22 N.Y.2d 414 (1968)

A passenger who boards or alights from a moving train is negligent per se, unless a railroad employee’s direction or an alternative danger diverts the passenger’s attention, creating a false sense of safety.

Summary

This case concerns a wrongful death action against the Long Island Rail Road after the plaintiff’s testator was fatally injured while disembarking from a train. The central issues revolve around the applicability of Section 83 of the Railroad Law, which addresses injuries to passengers on car platforms, and the standard of contributory negligence when a passenger boards or alights from a moving train. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court’s instructions to the jury regarding Section 83 and contributory negligence were erroneous, warranting a new trial. The Court emphasized that passengers who board or alight from a moving train are negligent per se unless certain exceptions apply.

Facts

The decedent, a regular commuter on the Long Island Rail Road, missed his usual train and took a train to Mineola station. His wife was to meet him there. The train was not scheduled to stop at Mineola, but it usually slowed down in that area. The decedent was fatally injured while disembarking at the Mineola station. There was conflicting evidence about whether the train was moving when he exited and whether he was riding on the platform in violation of Railroad Law § 83.

Procedural History

The case began in the Supreme Court. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division after a verdict for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case for a new trial.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Railroad Law § 83 applies to a passenger preparing to leave a train at a station who enters upon the platform as the train enters the station.

2. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the standard of contributory negligence applicable to a passenger who steps or jumps off a moving train.

Holding

1. No, because the statute prohibits entering the platform of a moving train, but it doesn’t require a passenger to remain seated until the train stops completely.

2. No, because boarding or alighting from a moving train is negligence per se unless the passenger faced alternative dangers or a railroad employee’s direction diverted their attention.

Court’s Reasoning

Regarding Section 83, the Court held that the statute doesn’t require passengers to remain seated until the train stops. It only prohibits entering the platform of a moving train. Citing Kettell v. Erie R.R. Co., the Court emphasized that railroads are not liable for injuries when a passenger violates posted regulations about riding on the platform. As the Appellate Division noted in Kettell, “If the statute means anything it permits this notice and exempts defendant from liability for accidents from its violation. If the prohibition in the notice means anything it prohibits the very act of the plaintiff which resulted in his injury.” (176 App. Div. 430, 435-436.) The Court reasoned that passengers should demand longer stops rather than disregard safety regulations.

On contributory negligence, the Court cited Mearns v. Central R. R. Co. of N. J. and Soloman v. Manhattan Ry. Co., stating that the established rule in New York is that boarding or alighting from a moving train is negligence per se. There are exceptions if the passenger is faced with alternative dangers or if a railroad employee’s direction created a false sense of safety. The trial court’s instruction, allowing recovery if the train moved at an “exceedingly slow rate of speed,” was an incorrect statement of the law.

Although the defendant’s attorney did not formally object to the charge until after the jury retired, the Court held that the issue was adequately preserved for review. The trial court had instructed counsel to raise exceptions and requests in chambers, and the objection was raised immediately after the jury retired. The Court found that requiring a formal objection before the jury retired would be “exalting useless formalism over substance” in this case.