New York Law Review

Tag: Bolstering

  • People v. Smith, 22 N.Y.3d 462 (2013): Admissibility of Police Officer Testimony Regarding Crime Victim’s Description

    People v. Smith, 22 N.Y.3d 462 (2013)

    A police officer’s testimony regarding a crime victim’s description of an attacker, given shortly after the crime, is admissible under the *Huertas* rule, provided it does not mislead the jury.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether a police officer’s testimony about a crime victim’s description of their attacker is admissible as evidence. The defendant was convicted of robbery, and the victim, Velez, identified the defendant at trial and testified about the description he gave to the police. Two police officers also testified, over objection, about Velez’s description. The Court of Appeals held that the officers’ testimony was admissible under the Huertas rule, which allows testimony about a witness’s description of the offender to assist the jury in evaluating the witness’s opportunity to observe and the reliability of their memory. The court reasoned that a statement that is not hearsay when the declarant testifies to it does not become hearsay when someone else does so, emphasizing the trial court’s discretion to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence.

    Facts

    Hector Velez was robbed by two men. A video recording of the robbery was admitted into evidence, but the face of the alleged perpetrator was unclear. Velez identified the defendant, Smith, as one of the robbers at trial. Velez testified that he described the attacker to the police as a black man, about 5’6, with short hair, a round face, and thick eyebrows, wearing a white shirt. The description matched the defendant. However, Velez later corrected his description of the shirt color after seeing the video. Two police officers also testified, over objection, about the description Velez provided on the night of the crime, corroborating Velez’s account.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the officers’ testimony improperly bolstered the victim’s testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, deeming the argument unpreserved and meritless. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer’s testimony about a crime victim’s description of the perpetrator, given to the police shortly after the crime, is admissible under the rule established in People v. Huertas.

    Holding

    Yes, because a statement that is not hearsay when the declarant testifies to it does not become hearsay when someone else does so, and the testimony assists the jury in evaluating the witness’s opportunity to observe and the reliability of their memory. This is subject to the trial court’s discretion to exclude evidence that is more prejudicial than probative.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Huertas, which held that a crime victim’s testimony regarding their own description of the attacker is admissible because it is not hearsay; it is offered to assist the jury in evaluating the witness’s opportunity to observe and the reliability of their memory. The Court extended this rule to allow police officer testimony about the victim’s description, reasoning that a statement does not become hearsay simply because someone other than the declarant testifies to it.

    The Court distinguished this situation from prior consistent statements that are inadmissible bolstering, as discussed in People v. Trowbridge and People v. Caserta, which involved prior identifications of the defendant by an eyewitness. Those cases held that testimony by one witness to a previous identification of the defendant by another witness is generally inadmissible. However, the Court emphasized that Huertas treated the description as non-hearsay, not an exception to the hearsay rule.

    The court cautioned that this holding should not be interpreted as a license to present redundant police testimony that serves no useful purpose and recognized the trial court’s discretion to exclude evidence that is more prejudicial than probative. The court stated that “[a] court retains discretion to exclude evidence of prior consistent statements when it reasonably finds that evidence to be more prejudicial than probative.” In this particular case, the Court found that the officers’ brief recitation of Velez’s description was not likely to create a false impression of overwhelming corroboration and, therefore, was not prejudicial to the defendant.

  • People v. Colon, 46 N.Y.2d 722 (1978): Admissibility of Negative Identification Testimony

    People v. Colon, 46 N.Y.2d 722 (1978)

    Negative identification testimony (i.e., testimony that a witness failed to identify the defendant in a prior lineup or viewing) is generally inadmissible as evidence-in-chief because it lacks probative value and constitutes bolstering, unless offered to rebut a specific defense claim.

    Summary

    In a rape and robbery case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of testimony that the victim failed to identify the defendant in a prior lineup where the defendant was not present. The Court held that such evidence was inadmissible because it was not probative and served only to bolster the victim’s in-court identification. The dissent argued that the defense’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal and that the evidence was prejudicial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision to admit the testimony, because the issue was not properly preserved for appeal.

    Facts

    The victim testified that she knew her attackers from previous encounters at her apartment, where they discussed potential employment opportunities. During the investigation, the police took the victim to the moving company where the alleged attackers worked. On two occasions, the victim viewed employees but did not identify the defendant or his co-defendant. Evidence was also presented that the victim failed to identify anyone in a “blank lineup” that did not include the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of rape and robbery. The defendant objected to the admission of the negative identification testimony, arguing it was irrelevant. The trial court overruled the objection. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue of admissibility was not properly preserved for appellate review because the defense did not specifically object on hearsay grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony that the victim failed to identify the defendant or others in prior lineups when the defendant was not present, and whether the defendant’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s objection at trial was not specific enough to preserve the issue of inadmissibility for appeal. The Court found that the objection needed to be based on hearsay grounds to alert the trial court to the specific nature of the error alleged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals majority held that the defendant’s general objection to the evidence as “irrelevant” was insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. The dissent argued that the basis of the objection (bolstering) was clear to the trial judge and that the evidence was both nonprobative and hearsay. The dissent stated, “Fairness to the defendant requires that, rather than turn aside his contention on the basis of the hairsplitting distinction which the majority makes, we hold it sufficiently preserved and, since it was both improper and prejudicial bolstering, that we reverse and remand for a new trial.” The dissent cited to People v Jung Hing, 212 NY 393, 402: “Testimony of nonidentification is admissible, if at all, only on rebuttal and even then is not admitted to prove or disprove any fact involved in the issues on trial, but solely to support the credibility of the witness”. The dissent argued the evidence was not relevant because it did not make any fact in issue more or less probable.