New York Law Review

Tag: building code

  • Tarquini v. Town of Aurora, 77 N.Y.2d 357 (1991): Scope of State Building Code Authority Over Swimming Pools

    Tarquini v. Town of Aurora, 77 N.Y.2d 357 (1991)

    The State Fire Prevention and Building Code Council has the authority to promulgate regulations concerning the safety of structures like swimming pools under Executive Law § 378(2), and the statutory exemption for pre-Code buildings does not apply to swimming pools.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the State Fire Prevention and Building Code Council has the authority to require enclosures around residential swimming pools and whether a statutory exemption for buildings constructed before the Code’s effective date applies to pools. The Court of Appeals held that the Council’s authority extends to regulating structures like swimming pools to ensure safety and that the exemption only applies to buildings, not swimming pools. The decision underscores the broad authority granted to the Council to establish safety standards for various structures and premises within the state, separate and apart from fire and toxic gas risks.

    Facts

    Respondent Tarquini owned property on which he built an unenclosed outdoor swimming pool in 1982. In 1984, the State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code became effective, including a regulation requiring enclosures around outdoor swimming pools. Tarquini did not build the required enclosure.

    Procedural History

    The Town of Aurora initiated an enforcement proceeding against Tarquini for violating the pool enclosure regulation. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Town. Tarquini then sought a variance, which was denied. He commenced an Article 78 proceeding challenging the denial. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment in the enforcement proceeding and dismissed the Article 78 proceeding, concluding the Council lacked authority to promulgate the pool enclosure regulation.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the State Fire Prevention and Building Code Council exceeded its legislatively delegated authority by promulgating a regulation requiring enclosures around residential outdoor swimming pools.
    2. Whether the statutory exemption for buildings constructed before the State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code’s effective date applies to swimming pools.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Executive Law § 378(2) authorizes the Council to establish standards regarding the condition, maintenance, and safety of existing structures and premises, which includes swimming pools.
    2. No, because the act defines “building” as a structure with a roof affording shelter for persons, animals, or property, and a swimming pool does not meet this definition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Executive Law § 378(2) grants the Council authority to establish standards for the condition and maintenance of existing buildings, structures, and premises, as well as to safeguard life and property from hazards. The Court noted that the legislative history of § 378(2) confirms its two-fold purpose: general regulations for existing buildings and specific regulations for fire and toxic gas hazards. The Court rejected the argument that § 378(2) only applies to fire and toxic gas hazards, pointing out that many standard building code provisions address safety concerns unrelated to those specific hazards, such as requirements for handrails, lighting on stairs, and elevator safety.

    Furthermore, the Court determined that a swimming pool falls under the definition of “structures and premises” as it is an assembly of materials framed of component parts and situated on a parcel of land. The Court referenced the Code’s definitions of premises and structure (9 NYCRR 606.3 [a] [151], [185]) which are consonant with the generally accepted meanings of these terms.

    Regarding the exemption, the Court relied on the statutory definition of “building” in Executive Law § 372(3) – “a combination of any materials, whether portable or fixed, having a roof, to form a structure affording shelter for persons, animals or property.” Since a swimming pool lacks a roof and does not provide shelter, the Court concluded that the exemption for pre-Code buildings did not apply. As the Court stated: “A swimming pool is clearly not a building as defined in the act, and the exemption provision, therefore, does not apply.”

  • Ass’n of Master Plumbers v. City of N.Y., 60 N.Y.2d 810 (1983): Permissible Scope of Agency Directives

    Ass’n of Master Plumbers v. City of N.Y., 60 N.Y.2d 810 (1983)

    An administrative agency’s directive is not arbitrary or contrary to law if it is issued after review of relevant issues and is consistent with the governing code, especially when the directive addresses the practical implementation of existing regulations.

    Summary

    The Association of Master Plumbers challenged a directive issued by the New York City Commissioner allowing either licensed master plumbers or mechanical, sprinkler, or steam-fitter contractors to install combination fire standpipes, superseding a prior directive that required such installation to be supervised by licensed master plumbers. The Association argued the directive was arbitrary, a public danger, a Building Code violation, and a failure to comply with rule-making and environmental review procedures. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding that the directive was neither arbitrary nor contrary to law. The Court found no demonstrated basis for the claim of imminent danger to public health and safety and noted that the Building Code did not mandate installation only by master plumbers.

    Facts

    The Commissioner of the New York City Department of Buildings issued a directive in 1982 allowing either licensed master plumbers or mechanical, sprinkler, or steam-fitter contractors to install combination fire standpipes. This directive superseded a 1975 directive that required such installations to be supervised by licensed master plumbers. The 1982 directive stipulated that connections to the potable water supply system must be made by master plumbers and comply with Reference Standard RS-16.

    Procedural History

    The Association of Master Plumbers initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the 1982 directive. Special Term dismissed the petition, finding no standing and no cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that no cause of action was stated, although two justices concurred that the Association had standing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Commissioner’s 1982 directive, allowing contractors other than licensed master plumbers to install combination fire standpipes, was arbitrary or contrary to law.

    Holding

    No, because the directive was issued after a review of relevant health and other issues and was consistent with the Administrative Code. The Court found no basis for the claim that the directive jeopardized public health and safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found the Association’s allegation of “imminent danger” to public health and safety without any demonstrated basis, noting that the directive was issued after review of health and other issues, and a study conducted by an engineering consultant. The Court also determined that the Building Code did not mandate that only master plumbers could install combination fire standpipes. The court emphasized that the 1982 directive itself contemplated that connections to the potable water supply system would still be made by master plumbers and comply with Reference Standard RS-16. The Court noted that even if rule-making procedures were at issue, the failure to present this specific issue to the lower court precluded consideration by the Court of Appeals. Further, the State Environmental Quality Review Act expressly excepts “inspections and licensing activities relating to the qualifications of individuals or businesses to engage in their business or profession” (6 NYCRR 617.13 [b] [11]). The court in effect deferred to the agency’s expertise in interpreting and implementing its own regulations, absent a clear showing of arbitrariness or illegality.