New York Law Review

Tag: Bloom v. New York Civil Court

  • Bloom v. New York Civil Court, 44 N.Y.2d 774 (1978): Challenging Administrative Orders via Article 78 Proceedings

    Bloom v. New York Civil Court, 44 N.Y.2d 774 (1978)

    Article 78 proceedings are generally not the proper mechanism to challenge administrative orders when direct appellate review is available, although a dissenting opinion argued for their use in compelling a public official to perform a duty required by law.

    Summary

    This case concerns the propriety of using Article 78 proceedings under the CPLR to challenge the refusal of judges in the New York Civil Court to grant requests. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decisions, holding that Article 78 proceedings were not the appropriate avenue for challenging these refusals, as direct appellate review was available. The dissenting opinion argued that the judges’ actions were based on a peremptory administrative order, making Article 78 review in the nature of mandamus appropriate to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law.

    Facts

    Judges of the New York Civil Court refused certain requests. The petitioners initiated Article 78 proceedings to challenge these refusals. The basis for the judges’ denial was allegedly a peremptory administrative order issued by the Administrative Judge.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts ruled in favor of the petitioners, finding the Article 78 proceedings were properly brought. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ orders and dismissed the petitions, determining that Article 78 was not the appropriate remedy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Article 78 proceedings are the appropriate mechanism to challenge the refusal of judges in the Civil Court when such refusals are based on an administrative order and direct appellate review is available?

    Holding

    No, because direct appellate review is available, making an Article 78 proceeding inappropriate in this instance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority held that the petitioners should pursue direct appellate review rather than utilizing Article 78 proceedings. The dissenting opinion, however, contended that the judges’ actions were not discretionary but rather the ministerial execution of an administrative order. The dissent argued that this scenario aligns with the classic use of Article 78 in the nature of mandamus, which is used to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law. The dissent noted that Article 78 is appropriate when seeking to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law. As stated by Judge Wachtler in dissent, “To the extent that the petitioners are seeking to compel a public official to perform a duty required by law, this case presents an article 78 in the nature of mandamus in its most classic sense.” The majority believed appellate review would suffice; the dissent felt an Article 78 proceeding was required to address the administrative mandate directly.