New York Law Review

Tag: blood alcohol test

  • People v. Elysee, 11 N.Y.3d 100 (2008): Overcoming Physician-Patient Privilege for Blood Samples in DWI Cases

    People v. Elysee, 11 N.Y.3d 100 (2008)

    In cases involving driving while intoxicated (DWI) resulting in death or serious injury, a court order issued under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3) compelling a blood test overcomes the physician-patient privilege that might otherwise protect previously drawn blood samples taken for medical purposes.

    Summary

    Elysee was involved in a fatal car accident and taken to the hospital, where blood samples were drawn for treatment (5:30 a.m. samples). Later, pursuant to a court order, a second set of samples was drawn for a blood alcohol test (2:50 p.m. samples). A search warrant was then issued to seize the 5:30 a.m. samples from the hospital. Elysee argued that seizing the 5:30 a.m. samples violated the physician-patient privilege. The New York Court of Appeals held that even if the samples were privileged, the privilege was overcome by the court order issued under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3), which authorizes chemical tests in DWI cases involving death or serious injury.

    Facts

    On December 25, 2003, Elysee was involved in a four-vehicle car accident resulting in a fatality and injuries. At 5:30 a.m., he was taken to the hospital, where blood samples were drawn for treatment purposes. At 1:50 p.m., a court order compelled him to submit to a blood alcohol test, resulting in a second blood draw at 2:50 p.m. A search warrant was issued and executed on December 29, 2003, to seize the 5:30 a.m. samples from the hospital.

    Procedural History

    Elysee moved to controvert the search warrant and suppress the results of the blood alcohol test performed on the 5:30 a.m. samples, arguing a violation of the physician-patient privilege. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, both sets of blood samples were tested. The jury convicted Elysee of manslaughter, assault, and driving while intoxicated. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the seizure of blood samples drawn for medical purposes, pursuant to a search warrant issued after a court order compelling a blood alcohol test under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3), violates the physician-patient privilege defined by CPLR 4504.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of second-degree manslaughter.

    Holding

    1. No, because even if the blood samples were privileged, the privilege was overcome by the court order issued pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3).

    2. No, because given the overwhelming evidence of Elysee’s intoxication, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding of criminally negligent homicide.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a) establishes implied consent to chemical tests for drivers in the state. Further, § 1194(3) allows for court-ordered chemical tests when a person is involved in an accident causing death or serious injury, operates the vehicle while intoxicated, is lawfully arrested, and refuses or is unable to consent to a chemical test. The Court stated, “Here, it is illogical to conclude that a blood sample taken at 5:30 a.m. cannot be seized pursuant to a properly issued court order, merely because the order issued after the blood was actually drawn by an authorized person.” The seizure of the earlier blood sample was in accord with the statute, as the Vehicle and Traffic Law authorized a chemical test under the circumstances. Regarding the lesser-included offense, the court held that a person who fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk by reason of his intoxication acts recklessly, not with criminal negligence. The court cited People v. Donohue, 123 AD2d 77, 81 (3d Dept 1987) and People v. Van Dusen, 89 AD2d 649 (3d Dept 1982).

  • People v.的好色喔啦, 76 N.Y.2d 870 (1990): Implied Consent and Blood Alcohol Tests for Unconscious Drivers

    People v.的好色喔啦, 76 N.Y.2d 870 (1990)

    Under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a)(1), the implied consent to a blood alcohol test applies even if the driver is unconscious and not formally placed under arrest, provided the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the driver violated § 1192 and the test is administered within two hours of when the arrest would have occurred.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the implied consent provision of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a)(1) allows for a blood alcohol test to be administered to an unconscious driver, even if a formal arrest has not been made. The defendant was involved in an accident and remained unconscious for two weeks. The court reasoned that a formal arrest would have been a meaningless gesture in this situation and that the statutory requirements were met because the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was driving under the influence, and the test was administered within two hours of when the arrest would have occurred had the defendant been conscious. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to admit the blood alcohol test results as evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and was found unconscious at the scene by police officers.

    The defendant remained comatose for approximately two weeks following the accident.

    A blood sample was taken from the defendant at the direction of a police officer, and the test revealed a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

    The blood alcohol test was administered within two hours of the accident.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried for reckless and vehicular manslaughter.

    The trial included evidence obtained from the blood alcohol test administered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) (a) (1).

    The defendant argued that the evidence should have been suppressed because he had not been formally placed under arrest at the time the blood sample was taken.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence obtained from a blood alcohol test administered to an unconscious driver, who was not formally placed under arrest, is admissible under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a)(1)?

    Holding

    Yes, because a formal arrest would have been an empty gesture given the defendant’s unconscious state, and the statutory requirements of reasonable grounds and timely testing were met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a)(1), which states that any person who operates a motor vehicle in the state is deemed to have consented to a chemical blood alcohol test if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving under the influence and the test is administered within two hours after the person has been placed under arrest.

    The court reasoned that the purpose of the statute is to obtain evidence of intoxication in a timely manner and that requiring a formal arrest of an unconscious person would serve no practical purpose. The court stated that “a formal arrest would have been an empty gesture in defendant’s case, since defendant was unconscious when the police first arrived at the scene of the accident and he remained comatose for approximately two more weeks.”

    The court distinguished the case from People v. Almond, 151 A.D.2d 820, where the blood test was suppressed because the police found the defendant conscious but waited until he was unconscious due to medical treatment before administering the test, without formally arresting him first.

    The court emphasized that the key factors were the officer’s reasonable belief that the defendant was driving under the influence and the fact that the test was administered within two hours of when the arrest would have occurred. By focusing on these key elements, the court ensured that the implied consent statute would be applied in a manner consistent with its purpose of promoting highway safety and deterring drunk driving.

  • People v. Campbell, 69 N.Y.2d 482 (1987): Foundation Required for Blood Alcohol Test Results from DuPont ACA

    People v. Campbell, 69 N.Y.2d 482 (1987)

    Blood alcohol test results obtained from a DuPont Automatic Clinical Analyzer (ACA) are not admissible per se; the prosecution must lay a proper foundation establishing the accuracy and reliability of the machine for blood alcohol content testing, specifically demonstrating its accuracy within the standard of 0.01 grams per 100 milliliters.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the evidentiary foundation required for admitting blood alcohol test results obtained from a DuPont Automatic Clinical Analyzer (ACA) in DWI cases. The Court of Appeals held that such results are not admissible per se simply because they were generated in a hospital laboratory. The prosecution must establish the ACA’s accuracy and reliability for determining blood alcohol content within the legally required precision. The court emphasized that a State Health Department permit for the hospital does not automatically guarantee the machine’s accuracy for forensic blood alcohol testing.

    Facts

    Defendants were charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWI) under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2). Blood samples were taken from the defendants and analyzed at Jamestown General Hospital, a state-permitted facility, using a DuPont Automatic Clinical Analyzer (ACA). The tests were performed by certified hospital technologists. The ACA is a spectrophotometer using reagent packs to determine blood alcohol content. The technologists were trained to operate the machine but lacked advanced degrees in chemistry.

    Procedural History

    Defendants were convicted in various Justice Courts of Chautauqua County. County Court reversed these convictions and dismissed the informations, holding that the blood alcohol test results were inadmissible without a proper foundation. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether blood alcohol test results from a DuPont Automatic Clinical Analyzer are admissible in evidence per se, or whether the People must lay a foundation establishing the accuracy and reliability of the machine under the standards articulated in People v. Mertz and People v. Freeland.

    Holding

    No, the blood alcohol test results are not admissible per se because the People failed to establish that the DuPont ACA machine used was sufficiently accurate and reliable for forensic blood alcohol testing to meet the state’s accuracy standard of 0.01 grams per 100 milliliters.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the general reliability of hospital tests for medical purposes and the specific accuracy required for forensic blood alcohol testing in criminal cases. The court referenced People v. Mertz, which requires establishing the accuracy of a breathalyzer before its results are admissible. The Court stated that the State regulations require blood alcohol readings to be accurate within 0.01 grams per 100 milliliters. The court noted that the People did not present any scientific evidence establishing the reliability of the DuPont ACA for determining blood alcohol content within that standard, and that, in fact, evidence suggested the ACA’s manufacturer-set range exceeded this standard. The Court rejected the argument that the technologists’ certifications or the hospital’s permit were sufficient to establish the machine’s accuracy. The Court emphasized that the technologist could not be considered an expert able to attest to the machine’s specific accuracy: “the technologist… does not qualify as an expert on the internal workings of the machine and his or her testimony does not satisfy the distinct foundational requirement that the machine test blood alcohol content accurately within required specifications”. Citing People v. Freeland, the court emphasized the need to show that the machine is capable of accurately discerning the distinction between legal and illegal blood alcohol content.

  • People v. Moser, 70 N.Y.2d 476 (1987): Defining “Personal Supervision” for Blood Alcohol Tests

    People v. Moser, 70 N.Y.2d 476 (1987)

    The “personal supervision” requirement of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(7)(a) for blood alcohol tests does not require the supervising physician to be physically present and observing the procedure when a laboratory technician draws the blood sample.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the meaning of “personal supervision” under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(7)(a) regarding blood alcohol tests. The Court of Appeals held that a physician need not be physically present and observing when a lab technician draws blood. It is sufficient if the physician directs and supervises activities in the emergency room, authorizes the test, and is available for inquiries and emergencies. This interpretation balances the need for medical oversight with the statute’s purpose of easing the process of obtaining blood alcohol tests.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and a blood sample was taken by a lab technician to determine its alcohol content. A physician in charge of the emergency room authorized the taking of the sample, directing and supervising all activities. The physician was not physically present, observing the technician draw the blood.

    Procedural History

    The City Court found that the physician personally supervised the procedure within the meaning of the statute and admitted the blood alcohol test results. County Court reversed, concluding the statute required the physician’s physical presence. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(7)(a) requires a physician to be physically present, observing the procedure, when a laboratory technician draws a blood sample for the purposes of conducting a test to determine its alcoholic or drug content.

    Holding

    No, because the statute’s purpose is to make blood alcohol and drug content tests easier to obtain, and requiring the physician’s physical presence would undermine that purpose. The physician’s authorization and availability to respond to inquiries and emergencies sufficiently addresses the supervision requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the County Court’s interpretation conflicted with the statute’s intent. The 1969 amendment aimed to enlarge the class of authorized persons to draw blood, easing the process of obtaining tests. Requiring the physician to stand by the technician during the procedure would negate the benefit of allowing technicians to draw blood in the first place. The court emphasized that the physician’s authorization of the test, implying a medical judgment that it poses no undue risk to the patient, and their availability for inquiries and potential emergencies, sufficiently addresses the concerns underlying the supervision requirement.

    The Court stated that “the personal supervision of a physician is an important safeguard for the health of the suspects to be tested, it would be anomalous in light of the purposes of the amendment to require the physician to put his other duties aside to watch the technician perform the procedure. If that were the requirement, there would be no reason to allow the technician to take the sample in the first place.”

  • People v. चोट्टसot, 63 N.Y.2d 945 (1984): Upholding Blood Test Admissibility Based on Time of Arrest

    People v. चोट्टसot, 63 N.Y.2d 945 (1984)

    A blood test administered to a suspect is admissible as evidence in a driving while intoxicated case if administered within two hours of the suspect’s formal arrest, and the determination of when the arrest occurred is a factual finding that, if affirmed by the lower courts, will not be disturbed by the Court of Appeals.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld a County Court order affirming a Town Court’s denial of a motion to suppress blood test results in a driving while intoxicated case. The defendant argued the blood test, indicating a .17% blood-alcohol level, was taken in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(1)(1), which requires the test to be administered within two hours of arrest. The Court of Appeals deferred to the affirmed finding that the defendant’s arrest occurred at 8:35 p.m., making the subsequent blood test admissible, as it was administered within the statutory time limit. This case emphasizes the importance of establishing the precise time of arrest when determining the admissibility of blood alcohol tests.

    Facts

    On August 15, 1981, the defendant was involved in a car accident at approximately 7:00 p.m., crashing into a bridge abutment. Police arrived and found the defendant injured and trapped in the vehicle. He was extricated around 7:45 p.m. and, while disoriented, resisted medical assistance, requiring restraint. At 8:35 p.m., a police officer interviewed the defendant at the hospital, observed signs of intoxication (bloodshot eyes, slurred speech), and formally arrested him, reading his Miranda rights. A blood test was administered shortly before 10:00 p.m., revealing a blood-alcohol level of .17%.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the blood test results in Town Court, arguing the test was taken more than two hours after his purported arrest at the accident scene. The Town Court denied the motion. The defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated but appealed the Town Court’s order. The County Court affirmed the Town Court’s decision. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the blood test results should have been suppressed because the test was administered more than two hours after the defendant’s arrest, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(1)(1)?

    Holding

    No, because the affirmed finding of the Town Court established that the defendant was not arrested until 8:35 p.m., making the blood test, administered before 10:00 p.m., compliant with the statutory time limit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the defendant’s argument hinged on a factual assertion: that he was effectively arrested at the scene of the accident, more than two hours before the blood test. However, the Town Court made a factual finding, affirmed by the County Court, that the defendant was not formally arrested until 8:35 p.m. The Court of Appeals stated, “in view of the affirmed finding of the Town Court that defendant was not arrested until 8:35 p.m., the determination that the test was administered within the statutory time limit may not be disturbed by this court (cf. Humphrey v State of New York, 60 NY2d 742, 743-744).” Because the lower courts agreed on the timing of the arrest, the Court of Appeals deferred to this finding, thus validating the admissibility of the blood test. The court did not delve into a deeper analysis of what constitutes an arrest, because the lower court’s finding of fact was determinative. The critical point for legal professionals is the importance of establishing a clear and supportable timeline of events to determine when an arrest occurred for the purposes of applying Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(1)(1).

  • People v. Kates, 53 N.Y.2d 591 (1981): Admissibility of Blood Alcohol Test from Unconscious Driver

    People v. Kates, 53 N.Y.2d 591 (1981)

    A blood alcohol test administered to an unconscious or incapacitated driver is admissible as evidence without express consent, and this does not violate equal protection rights.

    Summary

    The case concerns the admissibility of a blood alcohol test taken from an unconscious driver. Kates was involved in a fatal car accident and, while receiving treatment, police detected signs of intoxication but he was too disoriented to consent to a blood test. A test was administered without consent, revealing a high blood alcohol content. Kates sought to suppress the evidence, arguing it violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and his constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals held that the test was admissible, finding that the statute doesn’t require express consent for incapacitated drivers and that this distinction doesn’t violate equal protection, as there is a rational basis for treating conscious and unconscious drivers differently. The prosecutor’s certification of the necessity of the evidence for conviction was also upheld.

    Facts

    On March 3, 1979, Defendant Kates was involved in a car accident that resulted in a fatality. Police, arriving at the scene, found Kates and his passengers injured and transported to nearby hospitals. At the hospital, officers observed signs of intoxication in Kates, including the smell of alcohol and bloodshot eyes. However, Kates was so disoriented due to his injuries that he was incapable of giving or refusing consent to a blood alcohol test. Police requested a physician to draw a blood sample, which revealed a blood alcohol content of .18%. Kates was subsequently indicted for criminally negligent homicide and driving while intoxicated.

    Procedural History

    Kates moved to suppress the blood test results, arguing a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and his constitutional rights. The trial court granted the motion. The People appealed, certifying that the remaining evidence was insufficient to obtain a conviction. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no statutory or constitutional bar to the admissibility of the blood test results. Kates then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 requires express consent for a blood alcohol test to be administered to an unconscious or incapacitated driver.
    2. Whether admitting blood alcohol test results from an unconscious or incapacitated driver without express consent violates the driver’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
    3. Whether the prosecutor properly certified that the suppressed evidence was essential to the case, allowing for an appeal of the suppression order.

    Holding

    1. No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 does not explicitly require express consent and implies consent for all drivers using state roads.
    2. No, because there is a rational basis for distinguishing between conscious and unconscious drivers in the context of blood alcohol tests.
    3. Yes, because the prosecutor’s certification is sufficient under CPL 450.50, subd 1, par [b], and does not require further appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law does not explicitly mandate express consent for blood alcohol tests. The statute implies consent for all drivers operating vehicles in the state. The exception in subdivision 2 applies only when a driver refuses to consent, which was not the case here, as Kates was incapable of consenting or refusing. The court cited the legislative history, noting the legislature’s intent to allow chemical tests for unconscious individuals, deeming them to have given consent by using the highway. The court rejected the equal protection argument, stating that the distinction between conscious and unconscious drivers is rational. The legislature reasonably sought to avoid violent confrontations by requiring consent from conscious drivers while dispensing with this requirement for incapacitated drivers who pose no threat. “Indeed there is a rational basis for distinguishing between the driver who is capable of making a choice and the driver who is unable to do so. Thus, denying the unconscious driver the right to refuse a blood test does not violate his right to equal protection.” The court also upheld the prosecutor’s right to appeal the suppression order based on their certification that the remaining evidence was insufficient for conviction, emphasizing that this assessment is best made by the prosecutor. The court stated, “the prosecutor may appeal not only where the remaining proof is legally insufficient but also where he certifies that it is ‘so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of prosecuting such charge to a conviction has been effectively destroyed’ (CPL 450.50, subd 1, par [b]).”

  • People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419 (1979): Constitutionality of DWI Laws Absent a Blood Alcohol Test

    People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419 (1979)

    Statutory prohibitions against driving while impaired or intoxicated are not unconstitutionally vague, even when no blood alcohol test is administered, because the terms have a commonly understood meaning and provide sufficient standards for adjudication.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, specifically subdivisions 1 (driving while impaired) and 3 (driving while intoxicated), in the absence of a scientific test to determine blood alcohol content. The defendant argued the terms “impaired” and “intoxicated” were unconstitutionally vague without such a test. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that the terms possess a sufficiently definite meaning to satisfy due process requirements, providing adequate warning and preventing arbitrary enforcement, even without scientific evidence.

    Facts

    A police officer observed the defendant driving erratically and running a red light. Upon stopping the defendant, the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol. The defendant admitted to having a couple of drinks. The defendant’s eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slurred, he was unsteady on his feet, and his pupils did not dilate when a flashlight was shined in them. The defendant refused a breathalyzer test. The defendant was charged with a misdemeanor for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court dismissed the charges, finding the statute unconstitutionally vague in the absence of a blood alcohol test. The Appellate Term affirmed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether subdivisions 1 and 3 of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, prohibiting driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated, are unconstitutionally vague when applied in the absence of a scientific test for determining blood alcohol content.

    Holding

    No, because the terms “impaired” and “intoxicated” have a commonly understood meaning, providing a reasonable warning of the prohibited conduct and sufficient standards for adjudication, even without a blood alcohol test.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that due process requires criminal statutes to be reasonably definite, providing fair warning and preventing arbitrary enforcement. However, the Constitution requires only reasonable precision, not impossible standards. The court noted that New York law has prohibited driving while intoxicated since 1910, long before scientific tests were admissible. Scientific evidence is admissible but not essential. The Court stated that “if the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubt might rise”.

    The Court stated that driving while impaired prohibits driving when the driver’s ability to operate the vehicle is impaired to any extent, recognizing that individuals have different tolerances to alcohol. The applicable standard is whether the defendant’s abilities are less than what they should possess, judged by an objective standard expected of the average driver.

    Intoxication is a greater degree of impairment, rendering the driver incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities needed to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver. Intoxication is an intelligible concept to the average person and does not require expert opinion. A statute employing terms with accepted meaning, “long recognized in law and life” cannot be said to be unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded that the statute provides reasonable warning and sufficient standards even when no chemical test has been made of the driver’s blood alcohol content.

  • People v. Formato, 30 N.Y.2d 103 (1972): Admissibility of Refusal to Take Blood Alcohol Test

    People v. Formato, 30 N.Y.2d 103 (1972)

    Evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test is admissible in court, provided the defendant was clearly warned of the consequences of refusal, and such admission does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.

    Summary

    Formato was found slumped over in his car after an accident, with signs of intoxication. He refused a blood alcohol test after being warned that his refusal could be used against him in court. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of his refusal. Formato was convicted of possession of gambling records and driving while impaired. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that the refusal evidence violated his self-incrimination rights. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that because Formato had no constitutional right to refuse the test, evidence of his refusal was admissible, provided he was properly warned of the consequences. The court reasoned that the statute did not compel him to refuse, but rather offered a choice with known consequences.

    Facts

    Police officers found Formato alone in his car, which had crashed into a fence. He was bleeding, and the officers smelled alcohol on his breath. They found two wine bottles in the car, one nearly empty. The officers, experienced in DWI arrests, believed Formato was intoxicated. At the hospital, Formato had difficulty producing his driver’s license and refused to provide his registration. An officer took his wallet and found the registration and betting slips. Officer Haverlin, from the Intoxicated Drivers Testing Unit, informed Formato of his rights and warned him that refusing a blood test could result in license revocation and that his refusal could be used as evidence in court. Formato still refused the test.

    Procedural History

    Formato was charged with gambling offenses and driving while intoxicated. His motion to suppress the betting slips was denied. At trial, evidence of his refusal to take the blood test was admitted over his objection. The jury acquitted him of promoting gambling and driving while intoxicated but convicted him of possession of gambling records and driving while impaired. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction, holding that the refusal evidence violated Formato’s privilege against self-incrimination. The People were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical blood alcohol test violates the defendant’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, when the defendant was warned that such refusal could be used against him in court?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant has no constitutional right to refuse the test, and the statute provides for the admissibility of the refusal as evidence, provided the defendant is properly warned of the consequences of refusing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Schmerber v. California, which held that compelled blood tests do not violate the Fifth Amendment because they are not testimonial or communicative. Since a defendant can be compelled to take a blood test, they have no constitutional right to refuse. The court acknowledged that evidence of refusal is admitted to permit the inference that the defendant refused because he feared the test results. The court reasoned that the constitutional protection only applies to compelled communicative or testimonial evidence. Here, the statute doesn’t compel refusal; it presents a choice. The defendant is free to take the test. The court stated, “Although the evidence of the defendant’s refusal to take the test be classified as communicative or testimonial… it should be admissible so long as the defendant was under no compulsion of any sort to refuse to take the test.” The court distinguished this situation from cases where comment on a defendant’s silence is prohibited because, in those cases, the defendant has a constitutional right to remain silent. Here, Formato had no constitutional right to refuse the blood test. The court also reasoned that admissibility of refusal evidence is a permissible condition attached to the privilege of operating a motor vehicle on state highways. As Chief Justice Traynor observed, “A guilty party may prefer not to find himself in a situation where consciousness of guilt may be inferred from his conduct, but it can scarcely be contended that the police…will tend to coerce parties into refusing to take tests in order to produce this evidence.” The court overruled its prior holdings in People v. Paddock and People v. Stratton, which found error in admitting refusal evidence, because those cases were decided when the Vehicle and Traffic Law conferred an unqualified right to refuse a blood test.

  • People v. дорогa, 21 N.Y.2d 378 (1968): Admissibility of Blood Alcohol Test Results Without Proof of Police Regulations

    People v. дорогa, 21 N.Y.2d 378 (1968)

    The admissibility of blood alcohol test results in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated does not depend on proof of police compliance with internal rules and regulations regarding the administration of such tests, provided the reliability of the test is otherwise established.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was not required to prove police compliance with internal regulations for administering blood alcohol tests to admit the test results as evidence in a DWI case. The court reasoned that the statute’s purpose in requiring such regulations was to ensure fairness in the selection and administration of tests, not to govern the admissibility of scientific evidence. As long as the reliability of the blood test is proven through proper scientific and technological standards, the absence of proof of police regulations is irrelevant to the admissibility of the test results. The court reversed the County Court’s order, which had overturned the defendant’s conviction based on the failure to prove compliance with these regulations.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted in a Court of Special Sessions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The conviction was based, in part, on the results of a blood alcohol test. The arresting State Trooper, the physician who drew the blood sample, and the laboratory technician who analyzed it all testified at trial. The defense did not challenge the procedures used to take or test the blood, nor did they dispute the reliability of the test results. The defense argued that the prosecution failed to provide documentary proof of the Division of State Police Rules and Regulations adopted pursuant to subdivision 1 of section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Special Sessions convicted the defendant. The Allegany County Court reversed the judgment, finding that the prosecution failed to prove compliance with police rules and regulations regarding blood alcohol tests. The People appealed the County Court’s order to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the results of a blood alcohol test are inadmissible in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated if the prosecution fails to prove the content of, and police compliance with, the rules and regulations established by the police force regarding the administration of such tests.

    Holding

    No, because the admissibility of blood alcohol test results depends on the reliability of the test itself, not on proof of police compliance with internal regulations regarding the test’s administration, as long as there is no substantial question about the propriety of the test or the validity of the consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the purpose of requiring police rules and regulations for blood alcohol tests was to ensure fair treatment for the accused in the selection and administration of the test and to clarify that the police, not the accused, would select the type of test. The court stated that these regulations do not directly bear on the substantive results of the test. The reliability of the test is determinable by medical and scientific standards, not by specific police regulations. The court quoted People v. Fogerty, 18 N.Y.2d 664, 666, stating, “The failure to file, in a public office, rules governing the tests does not affect the admissibility in evidence of the results of the tests if found by the court to be intrinsically accurate and reliable.” The court emphasized that if the taking, handling, and testing of the blood are proven reliable, the content and compliance with departmental rules become irrelevant. The court reviewed the legislative history of the statute and concluded that the rule-making requirement aimed to protect drivers’ rights against arbitrary police action, not to dictate evidentiary standards for test results. The court observed that section 1192(3) states that “the court may admit evidence of the amount of alcohol in the defendant’s blood…” without explicitly mandating additional evidentiary preconditions beyond general evidentiary rules for scientific proof. Thus, the County Court’s reversal was in error.