New York Law Review

Tag: breach of warranty

  • Sheldon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 984 (1984): Pleading Requirements for Affirmative Defenses

    Sheldon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 984 (1984)

    A party must plead all matters which, if not pleaded, would likely surprise the adverse party or raise factual issues not appearing on the face of a prior pleading; failure to do so results in a waiver of the defense.

    Summary

    A bean farmer, Sheldon, sued Kimberly-Clark for breach of contract related to defective seed. Kimberly-Clark counterclaimed for the balance due on the seed. Sheldon attempted to introduce evidence of the seed’s inferior quality and his attempt to reject it, despite not pleading these issues in his reply. The court directed a verdict for Kimberly-Clark on its counterclaim. The Court of Appeals held that Sheldon waived the defense of breach of warranty by failing to plead it, even though Kimberly-Clark was aware of Sheldon’s complaints about the seed’s quality, because the unpleaded allegations raised new factual issues.

    Facts

    Sheldon, a bean farmer, contracted to purchase “foundation seed” from Kimberly-Clark in 1981 for delivery in spring 1982, tendering a $5,000 deposit.

    In spring 1982, Kimberly-Clark informed Sheldon they couldn’t deliver the “foundation seed” but offered “registered seed” at a reduced price, which Sheldon accepted.

    Sheldon picked up the “registered seed” and allegedly discovered it was defective, attempting unsuccessfully to return it.

    Procedural History

    Sheldon sued Kimberly-Clark for breach of contract, seeking damages for loss of customer goodwill.

    Kimberly-Clark counterclaimed for $9,500, the balance due on the “registered seed.”

    Sheldon replied with a general denial.

    At trial, Sheldon offered proof of the seed’s inferior quality and attempted rejection, which weren’t pleaded.

    The trial court dismissed Sheldon’s complaint and directed a verdict for Kimberly-Clark on its counterclaim, denying Sheldon’s motion to amend the pleadings.

    The Appellate Division modified, reversing the verdict on the counterclaim, but otherwise affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order regarding the counterclaim and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the offer of proof was sufficient to raise a defense as to the quality of the seed and the attempted rejection where these claims were not otherwise raised in the pleadings.

    Holding

    No, because the failure to plead these matters results in a waiver which entitles the defendant to summary judgment on its counterclaim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPLR 3018(b) requires a party to plead matters that would surprise the adverse party or raise new factual issues.

    While Kimberly-Clark knew about Sheldon’s complaints, the allegations of inferior quality and attempted rejection raised new factual issues not in the pleadings.

    The Court cited Surlak v. Surlak, 95 A.D.2d 371, stating that failing to plead these matters results in a waiver.

    Sheldon’s general denial was insufficient because it only puts in issue matters Kimberly-Clark had to prove on its counterclaim. The court referenced Hoffstaedter v. Carlton Auto Supplies Co., 203 App. Div. 494, 496 to support this principle.

    The court reasoned that permitting Sheldon to introduce these unpleaded defenses would unfairly prejudice Kimberly-Clark by requiring them to defend against claims they were not properly notified of.

    This case highlights the importance of proper pleading in litigation. Failing to raise affirmative defenses in the pleadings can result in the waiver of those defenses, even if the opposing party is aware of the underlying facts. The decision reinforces the purpose of pleading requirements, which is to provide notice to the opposing party of the claims and defenses that will be litigated, preventing surprise and ensuring a fair opportunity to respond.

  • Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460 (1969): Extent of “Danger Invites Rescue” Doctrine

    Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460 (1969)

    The “danger invites rescue” doctrine applies regardless of whether the initial peril was caused by negligence or breach of warranty, extending liability to rescuers injured while aiding a person placed in imminent danger by a culpable act.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the “danger invites rescue” doctrine applies when the initial peril arises from a breach of warranty rather than negligence. Rooney, a sewage worker, died due to a defective oxygen mask manufactured by Mine Safety Appliance Co. Other workers, including Guarino, Messina, and Fattore, attempted to rescue Rooney. Guarino and Messina died, and Fattore and others were injured during the rescue attempt. The court held that the rescue doctrine applies, extending liability to the manufacturer for injuries sustained by rescuers, regardless of whether the initial culpable act was negligence or breach of warranty. The focus is on the defendant’s culpable act placing another in imminent peril, which invites rescue.

    Facts

    John Rooney, a sewage engineer, died from gas asphyxiation while inspecting a sewer, wearing a defective oxygen mask manufactured by Mine Safety Appliance Co.

    Fattore entered the sewer with Rooney; Guarino and Messina were stationed in the shaft. After Rooney collapsed, Fattore attempted a rescue but was overcome by gas and called for help.

    Guarino and Messina entered the tunnel to rescue Rooney and Fattore but succumbed to the gas.

    Other sewage workers were injured in the rescue attempt.

    Rooney’s estate had previously recovered a judgment against the defendant based on breach of implied warranty.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs (Guarino, Messina, Fattore, and other injured workers).

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “danger invites rescue” doctrine applies when the initial peril is caused by a breach of warranty, rather than negligence, thus allowing recovery for injuries sustained by rescuers.

    Holding

    Yes, because a culpable act, whether stemming from negligence or breach of warranty, that places a person in imminent peril can lead to liability for damages sustained by a rescuer attempting to aid the imperiled victim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the theory of the action—negligence or breach of warranty—is not significant when the “danger invites rescue” doctrine applies. Both negligence and breach of warranty are wrongful acts that can create a situation of peril.

    The court cited Provenzo v. Sam, stating that the rescue doctrine applies when “one party by his culpable act has placed another person in a position of imminent peril which invites a third person, the rescuing plaintiff, to come to his aid.”

    The court also cited Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., holding that “[a] breach of warranty * * * is not only a violation of the sales contract out of which the warranty arises but it is a tortious wrong.”

    The court emphasized that the defendant committed a culpable act by manufacturing a defective mask, placing Rooney in peril and inviting rescue.

    The court quoted Judge Cardozo in Wagner v. International Ry. Co.: “Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief…The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer.”

    The court concluded that the rescuer’s status as a user or nonuser of the defective product is irrelevant; what matters is that they attempted to rescue someone imperiled by a “tortious wrong.”

    The court found that the trial court’s charge to the jury, while not perfect, adequately conveyed the essential elements of the case and did not constitute reversible error.

  • Kellogg v. Freeland, 195 N.Y. 451 (1909): Sufficiency of Denial Based on Lack of Information

    Kellogg v. Freeland, 195 N.Y. 451 (1909)

    A party cannot deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief regarding matters presumptively within their knowledge or readily ascertainable, especially concerning their own prior legal proceedings.

    Summary

    Kellogg sued Freeland for breach of warranty on a violin sale where Freeland acted as an agent. Freeland’s answer included an affirmative defense that Kellogg had previously sued and received satisfaction from the principal, Hey, for the same breach. Kellogg replied that he lacked sufficient information to confirm the prior judgment’s satisfaction. The court found Kellogg’s denial insufficient, as the prior legal action was presumptively within his knowledge. A plaintiff cannot feign ignorance of easily obtainable information, especially concerning the resolution of their own lawsuits. Obtaining satisfaction from the principal bars a second action against the agent. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Special Term’s order.

    Facts

    Kellogg purchased a violin from Hey through Freeland, who acted as Hey’s agents. Kellogg alleged Freeland provided a personal warranty on the violin’s quality. Kellogg sued Freeland for breach of this warranty. Freeland’s answer claimed that Kellogg had previously sued Hey in federal court for breach of a similar warranty related to the same violin. Freeland alleged that Kellogg obtained a judgment against Hey, which included damages and costs, and that Hey fully paid and satisfied this judgment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ordered Kellogg to reply to Freeland’s affirmative defense. Kellogg replied with a denial of sufficient knowledge or information to confirm the judgment against Hey was satisfied. Freeland moved for judgment based on the insufficiency of Kellogg’s reply. The Special Term granted Freeland’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed. Freeland appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Kellogg’s reply, denying sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief about the prior judgment’s satisfaction, was sufficient to contest Freeland’s affirmative defense.
    2. Whether settlement and satisfaction from a principal on a breach of warranty claim bars a subsequent claim against the agent for the same breach.

    Holding

    1. No, because Kellogg could not claim ignorance of readily ascertainable facts regarding a prior lawsuit he initiated.
    2. Yes, because obtaining full satisfaction for a breach of warranty claim from the principal necessarily discharges the agent’s liability for the same breach.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Kellogg’s denial was insufficient because it concerned matters presumptively within his knowledge. The court stated, “It is quite incredible that plaintiff should have had no knowledge concerning the termination of his lawsuit, and equally inconceivable that after the lapse of two years he should neither have received nor sought information on this subject.” The court emphasized that the facts were largely of record and easily verifiable. The court cited numerous cases supporting the practice of treating such denials as frivolous, thereby entitling the defendant to relief. Even if the denial had some force, Kellogg’s admission that the claim against Hey was settled and compromised undermined his case. The court held that settling with the principal for full damages on a warranty claim precludes a second action against the agent for the same claim, even with a purported reservation of rights: “If the claim has been settled, that is satisfied, there is nothing to be reserved as a basis for prosecution of another liable for the same claim.”