Bliss v. State, 95 N.Y.2d 911 (2000)

When a vehicle is ‘actually engaged in work on a highway,’ as per Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), the driver is exempt from the rules of the road but must not act recklessly, defined as consciously disregarding a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.

Summary

George Bliss sued the State for injuries sustained when his car was struck by a New York State Thruway Authority (NYSTA) truck driven by John Lawler. The Court of Claims granted summary judgment to the State, applying a recklessness standard and finding insufficient evidence of recklessness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that while the recklessness standard applied, there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether Lawler acted recklessly, and remitted the case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings.

Facts

On October 20, 1995, George Bliss was injured when his vehicle was struck by a NYSTA truck driven by John Lawler. The accident occurred on a bridge located on a heavily-traveled interstate highway. Lawler was backing the truck down a narrow decline. The truck only had side view mirrors and no rear view mirror. Lawler strayed 100 to 250 feet from the cone truck instead of staying within the required 30 feet according to NYSTA safety directives. There was no spotter provided for the backing operation. The work crew was allegedly hurrying to dismantle the lane closure because they started late. Lawler pleaded guilty to unsafe backing in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1211(a) as a result of the incident.

Procedural History

The Court of Claims granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the recklessness standard applied and that the claimant failed to present sufficient evidence of recklessness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order, denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remitting the case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings.

Issue(s)

Whether, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), Lawler’s truck was exempt from the rules of the road because it was “actually engaged in work on a highway,” and if so, whether the claimant presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Lawler acted recklessly.

Holding

Yes, because under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), Lawler’s truck was exempt from the rules of the road since it was “actually engaged in work on a highway.” No, because while factual and credibility issues remained, the claimant presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue for the jury to consider regarding whether Lawler acted recklessly.

Court’s Reasoning

The court applied Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), which exempts vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the standard rules of the road. Because Lawler was exempt, the claimant needed to demonstrate recklessness to recover damages. The court defined recklessness by quoting Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494, 501 (1994), as acting in conscious disregard of “a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” The court found the claimant presented enough evidence to demonstrate recklessness to warrant a trial. This evidence included Lawler backing his truck down a narrow decline on a bridge located on a heavily-traveled interstate highway, at an excessive speed, using only side view mirrors. There was no indication Lawler slowed down or sounded his horn. Furthermore, Lawler violated NYSTA safety directives. The court noted that Lawler’s guilty plea to a traffic offense further supported a finding of recklessness. The court explicitly declined to determine whether Lawler acted recklessly as a matter of law, and remitted the case to the lower court for trial. The court also did not rule on the viability of the defendant’s affirmative defenses, stating that the Court of Claims should address the claimant’s motion to dismiss those defenses in the first instance.