence demonstrating both a defective condition and a causal link between that condition and the injury.

    Summary

    In this personal injury action, the plaintiffs, Alan and Joan Hyman, alleged that Queens County Bancorp’s premises were unsafe due to a missing handrail on a staircase, which allegedly caused Alan Hyman to fall. The plaintiffs argued that this violated city and state building codes and constituted negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order granting summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish either a violation of applicable building codes or a causal connection between the missing handrail and Alan Hyman’s fall. The plaintiffs’ claims amounted to speculation, insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

    Facts

    Alan Hyman fell down six or seven stairs on premises owned by Queens County Bancorp. The plaintiffs alleged that the absence of a handrail on both sides of the stairway, violating city and state building codes, created a dangerous condition. The plaintiffs asserted that this missing handrail was the proximate cause of Alan Hyman’s fall.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued Queens County Bancorp for personal injuries. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The lower court’s decision is not specified in the provided text. The Appellate Division granted summary judgment in favor of Queens County Bancorp. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding a defective or dangerous condition on the defendant’s premises due to an alleged violation of city and state building codes regarding stairway handrails.

    2. Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding causation between the alleged defective condition (missing handrail) and Alan Hyman’s fall.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the building was subject to the cited codes and that the absence of a handrail constituted a dangerous condition, particularly considering the certificate of occupancy issued to the defendant.

    2. No, because the plaintiffs offered only speculation that the existing handrail was beyond reach, which is insufficient to establish causation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a party opposing summary judgment must provide admissible evidence that necessitates a trial on material facts. The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden. Specifically, they did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the building was subject to the building codes they cited regarding handrails. The court noted, “not all buildings were subject to the cited codes and plaintiffs offered no evidence of what would have brought the subject building within the purview of those laws.” The existence of a certificate of occupancy issued in 1978 further undermined the claim of a defective condition, distinguishing the case from Lesocovich v 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 NY2d 982 (1993). Regarding causation, the court found the plaintiffs’ claims to be speculative, stating that they offered “only speculation that in the circumstances presented the existing handrail was beyond reach.” Because the plaintiffs failed to establish both a defective condition and a causal link, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant. The Court thus reinforced the principle that mere allegations or speculation, without supporting evidence, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.