New York Law Review

Tag: Brady Rule

  • People v. Rosario, 81 N.Y.2d 903 (1993): Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Witness Misconduct

    People v. Rosario, 81 N.Y.2d 903 (1993)

    A defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on the delayed disclosure of a witness’s prior misconduct if the defense is given a meaningful opportunity to use the material during cross-examination.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of reckless endangerment and weapons possession. During the trial, it was revealed that a prosecution witness had a prior conviction for disorderly conduct related to an assault on his wife. The prosecutor was unaware of this conviction. The trial court granted a recess allowing the defense to review the related materials, and the defense subsequently cross-examined the witness about the incident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that even if the prosecutor had a duty to disclose the conviction earlier, the defendant wasn’t entitled to a new trial because he had a meaningful opportunity to use the information during cross-examination. The Court found any other claims made by the defendant were not preserved.

    Facts

    The defendant was on trial for reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
    During the cross-examination of a prosecution witness, it came to light that the witness had a prior conviction for disorderly conduct stemming from an assault on his wife. The trial prosecutor was unaware of this prior conviction.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor failed to disclose the prior conviction of a prosecution witness, pursuant to CPL 240.45 (1)(b), even though the defense was ultimately able to use the information during cross-examination.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant was given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People’s witness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that even assuming the prosecutor had an obligation to disclose the witness’s prior conviction earlier, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial. The court relied on the principle that a new trial is not warranted if the defendant is “given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People’s witnesses.” Here, the trial court granted a recess to allow the defense to examine the materials related to the witness’s prior conviction, and the defense subsequently used that information during cross-examination. Therefore, the defendant suffered no prejudice from the delayed disclosure. The court found that defense counsel pursued the matter on cross-examination. Because the defendant was provided with an opportunity to confront the witness with the information, the court reasoned that the purpose of disclosure was ultimately served. The court explicitly stated, “Defendant was ‘given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People’s witnesses’ (see, People v Cortijo, 70 NY2d 868, 870).” The Court also noted that the defendant’s remaining contentions were unpreserved, implying that these issues were not properly raised or objected to at trial, thus precluding appellate review.

  • People v. Machado, 90 N.Y.2d 187 (1997): Standard for Rosario Violations in CPL 440.10 Motions

    People v. Machado, 90 N.Y.2d 187 (1997)

    A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment of conviction on Rosario grounds via a CPL 440.10 motion, whether made before or after direct appeal, must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the Rosario violation.

    Summary

    Machado was convicted of kidnapping and felony assault. Prior to the exhaustion of his direct appeal, he brought a CPL 440.10 motion alleging a Rosario violation based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose a police report. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that because the CPL 440.10 motion was filed before the direct appeal was exhausted, the violation itself required reversal (per se error). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prejudice standard of CPL 440.10(1)(f) applies uniformly to Rosario claims raised in CPL 440.10 motions, regardless of whether the motion is made before or after direct appeal.

    Facts

    Machado seized his estranged wife, Lydia Machado, and forced her into his van. As he drove away, her brother, Edwin Morales, was dragged and fatally injured. Machado drove around with his wife, assaulting her. He was apprehended and charged with murder, kidnapping, and assault. At trial, Detective Russell, who investigated Morales’s death, testified for the People. The People did not disclose a report authored by Detective Russell, which contained a summary stating that Mrs. Machado sustained minor injuries and refused medical aid.

    Procedural History

    The jury acquitted Machado of murder and assault with a dangerous instrument but convicted him of kidnapping and felony assault. Machado appealed, arguing a Rosario violation based on the withheld Russell Report. The Appellate Division denied his motion to enlarge the record to include the report. While the appeal was pending, Machado filed a CPL 440.10 motion arguing that a “per se error” standard applied because the motion was made before his direct appeal was exhausted. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, suggesting the Rosario claim be raised in a CPL 440.10 motion. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Supreme Court denied Machado’s CPL 440.10 motion, finding the report wasn’t Rosario material and that Machado hadn’t demonstrated prejudice. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Rosario material and applying a per se error standard, vacating the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted the People’s leave application.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the per se error rule or the prejudice standard applies to Rosario violations raised by CPL 440.10 motions made before a defendant’s direct appeal has been exhausted.

    Holding

    No, because the unambiguous terms of CPL 440.10 (1)(f) require that a defendant making a CPL 440.10 motion seeking to vacate a judgment of conviction on Rosario grounds demonstrate prejudice resulting from the violation, regardless of when the motion is made relative to the direct appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 440.10(1)(f) explicitly requires a showing of prejudice for vacating a judgment based on improper conduct. The court emphasized the importance of statutory interpretation, stating that courts cannot broaden the scope of the remedy beyond what the Legislature specified. To apply a per se rule for pre-appeal 440.10 motions while requiring prejudice for post-appeal motions would give the word “prejudicial” two different meanings in the same statute. The Court acknowledged society’s interest in the finality of judgments, which is a key consideration in CPL 440.10 motions. The Court found that a uniform standard for CPL 440.10 motions, requiring a showing of prejudice (a “reasonable possibility” that the nondisclosure materially contributed to the verdict), adequately balances fairness to defendants and the need for the People to fulfill their disclosure obligations.

  • People v. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888 (1996): Specificity of Discovery Requests and Brady Material

    People v. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888 (1996)

    When a defendant makes a specific request for Brady material, the prosecution’s failure to disclose such evidence is judged by the “reasonable possibility” standard of prejudice, meaning there’s a reasonable possibility the trial outcome would have differed had the evidence been produced.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and weapons possession. He moved to vacate the conviction, arguing the prosecution failed to disclose Brady material – a “scratch” sheet referencing a polygraph examination of the sole eyewitness, Glenn Shaw. The defense had requested the polygraph report. The trial court granted a new trial, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the request not specific enough. The Court of Appeals held the request was specific, triggering the “reasonable possibility” standard. However, it ultimately affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal because polygraph results are inadmissible, and evidence suggested the witness was truthful.

    Facts

    Glenn Shaw, the only eyewitness, testified he saw the defendant with a handgun and others running from the victim’s house after hearing a gunshot. Before trial, the defense requested the polygraph exam report of a confidential informant. A “homicide bureau information sheet” (the “scratch sheet”) alluded to Shaw’s polygraph test, stating he was possibly withholding information. This sheet was not disclosed to the defense.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and weapons possession. He moved to vacate the conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing a Brady violation. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the discovery request not specific, and the stricter “reasonable probability” standard was not met. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defense counsel’s request for “a copy of the report of the polygraph exam(s) given to the confidential informant showing date(s) of exam and all results” constituted a specific request for Brady material.

    2. Whether, assuming a specific request, the failure to disclose the “scratch sheet” warranted a new trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the request provided specific notice of the defense’s desire for the witness’s polygraph test results.

    2. No, because polygraph evidence is inadmissible, and other evidence suggested the eyewitness was truthful, so there was no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have differed had the document been produced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the defense’s request was specific because it provided particularized notice of the information sought, even if the defense didn’t know the document’s precise form. This specificity triggers the “reasonable possibility” standard for materiality under Brady. The Court cited People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77, emphasizing that “heightened prosecutorial attention is appropriate” when the defense provides specific notice of its interest in particular material. However, the Court found that even under the “reasonable possibility” standard, a new trial was not warranted. The Court emphasized that “[a] polygrapher’s opinions regarding the witness’s veracity are not admissible evidence (see, People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217).” Additionally, the assistant district attorney who prepared the document had no recollection of its source, and other evidence suggested the witness was truthful. Therefore, the court found no reasonable possibility that the trial outcome would have changed had the document been disclosed.

  • People v. Bryce, 88 N.Y.2d 124 (1996): Prosecution’s Duty to Preserve and Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

    88 N.Y.2d 124 (1996)

    The prosecution has a duty to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence and to disclose such evidence to the defense; failure to do so, even in good faith, may warrant a new trial if there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been disclosed.

    Summary

    Bryce was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his infant son. The prosecution argued that Bryce inflicted fatal injuries, while Bryce claimed the death was accidental. Key to the prosecution’s case was evidence of a skull fracture, which their experts claimed could not have been accidental. Prior to trial, Bryce requested the skull and brain tissue for examination but received only a small bone fragment and unrelated organs. After conviction, the infant’s body was exhumed, revealing that the skull had not been preserved and showed no frontal fracture. Bryce moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that the prosecution failed to preserve and disclose exculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals held that a hearing was required to determine if the prosecution misrepresented the availability of the skull and whether the skull constituted Brady material, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Bryce’s seven-week-old son died from a brain hemorrhage due to a fractured skull. The prosecution’s theory was that Bryce inflicted the injuries while caring for the child. Bryce admitted to dropping and shaking the infant but claimed it was accidental. The prosecution’s medical experts testified that the skull fracture could not have been accidental and resulted from excessive force. Bryce’s experts testified that they found no evidence of a frontal bone fracture and that the injuries were consistent with an accident.

    Procedural History

    Bryce was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. After exhuming the infant’s body and discovering the skull had not been preserved and showed no frontal fracture, Bryce moved to vacate the judgment. County Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case for a hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution misrepresented to defense counsel that the skull and brain tissue had been preserved and would be available for examination before trial.

    Whether the skull constituted Brady material, and if so, whether a new trial is required.

    Holding

    Yes, a hearing is required to determine whether the District Attorney misrepresented the availability of the skull. Yes, because if the skull constituted Brady material and was improperly withheld, a new trial may be required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant has a constitutional right to discover favorable evidence in the prosecution’s possession that is material to guilt or punishment, as established in Brady v. Maryland. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The Court emphasized that this rule applies regardless of the prosecutor’s good or bad faith. Here, Bryce argued that the prosecutor prejudiced his ability to obtain exculpatory evidence by misrepresenting that the skull and brain tissue had been preserved and would be available for examination. The Court found that if the skull was Brady material and representations were made that it had been preserved when it had not, a new trial may be warranted. The Court stated, “Whether other, sufficient evidence of guilt was produced in response to defendant’s discovery demand is irrelevant if the skull was Brady material and representations were made that it had been preserved, when it had not, and was available for trial, when it was not.” Therefore, the Court remitted the case for a hearing to determine the validity of Bryce’s claims.

  • People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610 (1992): Mandating Disclosure of Rosario Material

    People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610 (1992)

    The Rosario rule mandates that the prosecution disclose any prior statements of its witnesses, and a per se reversal is required when such material is improperly withheld, unless the withheld material is the duplicative equivalent of material already disclosed.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose an “unusual occurrence report addendum” constituted a Rosario violation, requiring reversal of the defendant’s murder conviction. The court held that a per se reversal is required if the report contained statements of a trial witness and was not the duplicative equivalent of previously disclosed material. The court rejected the Appellate Division’s attempt to create a “commonsense” exception based on the perceived insubstantiality of the undisclosed material, reaffirming the strict application of the Rosario rule to ensure procedural fairness.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder based largely on the testimony of his girlfriend, Marie Somie, who claimed he described killing the victim to her. The prosecution presented testimony from police officers, including Officer Serra and Detective Daniel, who investigated the crime scene. During the appeal process, the prosecution discovered an undisclosed “unusual occurrence report addendum” authored by Sergeant Maisano. This report contained observations by the “investigating officer” regarding possible rope burns on the victim’s body, information not explicitly mentioned in other disclosed documents. The defense argued that Somie fabricated the story, and the undisclosed report could have aided in their cross-examination of the police officers.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to a 25-year-to-life term. While his appeal was pending, the undisclosed document was discovered. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the report was duplicative and did not affect the credibility of the police officers or the defendant’s guilt. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the undisclosed “unusual occurrence report addendum” constituted Rosario material because it contained statements of a trial witness.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in applying a “commonsense” exception to the Rosario rule based on the perceived insubstantiality of the undisclosed material.
    3. Whether the withheld report was the “duplicative equivalent” of other materials already disclosed to the defense.

    Holding

    1. The Court of Appeals did not definitively decide if the document constituted Rosario material, but remitted the case for a determination of whether the report contained statements made by a witness who testified at trial.

    2. Yes, because the Appellate Division’s approach substituted a harmless error analysis for the per se reversal rule mandated in Rosario violations on direct appeal.

    3. No, because the report contained details, specifically about possible rope burns, that were not explicitly mentioned in the disclosed statements of testifying officers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in both its “duplicative equivalent” analysis and its creation of a “commonsense” exception to the Rosario rule. The court emphasized that documents are not duplicative if there are variations or inconsistencies, or if they omit details that could be valuable for cross-examination. Here, the report mentioned rope burns, which were not in the disclosed police statements.

    The court also reaffirmed its commitment to the per se reversal rule in Rosario violations on direct appeal, stating that harmless error analysis is inappropriate. The court explicitly rejected the suggestion that reversal should not be required where the withheld Rosario information was “of only ‘de minimis’ or ‘minimal’ value.” The court stated that “a judge’s impartial determination as to what portions may be useful to the defense, is no substitute for the single-minded devotion of counsel for the accused.”

    Because it was unclear whether the “investigating officer” referred to in the report was a testifying witness, the court remitted the case to the trial court for a determination on that issue. If the report contained statements from a testifying witness, a new trial would be ordered; otherwise, the judgment would be amended to reflect that determination.

  • People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986): Consequences of Failing to Disclose Rosario Material

    People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986)

    The prosecution has an absolute duty to provide the defense with Rosario material (prior statements of prosecution witnesses) and the failure to do so requires a new trial, regardless of good faith efforts to locate the material.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose Rosario material (prior statements of a prosecution witness) required a new trial. The Court held that the prosecution’s duty to provide such material is absolute, and the failure to do so necessitates a new trial, irrespective of the prosecution’s good faith efforts to locate the material. The Court emphasized that the defense has no obligation to request the material or object to its non-production to preserve the issue for appeal. The decision reinforces the importance of the Rosario rule in ensuring fair trials in New York.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal charges. During the trial, a prosecution witness testified. Prior to the conclusion of evidence, the defense requested Rosario material related to the witness (prior statements). The prosecution failed to provide certain Rosario material, despite claiming to have made efforts to locate it.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after the lower courts upheld the conviction. The Court of Appeals considered whether the failure to disclose Rosario material warranted a reversal of the conviction and a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s failure to provide Rosario material to the defense, despite good faith efforts to locate it, requires a new trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution has an absolute duty to turn over Rosario material, and the failure to do so requires a new trial, irrespective of their efforts to locate such material.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that CPL 240.45 requires the prosecution to make Rosario material available to the defendant. The duty to produce is absolute. The Court cited People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547; People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154 to support the rule. The Court emphasized that this obligation cannot be avoided even by good-faith, but unsuccessful efforts, to locate the material. The Court noted that the defense is not required to request the material or object to its non-production to preserve the issue for appeal. "[W]e have made it clear that the People’s failure to turn over Rosario material may not be excused on the ground that they were unaware of its existence or were unable to locate it." The dissent argued that the majority’s ruling was incongruous. It noted that attorneys who request covered material are penalized unless they take affirmative steps to clearly preserve the Rosario objection, but attorneys who say nothing are fully protected and automatically entitled to a new trial.

  • People v. Wallace, 76 N.Y.2d 953 (1990): Duty to Preserve Rosario Material and Sanctions for Failure

    People v. Wallace, 76 N.Y.2d 953 (1990)

    When the prosecution fails to exercise due care in preserving Rosario material and the defendant is prejudiced, the trial court must impose an appropriate sanction.

    Summary

    Wallace was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Undercover and arresting officers discarded notes containing the defendant’s description after the arrest. The Court of Appeals held that discarding these notes, which constituted Rosario material, prejudiced the defendant because they would have been helpful for cross-examining the officers on the identification issue. The court emphasized that while the specific sanction is discretionary, the failure to impose any sanction when the defendant is prejudiced is an abuse of discretion.

    Facts

    An undercover officer purchased drugs from the defendant and broadcasted a description over the police radio, which the arresting officer recorded. The undercover officer performed a post-arrest “drive-by” identification. The undercover officer made two subsequent drug purchases. Both officers discarded their written descriptions of the defendant after the arrest, but the undercover officer claimed to have incorporated the description into a “buy” report created later that evening.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the lower courts affirmed the conviction, focusing on the issue of whether the discarding of the notes prejudiced the defendant.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to impose any sanction for the officers’ discarding of notes containing a description of the defendant, when those notes constituted Rosario material and the defendant was prejudiced by their absence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the written descriptions would have been helpful to the defendant in cross-examining the officers on the critical issue of identification, and the People failed to exercise due care in preserving the Rosario material. The court must impose a sanction when prejudice occurs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the discarded notes constituted Rosario material, and the People did not dispute this point or contend that the officers exercised due care in preserving them. The court limited its review to whether the defendant was prejudiced. The court reasoned that the written descriptions would have been helpful to the defendant in cross-examining the officers, especially given the importance of the identification issue. The undercover officer’s claim that he incorporated the description into his “buy” report did not alleviate the prejudice because there was no way to verify if the description in the report matched the lost notes, especially since the report was prepared after a confirmatory “drive-by” identification. The court cited People v. Martinez, 71 NY2d 937, 940, stating that “the [trial] court must impose an appropriate sanction” where the People fail to exercise due care in preserving Rosario material, and the defendant is prejudiced. While the specific sanction is discretionary (People v. Kelly, 62 NY2d 516, 521), it was an abuse of discretion to decline to impose any sanction. The court reversed the order and ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Goins, 73 N.Y.2d 983 (1989): Duty to Disclose Rosario Material at a Useful Time

    People v. Goins, 73 N.Y.2d 983 (1989)

    A prosecutor’s duty to provide Rosario material (prior statements of prosecution witnesses) includes providing it at a time when it can be effectively used by the defense; an offer to provide the material after the defense has rested is not a sufficient remedy for a prior Rosario violation.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of a crime, and the conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecution failed to provide the defense with a police officer’s daily activity report (DAR) in a timely manner, violating the Rosario rule. The court found that offering the report only after the defense had rested its case was insufficient to remedy the violation because the defense had already structured its case based on a perceived discrepancy that the DAR could have clarified. The court reasoned that late disclosure would only bolster the prosecution’s case while undermining the defense.

    Facts

    The key facts are centered around the prosecution’s failure to timely disclose a police officer’s Daily Activity Report (DAR). The defense believed a discrepancy existed concerning the undercover officer’s activities on the day of the sale. Defense counsel structured their defense, rested their case, and prepared their summation based on the perceived discrepancy. The prosecution offered the DAR only after both sides had rested.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s offer to provide the defendant with Rosario material (specifically, a police officer’s Daily Activity Report) after both sides had rested constituted a sufficient remedy for the prosecution’s failure to provide the material in a timely manner.

    Holding

    No, because a witness’s prior statement must be furnished to the defendant at a time when it can be useful to the defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the prosecution had a clear obligation to furnish the defense with a copy of the police officer’s daily activity report (DAR) under People v. Rosario and People v. Ranghelle well before both sides rested their cases. The Court found that the trial court’s offer to reopen the case for cross-examination with the DAR, after the defense had already rested, was insufficient to cure the Rosario violation. The Court stated, “A witness’s prior statement must be furnished to the defendant at a time when it can be useful to the defense.” Because the defense had already been structured around a perceived discrepancy, introducing the DAR at that late stage would only serve to bolster the prosecution’s case while undermining the defense’s strategy. The Court rejected the Appellate Division’s interpretation that the defense counsel’s refusal to accept the late disclosure constituted a waiver. The Court reasoned that the right to timely disclosure had already been violated, and the defense’s rejection of the inadequate remedy did not constitute abandonment of that right. The court emphasized the importance of timely disclosure for effective cross-examination and trial strategy, quoting People v. Perez, noting the prior statement must be useful to the defense. Allowing the prosecution to rectify the error so late in the trial would prejudice the defendant, and “destroy the defense while bolstering the case for the prosecution”.

  • People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547 (1987): Consequences of Failing to Provide Rosario Material

    People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547 (1987)

    A complete failure to provide Rosario material to the defense requires a new trial, and the People cannot remedy this failure by later claiming the undisclosed material was a duplicate equivalent of disclosed material if it was not included in the trial record.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted after an altercation. At trial, the defense requested the police officer’s memo book and arrest report related to the co-defendant’s arrest, pursuant to People v. Rosario. The prosecution stated it would provide these items, but the record only showed that the officer returned with *other* materials. The Court of Appeals held that the complete failure to provide the requested Rosario material warranted a new trial. The Court further stated that the People could not argue on appeal that the unproduced items were the equivalent of disclosed materials, as these items were not made part of the record.

    Facts

    The defendant, Jones, and Scott Horne were arrested following an altercation at a jewelry exchange.

    During the trial, defense counsel requested, based on People v. Rosario, access to the police officer’s memo book and the arrest report pertaining to Horne’s arrest.

    The People stated that the officer would return with these materials.

    The officer returned to the courthouse but only provided *other* materials, not the memo book or arrest report.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial.

    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding a Rosario violation.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s failure to provide Rosario material (police officer’s memo book and arrest report) requires a new trial.

    Whether the People can argue on appeal that the undisclosed materials were the duplicate equivalent of disclosed materials, when those undisclosed materials are not part of the trial court record.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a complete failure to comply with the Rosario rule. The Appellate Division correctly held that a new trial was required.

    No, because the People should have included these items in the trial court record so the issue could be resolved on appeal in the normal course.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the record demonstrated a complete failure to provide the requested Rosario material, not merely a delay.

    Referencing People v. Ranghelle, the Court reiterated the importance of providing Rosario material and the consequences of failing to do so.

    The Court refused to remit the case for a hearing to determine if the undisclosed items were duplicate equivalents because the People failed to include the items in the trial court record.

    The Court stated: “If the People intended to raise this issue to justify the nondisclosure, they should have included these items in the trial court record so that the point could be resolved on appeal in the normal course.”

    The Court cited People v. Consolazio and People v. Ranghelle to support this proposition.

    The Court’s decision underscores the prosecution’s burden to properly preserve the record for appellate review when attempting to justify the non-disclosure of Rosario material.

  • People v. Haupt, 71 N.Y.2d 929 (1988): Consequences of Lost Rosario Material

    71 N.Y.2d 929 (1988)

    When the prosecution loses or destroys Rosario material (prior statements of a witness), the trial court must impose an appropriate sanction, focusing primarily on eliminating prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. A key issue was the loss of police notes containing a description of the robber provided by a witness. The defense sought to preclude the witness’s testimony, arguing a Rosario violation. The trial court denied preclusion but instructed the jury that they could draw an adverse inference against the prosecution. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that an adverse inference charge was an appropriate sanction, given the circumstances, for the loss of the Rosario material and that it sufficiently mitigated any potential prejudice to the defendant. The court emphasized that the focus should be on eliminating prejudice to the defendant when Rosario material is lost or destroyed.

    Facts

    Efraim Gonzalez, a cashier, was threatened during an armed robbery at a cafe.
    Gonzalez immediately reported the crime to his manager, Nelson Aleman, who had briefly seen the defendant earlier.
    Aleman chased the defendant into the subway and onto a train, where the defendant was arrested by a transit police officer.
    At the pretrial Wade hearing, Gonzalez mentioned giving a description of the robber to police officers (Reycraft and Mosely) who responded to the cafe immediately after the robbery.
    Officer Reycraft testified that Officer Mosely wrote down Gonzalez’s description, possibly in his memo book or on a “scratch 61” sheet, and immediately broadcast the description over the radio.
    Officer Mosely was unavailable at trial, and his notes and any follow-up report could not be located despite intensive investigation.
    The defendant was given the Sprint tape of the radio transmission containing the description.

    Procedural History

    After the jury was sworn, the defense moved to preclude Gonzalez from testifying because the written record of his statement to the investigating police had not been provided.
    The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion to preclude Gonzalez’s testimony.
    However, the court instructed the jury that they could draw an adverse inference against the prosecution for failing to produce Officer Mosely’s notes.
    Defendant appealed the Rosario ruling, and the Appellate Division affirmed.
    The case then went to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by delivering an adverse inference charge rather than precluding the witness’s testimony as a sanction for the prosecution’s failure to produce Rosario material (Officer Mosely’s notes).

    Holding

    No, because the adverse inference charge was an appropriate sanction to mitigate any potential prejudice to the defendant arising from the loss of the Rosario material, given that a description of the defendant had been contemporaneously broadcast over the police radio and disclosed to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals outlined three categories of Rosario violations: (1) delayed disclosure, (2) complete failure to disclose material in the People’s possession, and (3) loss or destruction of evidence.
    Regarding lost or destroyed evidence, the court stated that the People have an obligation to preserve evidence until a request for disclosure is made, citing People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516, 520 (1984).
    The court emphasized that it is not a sufficient response to a demand for production to say that the material has been lost or destroyed.
    If the People fail to preserve evidence and the defendant is prejudiced, the court must impose an appropriate sanction. “The determination of what is appropriate is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion, and while the degree of prosecutorial fault may be considered, the court’s attention should focus primarily on the overriding need to eliminate prejudice to the defendant” (quoting People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d at 520-521).
    In this case, the trial court’s decision to deny preclusion and instead deliver an adverse inference charge was deemed appropriate.
    The court reasoned that the prosecution was apparently unaware of the Rosario material until trial, and the risk of prejudice to the defendant was remote, because the defendant had a tape of the radio transmission containing the description of the defendant.
    Under the circumstances, any risk of prejudice was overcome by the adverse inference instruction.