New York Law Review

Tag: Brady Rule

  • People v. Goins, 73 N.Y.2d 983 (1989): Consequences of Delayed Rosario Material Disclosure

    People v. Goins, 73 N.Y.2d 983 (1989)

    A delay in disclosing Rosario material (prior statements of a prosecution witness) that prejudices the defendant’s trial strategy warrants a new trial.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of burglary, sodomy, and related offenses. His defense hinged on inconsistencies in the complainant’s statements. The prosecution, aware of a memo book entry from a hospital interview with the complainant that corroborated her trial testimony, did not disclose it until after the defense had built its strategy around the statement’s supposed non-existence. This late disclosure significantly undermined the defense’s strategy, as it rehabilitated the complainant’s credibility. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and ordered a new trial, holding that the delayed disclosure of the Rosario material prejudiced the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with burglary, sodomy, and related offenses. The complainant provided an initial statement to the police. Later, she was interviewed at the hospital. The arresting officer testified about interviewing the complainant in her apartment and at the hospital. He stated that the hospital interview did not cause him to change his original memo book entry. The prosecutor knew of a memo book entry memorializing the hospital interview. The prosecutor elicited testimony that the complainant’s hospital version was substantially similar to her trial testimony.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defense appealed, arguing that the delayed disclosure of Rosario material prejudiced his defense. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s delay in disclosing Rosario material (a prior consistent statement of the complaining witness) until after the defense had committed to a particular trial strategy prejudiced the defendant to warrant a new trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the delayed disclosure of the statement recorded in the hospital prejudiced the defendant substantially by undermining his defense strategy which depended on the statement’s nonexistence and rehabilitated the complaining witness’s credibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principles established in People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 159 (1985); People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986); and People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289 (1961). The court reasoned that the prosecution’s failure to disclose the memo book entry memorializing the hospital interview prejudiced the defendant’s ability to effectively cross-examine the complaining witness and construct his defense. The defense strategy was based on highlighting inconsistencies between the complainant’s initial version and her later testimony. The undisclosed memo book entry, which corroborated her trial testimony and refuted any claim of recent fabrication, directly undermined this strategy. By the time the defense learned of the memo book entry, they had already committed to a line of questioning that was severely weakened by the new information. The court emphasized that the “People’s delay in turning over the statement recorded in the hospital — revealed as it was only after defense counsel had moved forward on a strategy that depended on the statement’s nonexistence — substantially prejudiced the defendant.” This prejudice warranted a new trial to ensure the defendant had a fair opportunity to present his defense with full knowledge of the evidence against him.

  • People v. Cortijo, 70 N.Y.2d 868 (1987): Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

    People v. Cortijo, 70 N.Y.2d 868 (1987)

    A defendant’s right to a fair trial is not violated by a delayed disclosure of exculpatory material if the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to use the material to cross-examine witnesses or present evidence.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and criminal possession of a weapon. He argued that the prosecution’s failure to disclose an eyewitness statement prior to trial, which he claimed was exculpatory, warranted a reversal. The Court of Appeals held that even assuming the statement was exculpatory, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial because he had a meaningful opportunity to use the statement during the trial, including the opportunity to recall witnesses for further cross-examination, which the defendant declined. This decision underscores that the timing of disclosure is less critical than the opportunity to effectively utilize the evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of shooting a neighbor. Prior to trial, the defendant requested all Brady material. During the trial, the defense discovered the prosecution knew of two eyewitnesses they had not called and had not disclosed to the defense. The prosecution produced one eyewitness with a statement to police. After interviewing the eyewitness and reviewing the statement, the defendant chose not to call the eyewitness as a defense witness. The defendant also declined the court’s offer to reopen the prosecution’s case to recall witnesses for cross-examination using the statement.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed, arguing the prosecution’s failure to disclose the eyewitness statement was a violation of his rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose the eyewitness statement prior to trial constitutes a violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial, requiring reversal of the conviction, given that the defendant was later provided with the statement and the opportunity to use it during the trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine witnesses or as evidence during his case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory material. However, the Court emphasized that a delayed disclosure does not automatically warrant a new trial. The critical factor is whether the defendant had a “meaningful opportunity” to use the material to cross-examine witnesses or as evidence. Here, the trial court offered the defendant the opportunity to recall the prosecution’s witnesses for further cross-examination based on the eyewitness statement. The defense declined this offer. Because the defendant had the chance to utilize the statement effectively, the Court found no violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court cited People v. Brown, 67 NY2d 555, 559; People v Smith, 63 NY2d 41, 68; People v Stridiron, 33 NY2d 287, 292-293, reinforcing that the key is the opportunity to use the evidence, not necessarily the timing of its disclosure. The court stated, “[W]hile the People unquestionably have a duty to disclose exculpatory material in their control,” a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial is not violated when, as here, he is given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People’s witnesses or as evidence during his case”.

  • People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 854 (1987): Preservation of Rosario Claims and Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose

    People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 854 (1987)

    To preserve a Rosario claim for appellate review, the prosecutor must specify any objections to furnishing requested materials at trial; otherwise, the issue is not preserved, and the court will not reach the merits of the Rosario claim.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse of his 11-year-old daughter. At trial, the defense sought to confront the complainant with statements she made to a social worker from the Bureau of Child Welfare (BCW), arguing these were prior statements relevant to her testimony. The prosecutor objected, citing privilege and the Family Court Act, and stated he possessed nothing relevant from BCW. The trial court sustained the objection. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor failed to adequately preserve objections to the defense’s Rosario claim because he didn’t specify his objections at trial, preventing the trial court from considering the matter and the defense from creating a proper record.

    Facts

    Defendant was accused by his 11-year-old daughter of rape and sexual abuse over several years.

    Defendant argued the accusations were fabricated by the child’s mother (from whom he was separated) to gain custody of their children.

    Defense counsel sought to cross-examine the daughter with prior statements made to a BCW social worker.

    The prosecutor claimed the statements were privileged and protected by the Family Court Act and asserted he had no relevant BCW material.

    The trial court denied the defense’s request for the statements.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor adequately preserved objections to the defense’s request for the complainant’s prior statements to a social worker under the Rosario rule.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor failed to specify his objections to furnishing the requested materials at trial, he did not preserve these arguments for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the prosecutor’s obligation to turn over a witness’s prior statements relating to the subject matter of their testimony, as established in People v. Rosario.

    The Court found that the prosecutor’s general reference to privilege and the Family Court Act was insufficient to invoke CPLR 4508, which governs social worker-client privilege. The court cited Matter of Grattan v. People to support this point.

    The prosecutor’s claim of possessing nothing relevant from BCW was deemed insufficient to argue on appeal that Rosario material doesn’t include statements in BCW custody.

    The Court stressed that the prosecutor’s failure to raise specific objections at trial deprived the trial judge of the opportunity to consider the issues and prevented the defense from creating a proper record. This record could have clarified the relationship between the People and BCW, the prosecutor’s access to BCW records, and who could assert or waive privilege under CPLR 4508, citing People v. Nieves and People v. Tutt.

    Because the Court did not reach the merits of the Rosario claim, it explicitly stated that it was not ruling on the availability of any of the requested materials. This leaves open questions about when the Rosario rule applies to materials held by outside agencies.

    The Court emphasized the importance of proper objections to allow the trial court to make informed decisions and to create a clear record for appeal. This case acts as a reminder to prosecutors that all objections to Rosario requests must be clearly laid out at trial.

  • People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434 (1979): Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Witness Cooperation Agreements

    People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434 (1979)

    A prosecutor must disclose to the defense any correspondence between the District Attorney’s office and the Parole Board regarding a prosecution witness’s cooperation, as it may affect the witness’s credibility, which is crucial for a fair trial.

    Summary

    Defendants Cwikla and Ford were convicted of burglary and possession of a dangerous instrument in connection with a burglary that resulted in the victim’s death. The prosecution’s key witness, Cox, an accomplice, testified he received no promises for his testimony. However, the prosecutor failed to disclose correspondence with the Parole Board indicating Cox’s cooperation and a request for leniency. The Court of Appeals held that this non-disclosure violated the defendants’ right to a fair trial because the correspondence could have influenced the jury’s assessment of Cox’s credibility. The court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.

    Facts

    Cwikla, Ford, and Cox were involved in a burglary. The victim died after being bound and gagged with a handkerchief. Cox pleaded guilty to manslaughter and testified against Cwikla and Ford at their joint trial. During direct examination, Cox denied receiving any promises for his testimony but admitted requesting the Assistant District Attorney to write to the Parole Board on his behalf. Defense counsel requested the production of correspondence between the District Attorney’s office and the Parole Board concerning Cox, which was denied by the prosecutor and trial court.

    Procedural History

    Cwikla and Ford were convicted of burglary and possession of a dangerous instrument in the first trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions but modified the sentences. Both defendants and the People were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s failure to disclose correspondence between the District Attorney’s office and the Parole Board concerning the prosecution’s key witness, Cox, violated the defendants’ right to a fair trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the correspondence could have affected the jury’s assessment of Cox’s credibility, and the prosecutor’s non-disclosure denied the defendant his right to a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States, which establish that the prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence, including evidence affecting a witness’s credibility, to ensure a fair trial. The court reasoned that the undisclosed correspondence between the District Attorney’s office and the Parole Board regarding Cox could have led the jury to believe that Cox had a tacit understanding or expectation of leniency in exchange for his testimony, even if no explicit promise existed. The court quoted United States v. Agurs, stating, “When the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.” The court found the prosecutor’s conduct particularly inexcusable because he personally wrote to the Department of Correctional Services on Cox’s behalf and then denied knowing of any such correspondence. The court noted, “While in the present case the materials sought by defense counsel do not directly demonstrate the existence of an express promise, there is nonetheless a strong inference, at the very least, of an expectation of leniency which should have been presented to the jury for its consideration.” The Court also briefly addressed Ford’s arguments regarding pretrial identification procedures, upholding the trial court’s ruling that requiring Ford to wear a wig during the lineup was permissible to conform his appearance to that at the time of the crime. The court also upheld the introduction of prior lineup identifications under CPL 60.25, even though witnesses were barred from making in-court identifications due to a prior court order.

  • People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 451 (1976): Duplicative Rosario Material Need Not Be Disclosed

    40 N.Y.2d 451 (1976)

    Under the Rosario rule, the prosecution must turn over prior statements of its witnesses, but this requirement does not extend to duplicative equivalents of statements already disclosed to the defense.

    Summary

    Consolazio, an attorney, was convicted on six counts of grand larceny. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s failure to disclose certain worksheets compiled during witness interviews violated the Rosario and Brady rules. The Court of Appeals held that while the worksheets constituted Rosario material, their non-disclosure was harmless error because the information they contained was duplicative of Grand Jury testimony already provided to the defense. The Court also addressed and rejected Consolazio’s challenge to the jury panel selection process.

    Facts

    Consolazio solicited investments from individuals, promising high returns, but failed to return the funds. He was indicted on multiple counts of grand larceny. Before trial, the prosecution interviewed potential witnesses and created worksheets summarizing their responses to questions. During the trial, the defense requested these worksheets, arguing they were Rosario and Brady material. The prosecution initially denied their existence and later refused to turn them over, claiming they were not statements of the witnesses and contained no exculpatory information.

    Procedural History

    The Nassau County Court convicted Consolazio on six counts. The People’s appeal of the dismissal of other counts was consolidated with Consolazio’s appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions and reinstated most of the dismissed counts. Consolazio appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals considered both Consolazio’s appeal and the People’s appeal from the trial order of dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s appeal from the trial order dismissing certain counts was barred by double jeopardy principles.

    2. Whether the prosecution’s failure to turn over worksheets compiled during witness interviews violated the Rosario and Brady rules, warranting reversal of the convictions.

    3. Whether the defendant’s challenge to the jury panel was properly denied.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under People v. Brown, such an appeal was barred by double jeopardy.

    2. No, because while the worksheets constituted Rosario material, their non-disclosure was harmless error, as they were duplicative equivalents of Grand Jury testimony already provided to the defense.

    3. No, because the challenge to the jury panel was not made in writing before jury selection commenced, as required by CPL 270.10(2), and was therefore waived.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that the People’s appeal was barred by double jeopardy. As to the worksheets, the Court determined that the trial court erred in not examining the worksheets itself to determine if they contained exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, but after reviewing them, the Court of Appeals agreed that they contained no exculpatory information, making the error harmless. The Court further held that the worksheets constituted prior statements of prosecution witnesses under People v. Rosario. However, because the information in the worksheets was identical to the witnesses’ Grand Jury testimony, which had been turned over to the defense, the failure to disclose the worksheets was harmless error. The Court emphasized that withholding Rosario material is typically not excused based on its limited use to the defense. However, this case presented a distinct issue: the worksheets were “duplicative equivalents” of previously disclosed statements. The court stated, “The worksheets in this instance were nothing more than duplicative equivalents of statements previously turned over to the defense—the only difference being as to the particular form in which such statements were recorded.” The Court also noted that a challenge to a jury panel must be made in writing before jury selection commences, as required by CPL 270.10(2). Since the written challenge was not made until after jury selection, the issue was waived.

  • People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554 (1956): Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

    People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554 (1956)

    The prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, even if the defense could have independently discovered it and even if the prosecution believes it lacks probative force.

    Summary

    Savvides was convicted of murder, but the prosecution failed to disclose information that contradicted the testimony of its key witness. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, regardless of whether the defense could have found it independently or the prosecution deems it lacking in probative value. The court emphasized that the jury, not the appellate court, should decide issues of credibility, especially when the undisclosed evidence could impeach the only witness essential to the prosecution’s case. This case underscores the importance of prosecutorial transparency to ensure a fair trial.

    Facts

    1. Gloria Kendal was the key witness against Savvides in his murder trial.
    2. Before trial, a Mrs. Dagmar Generazio gave the prosecution information that conflicted with Kendal’s expected trial testimony. This information suggested that Gloria or someone she knew, and not the defendant, was responsible for the murder.
    3. Gloria Kendal recanted her story against the defendant and then recanted again.
    4. The prosecution did not disclose Generazio’s information to the defense or reveal that Kendal had been confronted with this information before recanting her story for the second time.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of murder. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence warranted a new trial. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, even if the defense might have independently uncovered the evidence.
    2. Whether the prosecution can withhold evidence it deems lacking in probative force.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused because fairness and due process require it.
    2. No, the prosecution cannot withhold evidence it deems lacking in probative force because the prosecution is not privileged “to decide for the court what is admissible or for the defense what is useful.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the concept of fairness and due process mandates that the prosecution disclose evidence favorable to the accused. This duty exists regardless of whether the defense could have discovered the evidence independently or whether the prosecutor believes the evidence is not probative. The court stated, “The prosecution is not privileged ‘to decide for the court what is admissible or for the defense what is useful’”. The court further reasoned that jurors, not appellate judges, should decide issues of credibility, especially when disclosure of the evidence could impeach the sole witness without whom there would be no prosecution. The court noted that the prosecutor’s intent is irrelevant: “ ‘it matters little’ that the district attorney’s silence was not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice.” The ultimate goal is to avoid an unfair trial for the accused, not to punish the prosecutor.