Tag: Brunswick Hospital Center, Inc. v. Hynes

  • Brunswick Hospital Center, Inc. v. Hynes, 52 N.Y.2d 333 (1981): Enforceability of Grand Jury Subpoenas After Compliance

    Brunswick Hospital Center, Inc. v. Hynes, 52 N.Y.2d 333 (1981)

    A party who complies with a subpoena duces tecum issued on behalf of a grand jury cannot later challenge the validity of the subpoena or the jurisdiction of the issuing authority.

    Summary

    Brunswick Hospital sought to quash subpoenas issued by a Special Prosecutor on behalf of a Grand Jury, arguing the Grand Jury had expired before full compliance. The Court of Appeals held that once a party complies with a subpoena, they lose the right to challenge its validity or the issuer’s jurisdiction. The Special Prosecutor had the right to retain copies of subpoenaed materials without prior court approval, and it was the hospital’s burden to challenge the extent of possession. The motion to quash was untimely because compliance had already occurred.

    Facts

    The Special Prosecutor investigated Brunswick Hospital’s business affairs, leading to a Grand Jury impaneled in September 1978. The Special Prosecutor served a subpoena duces tecum on the hospital on behalf of the Grand Jury. After initial challenges, the hospital purportedly surrendered the records in January 1979. A second subpoena was issued in March 1979 for additional records, with the hospital claiming unavailability due to the prosecutor’s actions. The hospital delivered documents to the Special Prosecutor on June 27, considered substantial compliance.

    Procedural History

    The September 1978 Grand Jury’s term expired on June 22, 1979. On July 23, Brunswick Hospital commenced a proceeding to quash the subpoenas, regain original documents and copies, and suppress obtained information. The Special Prosecutor conceded to return the original documents but sought to retain copies. County Court granted the return of originals but refused to order surrender of copies. The Appellate Division modified this, ruling that the Special Prosecutor needed court approval before impounding subpoenaed material. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and reinstated the County Court order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a prosecutor who obtains evidence via a subpoena duces tecum issued on behalf of a Grand Jury must obtain a court order prior to possessing and retaining the subpoenaed material.

    2. Whether a motion to quash a subpoena can be entertained after the subpoenaed party has complied with the subpoena.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 610.25 grants the prosecutor the right to possess and retain subpoenaed evidence without prior court approval; the burden is on the subpoenaed party to challenge the extent of possession.

    2. No, because a motion to quash must be made before compliance with the subpoena; compliance waives the right to challenge the subpoena’s validity or the issuer’s jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on CPL 610.25, which grants a prosecutor issuing a subpoena duces tecum on behalf of a Grand Jury the right to possess and retain the subpoenaed evidence. This statute was enacted to overturn prior case law that restricted a prosecutor’s ability to retain subpoenaed documents without statutory authority. The court cited Matter of Hynes v. Moskowitz, 44 NY2d 383, emphasizing that no prior court order is required for the prosecutor to possess and retain materials. The court stated, “It is the burden of the subpoenaed party to raise a challenge as to the extent of possession to which the issuer is entitled. Prior to such an application, the issuer may lawfully exercise dominion and control over the subpoenaed evidence.”

    Regarding the motion to quash, the court emphasized that it must be made before compliance with the subpoena. The court stated, “Once there has been compliance with the subpoena, however, a motion to quash or vacate no longer is available.” Allowing challenges after compliance would create endless litigation and undermine the finality of legal processes. The court dismissed the argument that the hospital’s lack of knowledge about the Grand Jury’s expiration excused their delay, noting that the expiration was a matter of public record.