New York Law Review

Tag: Bribe Receiving

  • People v. Harper, 75 N.Y.2d 314 (1990): Sufficiency of Evidence for Bribe Receiving by a Witness

    People v. Harper, 75 N.Y.2d 314 (1990)

    An agreement to “drop charges” is not equivalent to an agreement to alter testimony or avoid appearing at a proceeding, and thus, is legally insufficient to establish bribe receiving by a witness under Penal Law § 215.05 without further evidence.

    Summary

    Montey Harper was convicted of bribe receiving by a witness for agreeing to “drop” assault charges against Rick James in exchange for money. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement to drop charges, without evidence of an explicit agreement to alter testimony or avoid appearing in court, was insufficient to support the conviction. The court reasoned that agreeing to drop charges does not necessarily imply an intent to influence testimony or absent oneself from the proceedings. This case highlights the importance of clearly establishing the intent to influence testimony or prevent a witness from appearing to secure a conviction for bribe receiving by a witness.

    Facts

    Montey Harper was allegedly assaulted by Rick James and Carmen Johnson. Harper filed assault charges against them. Harper approached Betty Gladden (James’s mother) and threatened a civil suit and criminal charges unless she paid him $10,000. Gladden paid Harper, who signed a release agreeing to “drop charges” against James and Johnson in exchange for $5,000 plus an additional $5,000 payment schedule for medical expenses. After receiving the initial payment, Harper went to court to drop the charges, but the Assistant District Attorney refused due to lack of access to the case file. The charges were later dismissed due to facial insufficiency. Harper refiled the charges when Gladden failed to make scheduled payments. Gladden then reported the matter to the District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    Harper was charged with bribe receiving by a witness (Penal Law § 215.05) and convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment, finding the evidence legally insufficient. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an unlawful agreement to alter testimony or avoid appearing at an action or proceeding may be inferred from a “release” agreement in which one party agrees to “drop” criminal and civil charges in exchange for money and other valuable consideration, thus satisfying the requirements for bribe receiving by a witness under Penal Law § 215.05.

    Holding

    No, because an agreement to “drop charges” is not the same as an agreement to alter testimony or absent oneself from a proceeding; therefore, it cannot alone support a conviction for bribe receiving by a witness without further evidence of such an agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the crime of bribe receiving by a witness requires an “agreement or understanding” that a witness will either influence their testimony or avoid appearing at the proceeding. The court found that the agreement to “drop charges” does not explicitly state or implicitly suggest that Harper would alter his testimony or absent himself from the criminal proceedings. The court noted, “agreeing to ‘drop’ charges is certainly not the same as agreeing to alter testimony or absent oneself entirely from a proceeding. Consequently, evidence that someone has agreed to do the former cannot alone be used as a basis to infer the existence of an agreement to do the latter.” The court reasoned that interpreting “drop the charges” as a promise to halt the proceedings or hinder the prosecution was an overextension of the statute’s intent. The court stated that penal statutes should be interpreted according to the fair import of their terms, and penal responsibility should not be extended beyond the fair scope of the statutory mandate. Further, the court found no evidence that Harper attempted to influence his testimony or avoid appearing. The court noted that Harper made himself available to the prosecution after Gladden failed to make the agreed-upon payments. Therefore, the court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order reversing Harper’s conviction.

  • People v. Fiore, 34 N.Y.2d 88 (1974): Admissibility of Uncharged Crimes to Show Common Scheme

    People v. Fiore, 34 N.Y.2d 88 (1974)

    Evidence of uncharged criminal conduct is inadmissible to establish a predisposition to commit the crime charged, unless it is offered for a relevant purpose other than to show criminal propensity, such as demonstrating a common scheme or plan that encompasses both the charged and uncharged crimes.

    Summary

    Fiore, a former president of a school board, was convicted of bribe receiving and related offenses for allegedly soliciting a kickback from a contractor. The prosecution introduced evidence that Fiore had previously received unlawful payments from the project’s architect, for which he was never charged. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the architect’s testimony was improperly admitted because it served only to show Fiore’s criminal propensity, not a common scheme or plan. The court emphasized that the uncharged crime did not directly support an inference that a single, inseparable plan existed encompassing both the charged and uncharged crimes.

    Facts

    The Lackawanna School Board, responsible for awarding construction contracts, charged Fiore with soliciting a kickback from a general contractor bidding on an elementary school addition. The contractor testified that the architect provided Fiore’s contact information, and Fiore, representing the board, requested 10% of the contract price, which the contractor refused. The architect testified he paid Fiore 20% of his fees in cash under an “arrangement”, and that Fiore asked him to have the contractor contact him. Fiore denied receiving payments from the architect or soliciting the contractor, claiming the meeting occurred after the contract was awarded at the contractor’s request.

    Procedural History

    Fiore was convicted in a jury trial for bribe receiving and related offenses. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the admission of the architect’s testimony regarding prior uncharged payments was reversible error. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed, vacating the conviction and ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged criminal conduct (payments from the architect to Fiore) to prove the charged crime (solicitation of a kickback from the contractor).

    Holding

    No, because the evidence of uncharged criminal conduct did not establish a common scheme or plan encompassing both the charged and uncharged crimes, but instead served only to show the defendant’s criminal propensity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the general rule that evidence of uncharged criminal conduct is inadmissible to establish a defendant’s predisposition to commit crimes. While such evidence may be admissible if offered for a relevant purpose other than to show criminal propensity (e.g., to prove a common scheme or plan), the court found that the architect’s testimony did not meet this exception. The court distinguished this case from cases like People v. Duffy, where there was a close relationship between the scheme and the multiple bribes received. Here, the court reasoned that there was no evidence of a single scheme to collect corrupt payments from both the architect and the contractor. The court stated, “[T]here must be ‘such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations’.” The court found that the close similarity of the bribery attempts, with only arguably insubstantial identities, did not support an inference that there existed a common scheme or plan encompassing both the contractor and the architect. The court also noted that while a modus operandi might be an element of proof in establishing a common scheme, it alone does not establish a common scheme. The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value and warranted a new trial. The court also briefly addressed the prosecutor’s inquiry regarding Fiore’s refusal to waive immunity before the grand jury, advising caution on retrial to avoid focusing on the waiver issue unless Fiore’s trial testimony was inconsistent with his earlier refusal.