New York Law Review

Tag: Blackout

  • Kopsachilis v. 130 E. 18 Owners Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 514 (2008): Landlord Liability for Extinguished Lights in Windowless Stairwells

    Kopsachilis v. 130 E. 18 Owners Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 514 (2008)

    A landlord can assert a “knowledge or consent” defense under Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) to avoid liability for extinguished lights in a windowless stairwell, even though § 37(3) requires such lights to be kept burning continuously.

    Summary

    Plaintiff was injured when she fell in a dark, windowless stairwell of defendant’s apartment building during the 2003 blackout. She sued, claiming the defendant violated Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(3), which requires lights in windowless fire-stairs to be kept burning continuously, constituting negligence per se. The defendant argued that § 37(2) provides a defense if a light is extinguished without the owner’s knowledge or consent. The Court of Appeals held that the “knowledge or consent” defense applies to violations of § 37(3), reversing the Appellate Division and granting summary judgment to the defendant. The court reasoned that the statute’s language and legislative intent support applying the defense, even when lights are required to be on continuously.

    Facts

    During the August 14, 2003 blackout, the plaintiff stayed overnight in a coworker’s apartment in a building owned by the defendant. The building’s backup battery-operated lights lasted only 40 minutes and were out when the plaintiff arrived. Building staff provided flashlights and candles, escorting occupants up the fire-stairs. The next morning, without a flashlight or assistance, the plaintiff opened the door to the fire-stairs, saw nothing, and fell, sustaining injuries. The building was not required to have emergency lighting connected to a backup power source.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that § 37(3) imposes a categorical duty regardless of the owner’s knowledge or consent. Two justices dissented, arguing that the statute does not impose absolute liability and the defendant should be able to assert a “knowledge or consent” defense. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “knowledge or consent” defense in Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) applies to a violation of § 37(3), which requires lights in windowless fire-stairs to be kept burning continuously.

    Holding

    No, because the “knowledge or consent” defense in Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) applies to the extinguishment of any lights required by subdivision (1), whether they are required to be on only at night or continuously.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute’s language supports the application of the “knowledge or consent” defense to § 37(3). The court stated, “The words ‘[e]xcept as provided in subdivision three’ do not modify the knowledge or consent defense—the exception and the defense appear in separate sentences.” The court further reasoned that it is unlikely the Legislature intended to impose strict liability for a light failure in a windowless area but not in a windowed hallway, absent a clear statement to that effect. The court noted that the defendant did not “consent” to the blackout. Therefore, the defendant had no liability under Multiple Dwelling Law § 37. The Court emphasized the interconnectedness of subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of the statute. Subdivision (1) establishes the lighting requirement, subdivision (2) sets the duration, and subdivision (3) creates an exception to the durational requirement. The court stated, “We therefore read subdivision (3)’s statement that lights in windowless areas ‘shall be kept burning continuously’ as stating an exception to the rule that lights need be on only at night, not as creating a new liability to which there is no defense.”

  • Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399 (1985): Duty of Care in Large-Scale Blackouts

    65 N.Y.2d 399 (1985)

    In the event of a widespread power outage, a utility company’s duty of care for personal injuries is generally limited to customers with whom it has a direct contractual relationship, precluding liability to non-customer tenants injured in common areas.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of a utility company’s duty of care during a massive blackout. Mr. Strauss, a tenant, was injured in his apartment building’s darkened common area during the 1977 New York City blackout. He sued Consolidated Edison (Con Ed), alleging negligence. The court considered whether Con Ed owed a duty to Mr. Strauss, who was a customer for his apartment but not for the common areas (the landlord was the customer for those areas). The court held that Con Ed’s duty was limited to its contractual relationship with the landlord, shielding it from liability to the tenant for injuries sustained in the building’s common areas. This decision was based on public policy considerations to prevent potentially limitless liability stemming from widespread power failures.

    Facts

    Julius Strauss, a 77-year-old tenant, resided in an apartment building in Queens. Con Edison (Con Ed) supplied electricity to his apartment under a contract with him and to the building’s common areas under a separate agreement with the landlord, Belle Realty Company. The blackout of July 13, 1977, caused a loss of running water in Strauss’s apartment, which relied on an electric pump. While attempting to obtain water from the basement on the second day of the blackout, Strauss fell on the poorly lit and defective basement stairs, sustaining injuries. He then sued Belle Realty and Con Ed for negligence.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted Strauss partial summary judgment on the issue of Con Ed’s gross negligence based on collateral estoppel from a prior case. However, the Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint against Con Ed, citing Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. The Appellate Division concluded that Con Ed owed no duty to Strauss in a compensable legal sense. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) owed a duty of care to a tenant, who was a customer for his apartment but not for the building’s common areas, for injuries sustained in those common areas during a city-wide blackout caused by Con Ed’s gross negligence.

    Holding

    No, because imposing such a duty would expose Con Edison to potentially limitless liability, and public policy dictates that liability be limited to those with whom the utility has a direct contractual relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that foreseeability of injury and privity of contract are not the sole determinants of duty in negligence cases. While a contractual obligation can create a duty to non-parties, courts must limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. The court emphasized that policy considerations play a vital role in defining the scope of duty. The court reviewed prior cases involving utility companies, including Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., which denied recovery to a plaintiff whose warehouse burned down due to insufficient water pressure from the water company. The court distinguished the case from White v. Guarente, where accountants were held liable to limited partners because the accountants’ services were intended for a known group with vested rights. Here, the court reasoned that extending Con Ed’s duty to tenants in common areas would create an unmanageable level of liability, given the widespread impact of a city-wide blackout. The court noted that a tenant’s guests, customers of stores, and occupants of office buildings are similarly situated, meaning liability could expand exponentially. Limiting recovery to customers with a direct contractual relationship with Con Ed was deemed necessary to establish a rational and controllable boundary on liability. The court explicitly rejected arguments that there should be a fact-finding hearing to assess the probabilities of catastrophic outcomes. The court concluded by stating, “In sum, Con Edison is not answerable to the tenant of an apartment building injured in a common area as a result of Con Edison’s negligent failure to provide electric service as required by its agreement with the building owner.”

  • Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Company, 54 N.Y.2d 167 (1981): Establishing Gross Negligence in Utility Service Interruption

    Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Company, 54 N.Y.2d 167 (1981)

    A utility company can be held liable for damages resulting from service interruption if its actions or inactions constitute gross negligence, even without explicit expert testimony defining the standard of care when the jury is competent to evaluate the utility’s conduct based on the facts presented.

    Summary

    This case concerns a grocery store chain’s lawsuit against Consolidated Edison (Con Edison) for damages resulting from the 1977 New York City blackout. The plaintiff alleged that Con Edison was grossly negligent in several respects, including failing to maintain adequate power sources, improperly managing the crisis, and staffing critical positions with inexperienced personnel. The New York Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to determine that Con Edison was grossly negligent, even without expert testimony, as the jury could evaluate Con Edison’s actions based on the presented facts. The court also clarified that the trial court properly presented the shortcomings in Con Edison’s procedures as evidentiary contentions, not as separate theories of liability.

    Facts

    On July 13, 1977, a blackout affected approximately three million Con Edison customers. The initiating event was two lightning strikes that caused double circuit outages of transmission lines. Plaintiff alleged that several power sources were unjustifiably out of service. These included the Hudson-Farragut tie, the Indian Point 2 power plant, and certain gas turbines. Plaintiff further alleged improper maintenance of relays and circuit breakers and inadequate lightning protection. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that William Jurith, the person in charge of the Con Edison system on the night of the blackout, reacted improperly to the crisis and lacked adequate experience. Con Edison argued that the power sources were justifiably out of service for repairs or due to the expiration of peak demand hours. They also maintained that their inspection program was adequate and Jurith acted appropriately.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury that they could only return a verdict for the plaintiff if they found that the defendant had been grossly negligent. The jury found that Con Edison had been grossly negligent and awarded the plaintiff $40,500. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Con Edison appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence of Con Edison’s gross negligence to present the issue for jury determination.
    2. Whether expert testimony was required to establish the standard of care Con Edison allegedly violated.
    3. Whether the use of a general verdict was improper given the multiple alleged shortcomings in Con Edison’s procedures.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence of Con Edison’s gross negligence for the jury to consider, particularly regarding the actions and inactions of its system operator, William Jurith.
    2. No, because the jury was competent to evaluate Con Edison’s actions based on the factual presentation alone, especially concerning the system operator’s response to the emergency.
    3. No, because the trial court presented the alleged shortcomings in Con Edison’s procedures as evidentiary contentions, not as separate theories of liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine gross negligence without expert testimony. The court reasoned that while some issues require expert testimony due to scientific or technical complexity, this case did not. The jury was capable of evaluating Con Edison’s actions, particularly the behavior of the system operator, William Jurith, during the crisis. The court noted Jurith’s failure to comply with the New York Power Pool’s directions to reduce voltage by shedding load after the lightning strikes. The court stated, “The actions of Con Edison’s employees on the night of the blackout, and Con Edison’s staffing decisions, could properly be judged by the members of the jury unaided by expert testimony to clarify the standard of care.” The court distinguished this case from situations requiring expert testimony, such as medical malpractice, where the lack of skill or success is not obvious. Regarding the general verdict, the court emphasized that the alleged shortcomings were presented as evidentiary contentions, not as separate theories of liability, thus making the general verdict appropriate. The court cited Davis v. Caldwell, distinguishing it by noting that in this case, the jury was presented with a summary of evidentiary contentions, not separate theories of liability for individual determination.

  • People v. Smith, 51 N.Y.2d 376 (1980): Inference of Intent in Attempted Burglary Cases

    People v. Smith, 51 N.Y.2d 376 (1980)

    In cases of attempted burglary or larceny, intent to commit a crime inside a premises can be inferred from the circumstances of the entry, the condition of the premises, and the defendant’s conduct within the premises, especially during widespread looting.

    Summary

    During the New York City blackout of 1977, police officers found Smith inside a vandalized appliance store. The store’s security gate was torn off, and the front window was shattered. Smith was found crouched behind a table in the disarrayed store. He was convicted of attempted burglary and attempted petit larceny. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to prove intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Smith’s intent to commit a crime could be inferred from the circumstances: the store’s condition, the ongoing looting, and Smith’s presence inside the store in a crouched position. This case clarifies how intent can be proven circumstantially in burglary cases.

    Facts

    On July 13, 1977, a city-wide blackout occurred in New York City. On July 14, 1977, at approximately 12:30 a.m., police officers responded to a report of a break-in at the Friendly Frost Appliance Store. The officers found the metal security gate torn from the storefront and the front plate glass window shattered. Inside, the store was in disarray, with televisions and other appliances overturned. Officer Meyer found Smith crouched behind a table in the store’s office. Smith was arrested. No witness saw Smith in possession of any merchandise.

    Procedural History

    Smith was convicted in the Supreme Court of attempted burglary in the third degree and attempted petit larceny. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution had not proven Smith’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The People were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for determination of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People established beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith acted with the requisite intent to commit the crimes of attempted burglary in the third degree and attempted petit larceny, based on circumstantial evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Smith’s intent to commit larceny within the store can be reasonably inferred from the circumstances: the condition of the store (vandalized, looted), the time of night (during a blackout), Smith’s unauthorized presence inside the store, and his crouching position inside the store’s office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that the “moral certainty” standard applies only when a case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. Here, there was direct evidence (the officers’ testimony) placing Smith in the store during widespread looting. Therefore, the traditional “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applies. The court emphasized that intent is rarely proven directly; it is usually inferred from the circumstances. The court stated, “in deciding whether the People met their burden, we are required to say whether, considering the facts proved and the inferences that could reasonably be drawn therefrom, [the fact finder] could conclude that there was no reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit the crimes charged.” The court found that the fact finder could reasonably infer that Smith entered the store with the intent to commit larceny, given the condition of the store, the blackout, and Smith’s position inside the store. The court noted, “Here, defendant was discovered crouched behind a table or desk in the middle of the night in a store which obviously was the target of widespread looting. The security gate was torn from the front of the establishment, and the windows were smashed leaving pieces of shattered glass about the entry to the premises.” The court deferred to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order because intent could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances. Competing inferences, if reasonable, are within the domain of the fact-finders and are not to be disturbed by the Court.