New York Law Review

Tag: Blood Alcohol Content

  • People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136 (1986): Admissibility of ‘Deficient Sample’ Intoxilyzer Results

    People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136 (1986)

    An Intoxilyzer test result, even if labeled a ‘deficient sample,’ is admissible as evidence of intoxication if the prosecution establishes a proper foundation demonstrating the instrument’s accuracy and the test’s proper administration; any deficiency in the sample goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of Intoxilyzer test results in a DWI case where the sample was labeled ‘deficient.’ The court held that a ‘deficient sample’ reading is admissible, provided a proper foundation is laid, including testimony about the instrument’s reliability and the proper administration of the test. The court reasoned that any irregularity in the sample’s quality affects the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury to decide, rather than the admissibility itself. The court reinstated the conviction for driving with more than .10% alcohol in the blood.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested after a high-speed car chase. He exhibited signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol, dazed behavior, and failure to pass sobriety tests. A breath test using an Intoxilyzer 5000 was administered. The first test yielded no reading. The second test produced a reading of .217, accompanied by the message “deficient sample — value printed was highest obtained.” The defendant sought to suppress the Intoxilyzer result.

    Procedural History

    The trial court determined the sample irregularity affected the weight, not admissibility, and the jury convicted the defendant of driving while intoxicated. The Appellate Term modified the judgment, vacating the conviction under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) (driving with more than .10% alcohol) and dismissing that count, while affirming the remaining convictions. Both the People and the defendant appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an Intoxilyzer test result indicating a “deficient sample” is admissible as evidence of a driver’s blood alcohol content in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated.

    2. Whether evidence, apart from the Intoxilyzer results, was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant was driving while intoxicated under the common-law standard.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a ‘deficient sample’ reading is admissible if a proper foundation is established showing the instrument’s accuracy and proper administration of the test; the deficiency affects the weight of the evidence, not admissibility.

    2. Yes, because the other evidence presented was legally sufficient to establish that defendant was driving while intoxicated under the common-law standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the testimony of the officer administering the test and the Technical Supervisor of Central Testing. The court highlighted that the Intoxilyzer measures the rate of change in alcohol content, detecting both ‘mouth alcohol’ and the presence of ‘deep lung air,’ which provides the most accurate reading. A ‘deficient sample’ in Intoxilyzer terminology does not mean an invalid sample, but rather one where the subject didn’t breathe long enough to reach sufficient deep lung air.

    The technicians testified that a full sample invariably yields a reading equal to or higher than a deficient sample. The Intoxilyzer is calibrated to give a result 10% lower than the true reading, benefiting the subject. Based on this uncontradicted testimony, and testimony that the Intoxilyzer was in proper working condition and properly administered, the court found the People established a sufficient foundation for the evidence’s reception. The court stated, “Once it was received, the jury was entitled to credit it to determine that defendant was driving with more than .10% alcohol in his blood in violation of section 1192 (2).”

    Regarding the cross-appeal, the court found sufficient evidence, apart from the Intoxilyzer results, to establish common-law intoxication.

  • Cook v. Town of Nassau, 33 N.Y.2d 7 (1973): Admissibility of Blood Alcohol Content in Autopsy Reports

    Cook v. Town of Nassau, 33 N.Y.2d 7 (1973)

    Quantitative tests for alcohol performed during an autopsy of a deceased motor vehicle operator, mandated by statute for statistical purposes, are inadmissible as evidence in legal actions, even if the full autopsy report might otherwise be accessible.

    Summary

    This case concerns the admissibility of blood alcohol content (BAC) results obtained during an autopsy of a motorcycle operator killed in an accident. The Town of Nassau sought to introduce the autopsy report, including the BAC, to suggest the operator’s intoxication contributed to the accident. However, a New York statute mandated such tests for statistical data collection while simultaneously prohibiting their use as evidence in legal proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the statute barred the BAC evidence, even though other parts of the autopsy report might be accessible under different statutory provisions. This decision highlights the legislature’s intent to prioritize the collection of statistical data on alcohol-related fatalities while protecting the privacy of the deceased and preventing potential misuse of the data in litigation.

    Facts

    William Cook died when the motorcycle he was operating crashed off a bridge culvert. His passenger, John Lynch, was injured. The accident occurred on a gravel road. Cook’s body was taken to Albany Medical Center, where an autopsy was performed. The autopsy included a quantitative test for alcohol content in Cook’s blood, as required by New York law. Lynch sued the Town of Nassau, alleging negligence in maintaining the bridge abutment, seeking damages for personal injury and Cook’s death.

    Procedural History

    The trial court refused to admit the victim’s autopsy report containing the alcohol analysis, based on a statutory prohibition. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs (Lynch and Cook’s estate). The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude the autopsy report. The Town of Nassau appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of the alcoholic content of the blood of a deceased motor vehicle operator, obtained during an autopsy shortly after death, is admissible in negligence actions, considering the statutory provisions of County Law § 674(3)(b) and § 677.

    Holding

    No, because County Law § 674(3)(b) explicitly bars the use of such test results for evidentiary purposes in any legal action, despite the general provisions of County Law § 677 that might allow access to autopsy records under certain circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied heavily on the plain language of County Law § 674(3)(b), which states that quantitative alcohol tests performed during autopsies “shall be used only for the purpose of compiling statistical data and shall not be admitted into evidence or otherwise disclosed in any legal action or other proceeding.” The court acknowledged the apparent conflict between this provision and County Law § 677, which allows a court to order the release of autopsy records. However, the court resolved this conflict by applying the principle that a specific statutory provision takes precedence over a general one. The court reasoned that the legislature had a specific intention to bar the use of alcohol analysis results in litigation, even while generally allowing access to autopsy reports. The court noted that the provision mandating alcohol tests was enacted to comply with federal requirements for gathering statistics on alcohol-related fatalities. The court stated, “when a general intention is expressed together with a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception”. The court acknowledged the argument that coroners might include alcohol content in autopsy reports regardless of the statutory mandate, but it emphasized that any argument that § 677 overrides the bar is dispelled by the principle of statutory construction prioritizing specific over general intentions. Therefore, the specific proscription against using alcohol analysis results in litigation controlled, regardless of the general availability of autopsy reports.