New York Law Review

Tag: Billboards

  • Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483 (1977): Upholding Zoning Ordinance Based on Aesthetics

    43 N.Y.2d 483 (1977)

    A municipality may, through a zoning ordinance, prohibit all non-accessory billboards throughout the town based solely on aesthetic considerations, provided that a reasonable amortization period is allowed for the removal of non-conforming signs.

    Summary

    Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. challenged a Town of Southampton ordinance banning all off-premises billboards. The New York Court of Appeals held the ordinance constitutional. The court reasoned that regulating aesthetics is a valid exercise of police power and that the ordinance was reasonably related to this objective. While acknowledging First Amendment protection for commercial speech, the court found the ordinance regulated the place and manner, not the content, of that speech. The court remanded the case to determine if the amortization period for removing existing billboards was reasonable as applied to the plaintiffs, but stressed the plaintiffs needed to exhaust administrative remedies before claiming the amortization period was unreasonable.

    Facts

    On May 2, 1972, the Town of Southampton enacted Building Zone Ordinance No. 26, which prohibited the erection of all nonaccessory billboards in all districts. The ordinance required the removal of all nonconforming billboards by June 1, 1975. Billboard owners could apply for an extension of the amortization period. Plaintiffs, who owned nonconforming billboards, sued, arguing the ordinance was unconstitutional and not related to public safety and welfare.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs, billboard owners, sought a declaratory judgment in the trial court that the Southampton ordinance was unconstitutional. The trial court’s decision is not specified in the Court of Appeals opinion. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a local zoning ordinance prohibiting all non-accessory billboards throughout the town constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of the police power.
    2. Whether the ordinance violates the First Amendment right to free speech.
    3. Whether the amortization period provided by the ordinance is reasonable as applied to existing billboard owners.

    Holding

    1. No, because regulating aesthetics is a valid basis for the exercise of the police power, and the Southampton ordinance prohibiting non-accessory billboards is substantially related to improving the town’s aesthetics.
    2. No, because the ordinance regulates the time, place, and manner of commercial speech, not the content, and aesthetic regulation is a significant governmental interest.
    3. Remanded for further determination, but premature until the plaintiffs have exhausted administrative remedies seeking an extension of the amortization period; the ordinance is valid on its face.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that regulating outdoor advertising is within the police power, citing precedent including People v Goodman and New York State Thruway Auth. v Ashley Motor Ct. While earlier cases questioned aesthetic regulation, the court stated that it’s now clear that regulating outdoor advertising for aesthetic purposes alone is a valid exercise of the police power, citing Matter of Cromwell v Ferrier. The court applied a reasonableness test, stating that once a regulation has a valid basis, it need only be reasonably related to the objective. In analyzing the reasonableness of the Southampton ordinance, the court noted similarities to Cromwell v Ferrier, where a similar ordinance was upheld. The court stated, “Advertising signs and billboards, if misplaced, often are egregious examples of ugliness, distraction, and deterioration.” The court found the Southampton ordinance was reasonably related to improving community aesthetics and not oppressive because on-premises billboards were still permitted. Regarding the amortization period, the court noted that billboard owners should have an opportunity to recoup their investment but not necessarily recoup it entirely. The court stated that the plaintiffs should be entitled to show that the three-year amortization period provided in the ordinance is unreasonable as applied. However, because the Southampton ordinance allows for extensions of the amortization period, the court determined that the plaintiffs were required to seek an administrative remedy before bringing an action in court. The court distinguished this case from Modjeska Sign Studios v Berle, noting that the statute in Modjeska did not provide an opportunity to obtain an extension of the amortization period. Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965 and section 88 of the Highway Law preclude the removal of nonconforming billboards without compensation.

  • Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263 (1967): Upholding Zoning Ordinances Based on Aesthetics

    Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263 (1967)

    A zoning ordinance that prohibits all non-accessory signs (signs not related to a business on the same lot) throughout a town is constitutional because aesthetic considerations can be a valid basis for such ordinances, provided they substantially relate to the community’s economic, social, and cultural patterns.

    Summary

    Cromwell challenged a town zoning ordinance that effectively prohibited all non-accessory signs, arguing it was an unconstitutional deprivation of property. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the ordinance, explicitly overruling its prior decision in Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond. The Court reasoned that aesthetic considerations, when substantially related to the economic and cultural welfare of the community, are a valid basis for zoning regulations. The court found that the ordinance’s distinction between accessory and non-accessory signs was reasonable, and the prohibition of non-accessory signs served a legitimate public purpose by preventing visual blight.

    Facts

    Cromwell owned a 200-acre parcel of land bisected by Route 17. He operated a service station and diner on one side of the highway. After a zoning ordinance was adopted in 1963, Cromwell contracted to have two signs erected on the other side of the highway, advertising his businesses. The town’s Building Inspector issued a stop order, citing the ordinance, which regulated accessory signs (those related to businesses on the same lot) but implicitly prohibited non-accessory signs throughout the township.

    Procedural History

    Cromwell appealed the Building Inspector’s stop order to the Zoning Board of Appeals, which affirmed the inspector’s decision. Cromwell then filed an Article 78 proceeding in Special Term, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. Special Term denied the application. The Appellate Division affirmed, with two justices dissenting. Cromwell then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a town zoning ordinance that prohibits all non-accessory signs throughout the township is an unconstitutional deprivation of property, particularly when primarily based on aesthetic considerations.

    Holding

    No, because aesthetic considerations can be a valid basis for zoning ordinances when they substantially relate to the economic, social, and cultural patterns of a community, and the ordinance’s distinction between accessory and non-accessory signs is a reasonable means of implementing community policy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged its prior holding in Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, which had struck down a similar ordinance. However, the court explicitly overruled Bond, stating that its underlying rationale was no longer valid in light of changing societal attitudes and legal precedents. The court noted the growing acceptance of aesthetic considerations as a legitimate basis for zoning regulations, citing People v. Stover. The court reasoned that “once it be conceded that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative concern, the conclusion seems inescapable that reasonable legislation designed to promote that end is a valid and permissible exercise of the police power.” The court further held that the distinction between accessory and non-accessory signs was reasonable, as business signs are integral to the business itself, while non-accessory signs are part of the business of outdoor advertising, which can be reasonably regulated. The court emphasized that not every aesthetic consideration justifies prohibition, but only those that “bear substantially on the economic, social, and cultural patterns of a community or district.” The court stated, “Advertising signs and billboards, if misplaced, often are egregious examples of ugliness, distraction, and deterioration. They are just as much subject to reasonable controls, including prohibition, as enterprises which emit offensive noises, odors, or debris. The eye is entitled to as much recognition as the other senses, but, of course, the offense to the eye must be substantial and be deemed to have material effect on the community or district pattern.” The court also dismissed the argument that a town lacked the power to adopt such an ordinance, citing Koffman v. Town of Vestal.