New York Law Review

Tag: Board of Elections

  • Matter of Barron v. Board of Elections in the City of New York, 11 N.Y.3d 747 (2008): Filling Vacancies in State Assembly After April 1st

    Matter of Barron v. Board of Elections in the City of New York, 11 N.Y.3d 747 (2008)

    Under Public Officers Law § 42(4), a special election is generally not required to fill a vacancy in the office of a member of the New York State Assembly that occurs after April 1st of the last year of the term, and the office will be filled at the next general election.

    Summary

    This case concerns the proper procedure for filling a vacancy in the New York State Assembly when it occurs late in the term. After a Member of Assembly was convicted of felonies, a vacancy was certified. A candidate sought to compel the Board of Elections to hold a special election to fill the vacancy for the remainder of the term. The Court of Appeals held that Public Officers Law § 42(4) governs, and a special election is not required because the vacancy occurred after April 1st of the last year of the term. The office will be filled in the next general election.

    Facts

    Diane Gordon, a Member of Assembly for the 40th Assembly District in Kings County, was convicted of felonies on April 8, 2008, which by law created a vacancy in her office, with the term ending December 31, 2008. On April 16, 2008, the State Board of Elections certified the vacancy to the Board of Elections in the City of New York. Inez D. Barron, who was already circulating petitions for the next term commencing January 1, 2009, also began circulating petitions for the vacancy term. Barron sought to compel the Board of Elections to conduct primary and general elections to fill the vacancy.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court ordered the Board of Elections to conduct primary and general elections to fill the vacancy and set a date for the start of petition circulation. The Appellate Division affirmed the order requiring elections but modified the petition circulation date. The Board of Elections appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Public Officers Law § 42(4) requires a special election to fill a vacancy in the office of Member of Assembly when the vacancy occurs after April 1st of the last year of the term.

    Holding

    No, because Public Officers Law § 42(4) provides a specific rule for vacancies in the office of Member of Assembly, stating that a special election is not required unless the vacancy occurs before April 1st of the last year of the term, or a special session of the legislature is called.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Public Officers Law § 42(4) governs the situation. The court analyzed both § 42(1), which generally provides for filling vacancies at the next general election, and § 42(4), which provides a special rule for members of the Assembly. The court stated, “Although subdivision (1) generally provides for the filling of vacancies at the next general election if the vacancy occurs before September 20th, subdivision (4) modifies the general rule for vacancies occurring in the office of Member of Assembly.”

    The court reasoned that since the vacancy occurred after April 1st, no special election was required. The court emphasized the legislative intent behind § 42(4), noting that historically, the Legislature recessed before April 1st, implying that vacancies occurring after that date were intended to remain unfilled for the remainder of the term unless a special session was called. Requiring separate elections for the vacancy and the upcoming term would be an unnecessary burden and expense. The court noted, “Indeed, it would be anomalous to require the Board of Elections to assume the burden and expense of simultaneously conducting a regular general election for the term commencing January first and a separate general election to fill the vacancy for the last two months of the year.”

    The court rejected the argument that the terms “term,” “office,” and “vacancy” were used interchangeably, clarifying that while “vacancy” refers to the unexpired term, “office” refers to the position itself. Therefore, the provision stating that “the office shall be filled at the next general election” refers to filling the position in the usual course for the next legislative term, not a separate election for the unexpired term. This interpretation aligns with the statute’s intent to avoid unnecessary elections when a vacancy occurs late in the term.

  • Graziano v. County of Albany, 3 N.Y.3d 475 (2004): Single Election Commissioner’s Standing to Sue for Political Imbalance

    3 N.Y.3d 475 (2004)

    An election commissioner has the capacity and standing to sue a county when its actions allegedly disrupt the equal representation of their political party on the board of elections, as guaranteed by the New York Constitution and Election Law.

    Summary

    John Graziano, a Republican election commissioner for Albany County, sued the county, alleging that its hiring practices caused a political imbalance on the Board of Elections. The County moved to dismiss, arguing that Graziano, as a single commissioner, lacked the authority to sue without the support of the other commissioner. The Court of Appeals held that while a single commissioner cannot sue regarding general Board functions without majority approval, they do have standing to sue for actions that allegedly impair the equal representation of their political party, as this right is implicit in constitutional and statutory requirements for balanced partisan representation.

    Facts

    John Graziano, the Republican election commissioner for Albany County, commenced an action against the County of Albany, alleging the county’s hiring freeze and delays in approving appointments resulted in a political imbalance in the Board of Elections staffing, favoring the Democratic party. Michael Monescalchi, the Democratic commissioner, did not authorize or join the lawsuit. Graziano argued that the County’s actions impaired the Board’s ability to function effectively and maintain equal representation.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court denied the County’s motion to dismiss, finding the Board had complete authority over personnel appointments. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition, concluding that a single commissioner could not pursue the claim. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s judgment, reinstating the claim regarding political imbalance and remitting the matter to the Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a single election commissioner has the capacity and standing to sue a county for actions that allegedly impair the equal representation of their political party on the board of elections, without the support of the other commissioner.

    Holding

    Yes, because the right to pursue such a claim is implicit in the constitutional and statutory requirements of balanced partisan representation on local boards of elections, but only concerning claims of political imbalance affecting their own party.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between claims affecting the general functioning of the Board and claims alleging political imbalance. Regarding general Board functions, a single commissioner needs majority approval to sue under Election Law § 3-212(2). However, the Court emphasized that the New York Constitution, Article II, § 8, and Election Law § 3-300 mandate equal representation of the major political parties on boards of elections. The Court reasoned that each commissioner is chosen by their party to represent its interests. Therefore, a commissioner can act alone to challenge actions that threaten the equal representation of their party. The Court stated, “Recognition of such a right ensures that attempts to disrupt the delicate balance required for the fair administration of elections are not insulated from judicial review.” The Court found that Graziano alleged a sufficient injury in fact to his own party, stemming from the County’s delays in approving Republican appointments, creating periods of political imbalance. The dissenting opinion argued that Graziano’s claims were too conclusory and failed to specifically allege an injury to the Republican party. However, the majority found that, given the procedural posture of the case, Graziano’s allegations must be presumed true and given every favorable inference, entitling him to a hearing on his political imbalance claim. The court emphasized that the commissioner does not have standing to claim political imbalance suffered by the opposing political party.

  • Green v. DiNapoli, 97 N.Y.2d 43 (2001): Duty to Ensure Proper Filing of Election Documents

    Green v. DiNapoli, 97 N.Y.2d 43 (2001)

    A candidate should not be penalized for errors or omissions made by the Board of Elections in the filing process when the candidate has taken reasonable steps to comply with election law filing requirements.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a candidate’s nominating petition when the Board of Elections failed to properly endorse the filing with the date and time of receipt, as required by Election Law § 6-144. DiNapoli, a candidate, timely submitted his certificate of acceptance to the Board of Elections, but the Board failed to time-stamp it. The court held that the lack of endorsement, due to the Board’s oversight, did not constitute a fatal defect because the candidate had fulfilled his responsibility by delivering the document on time.

    Facts

    DiNapoli was nominated as a candidate of the Independence Party for Nassau County Executive. He was required to file his certificate of acceptance with the Board of Elections by July 16, 2001. He presented the certificate to an official at the Board of Elections shortly after 9:30 a.m. on July 16, meeting the deadline. The Board of Elections did not endorse the certificate with the day, hour, or minute of receipt at that time, though a separate book entry indicating timely receipt was made. The Board official intended to time-stamp the certificate later but failed to do so.

    Procedural History

    Green brought a proceeding to invalidate DiNapoli’s designating petition. Supreme Court rejected Green’s challenge, finding the filing valid. The Appellate Division reversed, invalidating DiNapoli’s petition, holding that strict compliance with the statute was required and the lack of endorsement was a fatal defect. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure of the Board of Elections to properly endorse a certificate of acceptance with the time of filing, as required by Election Law § 6-144, constitutes a fatal defect that invalidates the candidate’s petition, when the candidate timely submitted the document.

    Holding

    No, because in the circumstances presented, DiNapoli satisfied the filing requirement of Election Law § 6-144 and the lack of an endorsement due to the Board’s oversight does not constitute a fatal defect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the responsibility for endorsing the document with the time of filing rests with the Board of Elections, not the candidate. Penalizing the candidate for the Board’s error would be unfair, especially when the candidate took the necessary steps to ensure timely filing. The court emphasized that DiNapoli delivered the certificate early in the day to the appropriate Board employee. Election Law § 6-144 states that “All such petitions and certificates shall at the time of filing thereof be endorsed by such officer or board with the day, hour and minute of such filing…”. The Court held that the key issue was that the certificate was delivered to the appropriate Board employee within the prescribed timeframe. The court’s decision reflects a practical approach, acknowledging that candidates should not be prejudiced by administrative errors outside their control. The Court focused on the fact that the candidate had acted diligently and within the requirements of the law, and the error was solely attributable to the Board of Elections. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • Testa v. Ravitz, 84 N.Y.2d 894 (1994): Board of Elections’ Duty to Canvass Ballots

    Testa v. Ravitz, 84 N.Y.2d 894 (1994)

    A vacancy in a nomination is not created under Election Law § 6-148 when the Board of Elections fails to fulfill its statutory duty to canvass primary ballots and file tabulated statements of the voting results.

    Summary

    In a primary election for a Member of Assembly, a dispute arose when the Board of Elections failed to officially canvass the ballots and file the required tabulated statements due to a deadlock. One candidate sought a judicial determination of the winner or, alternatively, a new primary election. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Board’s failure to act did not create a vacancy in nomination under Election Law § 6-148, as a valid nomination is a prerequisite for such a vacancy. The court also affirmed that it lacked jurisdiction to conduct its own canvass before the Board fulfilled its statutory duty. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court with instructions to remand to the Board of Elections to complete the canvassing process.

    Facts

    Anne-Renee Testa and John Ravitz were candidates in a primary election for the Liberal Party nomination for Member of Assembly. Testa was a write-in candidate, and Ravitz was the designated candidate. After the primary, a dispute arose regarding the vote count. The Board of Elections was unable to agree on the tabulated statements of the voting results, with a 4-4 vote and two members absent, thus failing to certify the election results.

    Procedural History

    Testa initiated a proceeding under Article 16 of the Election Law, seeking a judicial determination of the winner or a new primary election. The Supreme Court was informed that the Board of Elections had failed to file signed, tabulated statements. The Supreme Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to conduct its own canvass. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a vacancy in a nomination is created within the meaning of Election Law § 6-148 when the Board of Elections fails to fulfill its statutory duty under Election Law § 9-200(1) to canvass the primary ballots and file tabulated statements setting forth the voting results.

    Holding

    No, because a valid nomination is a prerequisite to the creation of a vacancy under Election Law § 6-148, and the Board of Elections’ failure to act means no valid nomination has been made.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that under Election Law § 6-148, a valid nomination must exist before a vacancy can be created. Since the Board of Elections failed to canvass the ballots and file the required statements, no valid nomination had been made. Therefore, no vacancy existed within the meaning of Election Law § 6-148. The court cited Matter of Di Lorenzo v. Heffernan, 187 Misc 766, affd 271 App Div 802, affd 296 NY 687, to support the principle that a valid nomination is a prerequisite to a vacancy. The court emphasized that it lacked jurisdiction to conduct its own canvass before the Board of Elections fulfilled its statutory duty under Election Law § 9-200(1), citing Matter of Larsen v. Canary, 107 AD2d 809, affd for the reasons stated below 65 NY2d 634. The Court noted the Board of Election’s statutory duty to canvass the ballots cannot be abdicated. Furthermore, the failure of the Board of Elections to fulfill its statutory duty does not warrant an order directing the holding of a new primary election, since the court cannot determine if fraud or irregularity made it impossible to determine who rightfully was nominated until the Board fulfills it’s duty. The Court directed that the matter be remanded to the Board of Elections to perform its statutory duty, stating, “Pursuant to Election Law § 16-106 (4), Supreme Court should remand the matter to the Board of Elections, and direct it to perform its statutory duty to canvass the ballots and file the requisite tabulated statements.”

  • Matter of Committee to Stop the Airport v. Board of Elections, 66 N.Y.2d 163 (1985): Limits on Referendums that Contradict State Law

    66 N.Y.2d 163 (1985)

    A proposed city referendum that directly conflicts with a state statute is invalid and can be removed from the ballot.

    Summary

    This case concerns a proposed New York City referendum that sought to restrict the city’s ability to use property and funds for a military installation involved with nuclear weapons. The Committee to Stop the Airport sought to have the referendum removed from the ballot. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the referendum was invalid because it conflicted with New York State Law § 50(2), which grants cities the power to dispose of land to the United States for military use, notwithstanding any city charter provisions. The court found that because the referendum sought to deprive the city of a power granted by the legislature, it was facially invalid.

    Facts

    A proposed referendum sought to amend the New York City Charter § 67. The amendment aimed to prohibit the Board of Estimate from approving the sale, lease, or other disposition of city property for a military installation involved in carrying or storing nuclear weapons. It further sought to prohibit the Board from granting franchises, permits, or licenses for such purposes, as well as from approving appropriations of funds to facilitate the development of such installations.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term found the proposed amendment unconstitutional as it interfered with the federal government’s power to provide for national defense. It also found the amendment called for an unauthorized citywide opinion poll. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, agreeing that the amendment violated the Federal Constitution and was also invalid under State Law § 50(2). The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a proposed city referendum that seeks to restrict the city’s power to dispose of land for federal military installations, when that power is expressly granted by state law, is invalid and can be removed from the ballot.

    Holding

    Yes, because State Law § 50(2) expressly authorizes cities to sell, lease, exchange, or donate land to the United States for military use, notwithstanding any city charter provisions. Therefore, a referendum seeking to deprive the city of this power is invalid on its face.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision solely on state statutory grounds, finding it unnecessary to reach federal constitutional questions. The court emphasized that State Law § 50(2) grants cities the power to dispose of land to the United States for military use, even if it conflicts with city charter provisions. The proposed referendum directly contradicted this state law by attempting to preclude the city from approving the sale, lease, or exchange of city property for a federal military installation. Because the referendum sought to deprive the city authorities of a right and power granted by the legislature, the court held that it was invalid on its face and could have no legal effect if enacted. The court quoted the statute directly, noting that the state law authorizes cities to dispose of land for military reservations “notwithstanding the provisions of any charter or any other statute”. Because the disposition and use of city land was at the core of the controversy, the Court found it inappropriate to submit the referendum to the electorate.

  • Matter of Quinones v. Board of Elections, 40 N.Y.2d 813 (1976): Sufficiency of Evidence for Invalidation of Signatures on a Petition

    Matter of Quinones v. Board of Elections, 40 N.Y.2d 813 (1976)

    Misconduct by a candidate in soliciting signatures on designating petitions warrants invalidation of all signatures obtained by that candidate only if the misconduct is of such character or magnitude as to warrant an inference that similar misconduct permeated other signatures obtained by him.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to the validity of signatures on designating petitions for candidates in an election. The petitioners argued that a candidate, Silva, engaged in fraudulent conduct by postdating signatures on the petitions. The trial court invalidated all signatures obtained by Silva based on this misconduct. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to infer that the misconduct permeated all signatures. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the proved instances of postdating were too few to justify invalidating all signatures obtained by Silva. The Court emphasized that the determination of whether misconduct permeated the signatures is a question of fact.

    Facts

    Three subscribers testified before the referee that Silva, a candidate and subscribing witness, obtained their signatures on the designating petition and registration forms simultaneously. The registration cards were date-stamped earlier than the dates on the petition signatures, suggesting postdating. The trial court found that Silva participated in the postdating and invalidated all 91 signatures he obtained.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners initiated a proceeding to invalidate the designating petition of Gonzalez, Silva, and Velez. The Supreme Court invalidated the signatures obtained by Silva. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, reversing the invalidation and granting ancillary relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the candidate’s misconduct in postdating a few signatures warrants an inference that similar misconduct permeated other signatures obtained by him, justifying the invalidation of all those signatures.

    Holding

    No, because the small number of proved incidents of postdating was insufficient to support an inference of permeation such as to invalidate all the signatures procured by Silva.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the evidence was insufficient to infer that Silva’s misconduct permeated all the signatures he obtained. The court acknowledged that in some cases, a candidate’s misconduct might be so significant as to warrant such an inference. However, in this case, the court found that the proved instances of postdating were too few to justify invalidating all 91 signatures. The Court emphasized that the determination of whether misconduct permeated the signatures is a question of fact. The court stated: “Whether to draw an inference of permeation would usually be a question of fact (cf. Matter of Ruiz v McKenna, 40 NY2d 815).” The Court deferred to the Appellate Division’s factual determination that the conduct was insufficient to support an inference of permeation. The court also noted that the petitioners’ attempt to introduce additional evidence of postdating was rejected by both lower courts, and this factual determination was beyond the scope of the Court of Appeals’ review. Because the court found the number of incidents of postdating to be small, it could not conclude that the appellate division’s determination was incorrect.

  • Matter of O’Brien v. Board of Elections, 18 N.Y.2d 106 (1966): Court Authority to Recanvass Election Returns

    Matter of O’Brien v. Board of Elections, 18 N.Y.2d 106 (1966)

    Section 330 of the Election Law validly vests summary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to order a recanvass of absentee and military ballots in an election, even for delegates to a Constitutional Convention, and this jurisdiction is not deprived by the Board of Elections certifying a candidate or the candidate taking their oath of office.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the New York Supreme Court has the power to order a recanvass of election returns for delegates to the state Constitutional Convention, given that the Convention itself is the ultimate judge of its members’ elections. The Court of Appeals held that section 330 of the Election Law validly grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction to order a recanvass to ensure the Board of Elections accurately tallies and certifies votes. The court reasoned that while the Convention can disregard the Board’s certificate, this does not negate the court’s power to ensure an accurate initial count. The Court also held that subsequent certification and oath-taking do not strip the court of its jurisdiction once it has been properly invoked.

    Facts

    A dispute arose between two nominees for the office of delegate to the Constitutional Convention regarding the election returns. After the proceeding commenced, the Board of Elections certified Santangelo as the duly elected delegate, and he subsequently took and filed his oath of office. O’Brien sought a recanvass of the absentee and military ballots, and the case eventually reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially heard the case. The specific ruling of the Special Term which was appealed is not stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Special Term and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether section 330 of the Election Law validly vests summary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to order a recanvass of absentee and military ballots cast in an election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, despite the Convention being the ultimate judge of its members’ elections.

    Holding

    Yes, because section 330 of the Election Law validly vests summary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to order a recanvass of the absentee and military ballots to ensure the Board of Elections accurately tallies the votes cast, and the Constitutional Convention’s power to judge elections does not vitiate the court’s power to require accurate vote tallies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the State Constitution designates the Constitutional Convention as the ultimate judge of its members’ elections, the Board of Elections has the initial duty to certify the candidate receiving the most votes. The Court emphasized that no constitutional provision deprives the courts of jurisdiction under section 330 to inquire whether the board properly discharged its duty. The court stated, “Although the Convention is privileged to disregard the certificate issued by the Board of Elections in determining whether a delegate was properly elected and should be seated, this does not in any way vitiate the power of the courts to require that the certificate reflect an accurate tally of the votes cast.” The court analogized its reasoning to People ex rel. Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 216 N.Y. 732. Further, the court found that the Board of Elections certifying the respondent and him subsequently taking his oath of office did not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction. The court highlighted that delegates are not required to take their oath until April 1967, and section 279 of the Election Law allows a court to order the Board of Elections to issue a corrected certificate. The court explicitly stated that a corrected certificate “shall stand in lieu of the original * * * certificate.” The court emphasized the importance of ensuring accurate election results, even in the context of elections for delegates to the Constitutional Convention.