Broggy v. Rockefeller Group, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 675 (2007)

To prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) claim involving cleaning, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the cleaning task created an elevation-related risk requiring protective devices and that the absence of such devices was the proximate cause of the injury.

Summary

Laurence Broggy, a window washer, was injured while cleaning windows in an office building. He stood on a desk to reach the upper portion of the windows and fell, allegedly due to the lack of safety devices. The Court of Appeals held that Broggy failed to prove that the window washing task required him to work at an elevation, thus negating the need for safety devices under Labor Law § 240(1). The Court emphasized that simply using an elevated platform does not automatically trigger liability; the task itself must inherently require work at an elevation.

Facts

Laurence Broggy, an employee of ISS, was assigned to wash interior windows on the eighth floor of 75 Rockefeller Plaza. In room 810, Broggy encountered a large desk positioned against the window he needed to clean. He and his coworkers deemed the desk too heavy to move. Broggy climbed onto the desk to reach the upper portions of the windows. While cleaning, a window sash slammed down, causing him to lose his balance and fall off the desk, resulting in injury. Broggy had previously cleaned eight similar windows in the building without incident and without using a ladder or other safety device.

Procedural History

Broggy sued the building owners, alleging violations of several sections of the Labor Law, including § 240(1). The Supreme Court initially granted Broggy partial summary judgment on the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division reversed, denying Broggy’s motion and granting summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the § 240(1) claim. The Court of Appeals granted Broggy leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the plaintiff established that the window washing task created an elevation-related risk requiring safety devices under Labor Law § 240(1), and that the absence of such devices proximately caused his injury.

Holding

No, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the window washing task inherently required him to work at an elevation, thus failing to establish the need for safety devices under Labor Law § 240(1).

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, focusing on the lack of evidence demonstrating that the window cleaning task required Broggy to work at an elevation. The Court acknowledged that Labor Law § 240(1) explicitly includes “cleaning” as a protected activity. However, the Court distinguished between routine household window washing and tasks that inherently involve elevation-related risks. The Court stated that “[t]he crucial consideration under section 240 (1) is not whether the cleaning is taking place as part of a construction, demolition or repair project, or is incidental to another activity protected under section 240 (1); or whether a window’s exterior or interior is being cleaned. Rather, liability turns on whether a particular window washing task creates an elevation-related risk of the kind that the safety devices listed in section 240 (1) protect against.”

The Court noted that Broggy did not provide evidence showing how high he could reach from the floor with his tools. While he claimed he had to stand on the desk, he did not demonstrate that this was due to the necessity of working at an elevation. The Court reasoned that the desk may have simply been an obstruction or a matter of convenience. Furthermore, the Court highlighted the fact that Broggy had successfully cleaned eight similar windows without any safety devices. This undermined his claim that the task inherently required elevation-related protection. The Court concluded that summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate because the evidence demonstrated that Broggy did not need protection from the effects of gravity in this instance.