Matter of Biondo v. New York State Board of Parole, 60 N.Y.2d 832 (1983)

The statute of limitations for challenging an administrative determination does not begin to run until the petitioner receives notice of the determination, as the petitioner is not “aggrieved” until they are aware of it.

Summary

Biondo, a parolee, sought judicial review of the Parole Board’s decision to dismiss his appeal as moot after his sentence expired while the appeal was pending. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations for challenging the board’s determination did not begin to run until Biondo received notice of the determination. The court reasoned that a petitioner cannot be considered “aggrieved” by a determination until they are aware of it. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for a hearing to determine when Biondo was informed of the appeal board’s decision, and clarified that because Biondo was found to have been a parole violator, which may have lasting consequences despite the expiration of his sentence, the proceeding was not moot.

Facts

Biondo was a parolee whose sentence expired while his appeal to the New York State Board of Parole was pending. The Board of Parole dismissed Biondo’s appeal as moot, presumably because his sentence had expired.

Procedural History

Biondo sought judicial review of the Parole Board’s decision via an Article 78 proceeding. The lower courts concluded that the four-month statute of limitations began to run immediately upon the issuance of the Parole Board’s determination, and thus dismissed the claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Biondo received notice of the Board’s determination.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the four-month statute of limitations for challenging an administrative determination begins to run upon the issuance of the determination, or upon the petitioner’s receipt of notice of the determination.

2. Whether the proceeding was rendered moot after the sentence expired while the petitioner’s case was pending before the appeal board.

Holding

1. No, because the petitioner is not “aggrieved” by the determination until they receive notice of it.

2. No, because the petitioner was found to have been a parole violator, which may have lasting consequences despite the expiration of his sentence.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the four-month statute of limitations does not begin to run until the petitioner receives notice of the appeal board’s determination. The court stated, “the running of the statutory period began to run immediately upon the issuance of the determination, overlooks the additional requirement that the petitioner be ‘aggrieved’ by the determination.” The court referenced Matter of Martin v. Ronan, 44 NY2d 374, 381, and further explained, “We have previously held that for the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not the determination was intended to be final.” The court found a similar principle should apply when the petitioner has received no notice. The Court emphasized fairness, stating, “fundamental fairness would seem to compel the conclusion that a petitioner should not be held to have been dilatory in challenging a determination of which he was not aware.” The Court held that the sentence expiring while the petitioner’s case was pending before the appeal board did not render the proceeding moot, since “petitioner was found to have been a parole violator which may have lasting consequences despite the expiration of his sentence.”