18 N.Y.2d 560 (1966)

A judgment in favor of a contractor in a trespass action, based on the contractor acting under the state’s direction, can bar a subsequent claim against the state for the same trespass under the doctrine of res judicata, provided the prior judgment actually determined the contractor committed no actionable wrong.

Summary

Bronxville Palmer sued the State of New York for trespass, alleging damage to their property during the construction of a parkway. A prior lawsuit against the contractors for the same trespass had resulted in a judgment for the contractors. The Court of Appeals held that the prior judgment in favor of the contractors barred the claim against the State under the doctrine of res judicata. The court reasoned that the State’s liability was derivative of the contractors’ actions; if the contractors were found not liable for trespass, the State could not be held liable for the same acts. The critical factor was whether the prior judgment actually determined the contractors committed no actionable trespass.

Facts

Claimant owned an apartment building in Yonkers.
During the Sprain Brook Parkway construction, piles were allegedly driven onto the claimant’s land, causing damage to the building.
Claimant previously sued the general and special contractors for the same trespass and damages in Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court action resulted in a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits.

Procedural History

Bronxville Palmer filed claims against the State of New York in the Court of Claims.
The State moved to dismiss the claims based on the prior judgment in favor of the contractors, arguing res judicata.
The Appellate Division dismissed the claims, holding that the prior judgment was res judicata.
Bronxville Palmer appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a judgment in favor of contractors in a prior trespass action, based on the same physical acts, bars a subsequent claim against the State for the same trespass under the doctrine of res judicata.

Holding

Yes, because the State’s liability is derivative of the contractors’ actions, and a prior adjudication that the contractors committed no actionable wrong inures to the benefit of the State, provided the prior judgment actually determined the contractors committed no actionable trespass.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of res judicata, which prevents a party from relitigating issues that have already been decided in a prior action. The court emphasized that the State’s liability for trespass was derivative of the contractors’ actions. If the contractors were found not liable for trespass, the State could not be held liable for the same acts.
The court noted that the burden of establishing res judicata is on the party asserting it (here, the State). The State met this burden by demonstrating that the prior judgment determined the contractors were not responsible for trespass.
However, the court acknowledged an exception: if the prior judgment was based on a finding that the contractors acted under compulsion by the State, or that the State was solely responsible, then res judicata would not apply. The claimant argued that the jury in the Supreme Court action was instructed to decide “who was to blame, the contractors or the State”.
But the Court found that the claimant failed to demonstrate that the prior adjudication was based on a theory different from the trespass claim. Extracts from the jury charge did not show that the jury was instructed to find for the contractors if they acted under the State’s compulsion. The court relied on the pleadings and the judgment itself, which indicated that the issue of trespass was decided against the claimant.
Judge Keating’s concurrence emphasized that trespass is an intentional tort, and the contractors’ motive or justification is irrelevant. The only issue is whether the contractors went on the claimant’s land. If the jury was improperly instructed, the claimant’s remedy was to appeal the prior judgment.
Judge Van Voorhis dissented, arguing that the prior judgment excluded the issue of the State’s liability. The jury could have found the contractors not liable even if there was a trespass, if they acted under the State’s direction. Therefore, the prior judgment did not decide that there was no trespass by the State, and res judicata should not apply. He emphasized that “the essence of res judicata is that the controlling issue, whether of fact or of law, has been decided between the parties by a competent tribunal.”