New York Law Review

Tag: bill of particulars

  • People v. W., 78 N.Y.2d 734 (1991): Specificity of Timeframe in Child Sex Abuse Indictments

    People v. W., 78 N.Y.2d 734 (1991)

    When time is not an essential element of an offense, an indictment, supplemented by a bill of particulars, alleging the time of the offense in approximate terms must set forth a time interval which reasonably protects the defendant’s constitutional right to be informed of the accusation to prepare a defense and avoid double jeopardy.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the permissible time frame specified in an indictment for child sex abuse, specifically rape and sodomy. The defendant was convicted of multiple counts, but the Appellate Division dismissed them due to the five-month period specified in the bill of particulars. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a five-month period is not per se unreasonable and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to review the specific circumstances using established criteria to determine if the defendant was adequately informed to prepare a defense.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple counts of rape, sodomy, and endangering the welfare of child victims. The indictment initially stated the offenses occurred between August 1, 1984, and May 3, 1985. A bill of particulars narrowed this time frame to August 1, 1984, through December 31, 1984, a five-month period. The trial court’s instructions to the jury reflected this narrowed timeframe.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division dismissed all counts, granting leave for the People to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury, finding the five-month period per se excessive. A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a five-month period specified in a bill of particulars for the commission of rape and sodomy against a child is per se so excessive as to violate the defendant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, thus precluding the defendant from presenting a defense.

    Holding

    No, because the determination of whether sufficient specificity has been provided to the defendant must be made on an ad hoc basis, considering all relevant circumstances, and a five-month period is not per se unreasonable. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to make that determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that an indictment must contain a statement indicating the charged offense was committed on, or about, a designated date or period of time (CPL 200.50[6]). When time is not an essential element, the indictment, as supplemented by a bill of particulars, may allege the time in approximate terms. The critical inquiry is whether the time interval reasonably protects the defendant’s constitutional right to be informed of the accusation, enabling preparation of a defense and preventing double jeopardy. The Court acknowledged that an interval could be so excessive on its face as to warrant dismissal but emphasized that this determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Citing People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 294, the court reiterated the need to protect defendant’s right to be informed of the accusation. The Court outlined a non-exclusive list of factors, originally developed in People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 419, and People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 295-296, to be considered, including the length of the time span, the knowledge the People possess of the dates of the criminal conduct, the age and intelligence of the victim and other witnesses, the nature of the offenses, and other surrounding circumstances. The Court noted the five-month period was longer than the three-week period in Morris, but shorter than the nine-month period in People v. Beauchamp, 74 N.Y.2d 639. The Court concluded that the Appellate Division erred in applying a per se rule, thus curtailing its full appellate review, and remitted the case for further consideration under the appropriate legal standard and principles.

  • Iandoli v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 332 (1991): Consequences of Failing to Particularize Defenses

    Iandoli v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 332 (1991)

    A defendant who fails to comply with a request for a bill of particulars regarding a defense may be precluded from introducing evidence related to that defense, even if the defendant asserts a general denial.

    Summary

    This case addresses the consequences of a defendant’s failure to respond to a request for a bill of particulars concerning defenses asserted in their answer. The plaintiff, a subcontractor, sought a bill of particulars regarding the defendant’s counterclaims and defenses. When the defendant failed to respond, the plaintiff obtained a preclusion order. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s failure to challenge the request or comply with the preclusion order justified summary judgment for the plaintiff, even if the defendant asserted a general denial. The dissent argued the request was improperly directed to matters the defendant did not have the burden to prove.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a subcontractor, sued the defendant, a general contractor and its surety, to collect the balance due on a contract. The defendant’s answer included both counterclaims and defenses. The plaintiff requested a bill of particulars related to specific paragraphs of the answer that the defendant labeled as “counterclaim and defense.” The defendant did not respond to this request or subsequent discovery requests.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff moved for a preclusion order due to the defendant’s failure to provide a bill of particulars. The trial court granted a conditional preclusion order, which the defendant also ignored. Subsequently, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a general denial insulates a defendant from the effects of a preclusion order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who asserts a general denial is insulated from a preclusion order resulting from their failure to provide a bill of particulars regarding their defenses.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant who fails to challenge a request for a bill of particulars or comply with a preclusion order risks being precluded from introducing evidence to support their defenses, regardless of whether they also assert a general denial. The defendant should have moved to vacate or modify the request if they believed it was improper.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals majority reasoned that the bill of particulars is an integral part of the CPLR. The defendant had several opportunities to challenge the request for particulars, including moving to vacate or modify the request under CPLR 3042(a) or amending their answer under CPLR 3025(a) and (b). By failing to respond to the request, the motion for preclusion, and the conditional preclusion order, the defendant waived their right to object. The court emphasized the CPLR specifies when and how a request for particulars should be made, amended, and answered, as well as the sanctions for non-compliance. The Court held that allowing the defendant to evade the consequences of their non-compliance would reward their indifference to the CPLR and encourage costly, time-consuming motion practice. Allowing the defendant to claim protection of the general denial at such a late stage undermines the purpose of the bill of particulars, which is to clarify the issues and prevent surprise at trial. The court stated “Where a defendant fails to furnish a requested bill of particulars with respect to a defense, it may be precluded from introducing evidence relevant to that defense.”

  • Raphael v. Cohen, 62 N.Y.2d 700 (1984): Excusing Law Office Failure in New York Civil Practice

    62 N.Y.2d 700 (1984)

    CPLR 2005 permits courts, in their discretion, to excuse delays or defaults caused by law office failure, requiring consideration of both the reason for the delay and the merit of the underlying claim.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether law office failure could excuse a delay in serving a bill of particulars. The Supreme Court had granted the plaintiff’s motion deeming the service timely in the interest of justice. The Appellate Division reversed, finding law office failure an insufficient excuse and granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that CPLR 2005 now allows courts to excuse delays due to law office failure at their discretion, requiring consideration of the delay’s cause and the claim’s merit.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs failed to timely serve a bill of particulars. The only excuse offered for the delay was law office failure. Plaintiffs cross-moved to have the bill of particulars deemed timely served.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ cross-motion. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, denied the plaintiffs’ motion, and granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that law office failure was an insufficient excuse for the delay. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in holding that law office failure could never be a sufficient excuse for a delay in serving a bill of particulars, precluding the exercise of discretion under CPLR 2005?

    Holding

    Yes, because CPLR 2005 now allows delay or default due to law office failure to be excused in the exercise of discretion, requiring the Appellate Division to consider both the reason for the delay and whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated a meritorious cause of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Appellate Division’s per se rule against excusing delays due to law office failure was incorrect in light of CPLR 2005. The statute grants discretion to the courts to excuse such delays. The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division should have considered whether to exercise its discretion to excuse the plaintiffs’ delay. Furthermore, the Appellate Division should have also considered whether the plaintiffs demonstrated a meritorious cause of action. The Court of Appeals stated that CPLR 2005 now allows delay or default due to law office failure to be excused in the exercise of discretion, requiring the court to consider “whether in the exercise of this discretion plaintiffs’ delay in serving their bill of particulars should be excused, as well as whether plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have a meritorious cause of action.” The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Appellate Division for the exercise of its discretion consistent with this interpretation of CPLR 2005.

  • People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290 (1984): Sufficiency of Indictment Regarding Time of Offense

    61 N.Y.2d 290 (1984)

    An indictment will not be dismissed as defective for failing to specify the exact date of an offense if the indictment or bill of particulars provides a reasonable approximation of the date or dates involved, considering the circumstances of the case.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for rape and sodomy, alleged to have occurred “during the month of November 1980.” He sought a bill of particulars specifying the exact dates, times, and places. The prosecution narrowed the time frame to “on or about and between Friday, November 7, 1980 and Saturday, November 30, 1980.” The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it was defective under CPL 200.50(6) and violated his constitutional right to notice. The trial court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the indictment was reasonably precise under the circumstances, considering the young ages of the victims and the nature of the crimes.

    Facts

    Defendant was accused of raping a six-year-old child and sodomizing his five-year-old daughter. Both children lived in the defendant’s home. The indictment stated that both offenses occurred “during the month of November 1980.” The prosecution served a demand for a notice of alibi. The defendant then requested a bill of particulars specifying the exact times, places, and dates of the alleged crimes. The People narrowed the time to “on or about and between Friday, November 7, 1980 and Saturday, November 30, 1980,” stating the exact times were unknown.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it failed to designate a specific date for each crime as required by CPL 200.50(6) and violated his constitutional right to notice. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment is defective under CPL 200.50 if it alleges that a crime occurred within a 24-day period, rather than on a specific date.

    Holding

    No, because under the circumstances of this case, the indictment, as supplemented by the bill of particulars, provided a reasonable approximation of the date of the offenses and afforded the defendant sufficient notice to prepare a defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the purpose of an indictment is to provide the defendant with sufficient information to prepare a defense and to satisfy constitutional notice requirements. While CPL 200.50 requires the indictment to state facts supporting every element of the offense with sufficient precision, it does not mandate an exact date and time. The statute states the crime must have been committed “on, or on or about, a designated date, or during a designated period of time” (CPL 200.50, subd 6). The court emphasized that “the requirements for a valid indictment will vary with the particular crime involved.”

    In determining the sufficiency of the time period alleged, courts should consider the span of time, the knowledge the People have or should have of the exact date, and whether the People acted in good faith in their investigation. Factors to consider include the age and intelligence of the victim, the surrounding circumstances, and the nature of the offense. The court emphasized the standard is reasonableness; “[reasonable certainty, all will agree, is required in criminal pleading” (United States v Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 568). The court noted that, in this case, the victims were young children unable to provide precise dates, there was no indication of bad faith by the prosecution, and the defendant was arrested shortly after the alleged period. The court found that the 24-day period was not so inadequate as to justify dismissal, as the defendant had been informed of the nature of the charges, the conduct underlying them, the place of the crimes, the witnesses present, and the time of the offense within a reasonably designated period. The court stated, “Defendant has been provided with reasonable and adequate notice under the Federal and State Constitutions and is not prevented from preparing a defense, notwithstanding that it would be easier to prepare an alibi defense if the exact date and time of the offense were known and provided.”

  • Tate v. Colabello, 58 N.Y.2d 84 (1983): Admissibility of Evolving Injury Descriptions in Personal Injury Cases

    Tate v. Colabello, 58 N.Y.2d 84 (1983)

    A supplemental bill of particulars in a personal injury case may include a more definitive statement of the sequelae of previously listed permanent injuries, provided the later statement is a reasonably foreseeable evolution of the original injuries and does not introduce a completely new injury.

    Summary

    Liza Tate, a 15-year-old, was struck by the defendant’s car and sustained injuries. The plaintiff presented a supplemental bill of particulars that included a description of an “asymmetrical looking chest,” stemming from the initial injuries. The defense argued this was a new injury not previously disclosed, and thus inadmissible. The Court of Appeals held that the supplemental bill was admissible because it described a foreseeable consequence of the original injuries, rather than a new, distinct injury, especially since the defense declined the plaintiff’s offer of a new physical examination. The court also addressed the propriety of the plaintiff’s attorney suggesting a total compensation amount during summation.

    Facts

    • 15-year-old Liza Tate was struck by the defendant’s motor vehicle.
    • The original bill of particulars listed a dislocation of the spine, a fractured clavicle, and resulting shoulder and clavicular “deformation” affecting the thoracic and spinal areas as permanent injuries.
    • A supplemental bill of particulars described stiffness and atrophy of the shoulder, muscle spasm, distortion of the clavicle, a lowered shoulder, and a “permanent cosmetic disfiguration” in the form of an “asymmetrical looking chest.”
    • The plaintiff offered a new physical examination when serving the supplemental bill, but the defendants declined.

    Procedural History

    • The trial court initially granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial after a jury verdict of $320,000 for the plaintiff.
    • The Appellate Division modified the order, reinstating the verdict on liability but ordering a new trial on damages unless the plaintiff consented to reduce the verdict to $150,000, which she did.
    • The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals based on alleged errors of law during the trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of the “asymmetrical looking chest” without the plaintiff first obtaining leave to include it in a supplemental bill of particulars.
    2. Whether the plaintiff’s counsel committed reversible error by suggesting a specific monetary amount for the plaintiff’s injuries during summation.
    3. Whether the plaintiff’s counsel’s reference to the plaintiff’s life expectancy and rhetorical questions about the value of pain over that time constituted an impermissible “per diem” argument.

    Holding

    1. No, because the “asymmetrical looking chest” was a reasonably foreseeable sequela of the injuries described in the original bill of particulars, not a new injury.
    2. No, because counsel is permitted to state the amount of damages demanded in the complaint to place before the jury the client’s contentions regarding compensation.
    3. No, because the counsel did not suggest a specific monetary value for units of time or multiply them for the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the description of the “asymmetrical looking chest” was a more definitive statement of the already-listed permanent injuries. The court emphasized that it was a reasonably foreseeable development of the initial injuries, especially considering the dynamics of maturing injuries. The defendants were also offered a new physical examination to assess the updated condition, which they declined. Therefore, the court found no surprise or prejudice to the defendants.

    Regarding the summation, the court stated, “[I]t was counsel’s privilege ‘to place before the jury his client’s contentions in this regard’ and, to this end, he was ‘entitled to state the amount of damages demanded’.” The court also noted that the trial judge properly instructed the jury that the ultimate measure of damages was to be a sum that would justly and fairly compensate the plaintiff.

    Finally, the court distinguished the summation from an impermissible “per diem” argument, noting that the counsel suggested no specific monetary value for units of time and did not perform any multiplication to arrive at a total amount. Because a unit-of-time argument was not made, the court did not have the opportunity to rule on its propriety. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Fitzgerald, 45 N.Y.2d 574 (1978): Sufficiency of Factual Allegations in Indictment for Criminally Negligent Homicide

    People v. Fitzgerald, 45 N.Y.2d 574 (1978)

    An indictment charging criminally negligent homicide or assault must contain factual allegations supporting the element of criminal negligence, but these facts can be provided in a bill of particulars if not fully detailed in the indictment itself.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for criminally negligent homicide and assault after hitting two teenage girls with his car, resulting in one death and one severe injury. The indictment stated the defendant caused the death and injury through criminal negligence while operating his vehicle. The defendant argued the indictment lacked sufficient factual detail regarding the alleged criminal negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the indictment must assert facts supporting every element of the offense, including criminal negligence, a bill of particulars can provide the necessary details if the indictment itself is not sufficiently specific, ensuring the defendant is adequately informed to prepare a defense.

    Facts

    On December 22, 1975, two teenage girls were struck by a hit-and-run driver in Westchester County. Cara Pollini died from a broken neck, and Susan Bassett was severely injured. Several days later, the defendant surrendered himself and his car to the police. A grand jury indicted the defendant on four counts: criminally negligent homicide, third-degree assault, and two counts of leaving the scene of an accident.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the first two counts (criminally negligent homicide and assault) for failing to comply with CPL 200.50(7), arguing they lacked factual indication of acts constituting criminal negligence. The trial court dismissed these counts, citing insufficient evidence and inadequate factual allegations. The Appellate Division affirmed solely on the grounds of insufficient factual allegations. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment charging criminally negligent homicide and third-degree assault is sufficient under CPL 200.50(7) when it alleges criminal negligence in the language of the statute, without specifying the underlying facts constituting the negligence, provided a bill of particulars is available to supply those facts.

    Holding

    Yes, because while an indictment must contain a factual statement supporting every element of the offense, the required details concerning the conduct constituting criminal negligence can be provided in a bill of particulars, ensuring the defendant is adequately informed to prepare a defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that criminal negligence, unlike intent, encompasses both a culpable mental state and underlying conduct involving a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and a gross deviation from reasonable care. While the mental element may generally be alleged in the words of the statute, the underlying conduct creating the risk varies and may involve complex circumstances. CPL 200.50(7) requires a plain and concise factual statement supporting every element of the offense. However, a complete itemization of all circumstances in the indictment could be overly complex. The court emphasized the defendant’s right to be informed of the conduct forming the basis of the accusation to prepare a defense. The court noted: “Thus a person accused of causing death or injury by acting with ‘criminal negligence’ is entitled to know specifically what conduct on his part involved a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ of death or injury and ‘a gross deviation’ from the standard of reasonable care (Penal Law, § 15.05, subd 4).” The availability of a bill of particulars to provide these details ensures adequate notice to the defendant. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for consideration of the sufficiency of the Grand Jury evidence.

  • People v. Grice, 37 N.Y.2d 975 (1975): Admissibility of Statements and Double Jeopardy

    People v. Grice, 37 N.Y.2d 975 (1975)

    Statements made during the commission of a crime are part of the crime itself and need not be disclosed in a bill of particulars; a purported declaration of mistrial is not effective if immediately rescinded; and pedigree information obtained without pre-interrogation warnings may be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, addressing several claims by the defendant, Grice. The court held that statements made during a crime’s commission are part of the crime itself (corpus delicti) and don’t need to be disclosed in a bill of particulars. It also found that a quickly retracted declaration of mistrial doesn’t trigger double jeopardy protections. Finally, the court permitted the use of pedigree information, obtained without pre-interrogation warnings, to impeach the defendant’s credibility on cross-examination. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the civilian was not a confidential informant, the mistrial was not actually entered, and the impeachment was permissible even if the pedigree information was initially obtained improperly.

    Facts

    The defendant, Grice, sold narcotics to an undercover police officer in the presence of a civilian. Before trial, the People disclosed the identity, description, and address of this civilian in a bill of particulars. During the criminal transaction, Grice made certain remarks. At trial, a purported declaration of mistrial was made but rescinded almost immediately. The defendant was also interviewed in connection with his possible release on his own recognizance and provided pedigree information without being given pre-interrogation warnings. This information was later used to impeach his credibility during cross-examination.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People were obligated to produce the civilian present at the narcotics sale at trial.

    2. Whether the defendant’s remarks made during the criminal transaction needed to be disclosed in the bill of particulars.

    3. Whether the trial court’s purported declaration of a mistrial barred further proceedings on double jeopardy grounds.

    4. Whether the defendant was entitled to pre-interrogation warnings before being asked pedigree information and whether such information, if obtained without warnings, could be used to impeach his credibility.

    Holding

    1. No, because the civilian was not a confidential informant but a police suspect.

    2. No, because the remarks were part of the corpus delicti.

    3. No, because the declaration of mistrial was immediately rescinded and no mistrial order was entered.

    4. No, because such warnings are not required for pedigree information; even if they were required and not given, the information could be used for impeachment purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the civilian witness, the court emphasized he was not a confidential informant but a police suspect, thus relieving the People of the obligation to produce him at trial. As to the defendant’s remarks, the court reasoned that because they were made during the commission of the crime, they constituted part of the crime itself (corpus delicti) and therefore did not require disclosure in the bill of particulars, citing CPL 200.90, subd 3.

    Concerning the mistrial, the court stated that the trial court’s declaration was merely a statement of intention, not a completed act, because it was rescinded almost immediately. Therefore, no double jeopardy claim could stand.

    Regarding the pre-interrogation warnings, the court cited People v. Rivera, 26 NY2d 304, 309, holding that such warnings aren’t required before obtaining pedigree information. Even if obtaining the information violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, the court relied on People v. Harris, 25 NY2d 175, 177, affd 401 US 222; and People v. Kulis, 18 NY2d 318, 323, to state that its use to impeach the defendant’s credibility on cross-examination was permissible. The court affirmed the principle that illegally obtained evidence can sometimes be used for impeachment purposes.

  • People v. Boback, 23 N.Y.2d 189 (1968): Simplified Traffic Information Based on Information and Belief

    People v. Boback, 23 N.Y.2d 189 (1968)

    A Simplified Traffic Information, even when based solely on information and belief and not personal knowledge, is a valid pleading and does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights, provided the defendant can obtain a bill of particulars.

    Summary

    This case addresses the validity of using Simplified Traffic Informations (STI) based on information and belief, rather than the personal knowledge of the officer issuing the ticket. Boback and Markwart were convicted of traffic violations based on STIs issued by officers who did not witness the violations. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s decision, holding that STIs are authorized even when based on information and belief, and this does not violate constitutional rights, as long as the defendant can request and receive a bill of particulars providing details of the charges. This decision clarifies that STIs serve as pleadings, and the right to a bill of particulars protects the defendant’s right to be informed of the charges.

    Facts

    Boback was involved in a car accident and issued a Uniform Traffic Ticket for “Following Too Closely” by a state trooper who arrived after the accident. The trooper’s information was based on what others told him, not personal observation. Markwart was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident under similar circumstances where the officer did not witness the event.

    Procedural History

    Boback and Markwart were convicted in Justice Court. They appealed to the Herkimer County Court, which reversed the convictions, holding that the Simplified Traffic Informations were defective because they were based on information and belief. The People then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the use of a Simplified Traffic Information is authorized when the information is based solely upon information and belief, and if so, whether its employment is constitutional.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory scheme authorizes the use of Simplified Traffic Informations regardless of whether the officer has personal knowledge of the violation. Further, this is constitutional because the defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars that informs them of the nature of the charge and the circumstances of the alleged violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Simplified Traffic Information statute was intended to streamline traffic violation proceedings by allowing for a short-form pleading combined with a uniform ticket. The court distinguished prior cases requiring verified informations based on personal knowledge, noting that those cases predated the enactment of the Simplified Traffic Information statute. The court emphasized that the purpose of requiring verified informations was to deter baseless prosecutions, but this goal is not fully achieved even when the officer has personal knowledge, because the bill of particulars, which provides the details of the charges, is not required to be verified. The court stated, “[T]he bill of particulars, which the defendants could have had upon demand, fulfills this function [of informing the defendant of the charge].” Furthermore, the court noted that the STI cannot be used as a basis for an arrest warrant without additional evidence establishing probable cause. The court concluded that the Legislature intended to override pre-existing law regarding the specificity of criminal pleadings in order to facilitate the efficient prosecution of traffic violations. The court found no constitutional impediment to this legislative choice, as the defendant’s right to be informed of the charges is protected by the right to demand a bill of particulars. The court cited People v. Weeks, 13 N.Y.2d 944, as precedent for upholding the validity of STIs when coupled with a bill of particulars, and clarified that People v. Jeffries, 19 N.Y.2d 564, was not applicable because it involved the old procedure of a summons followed by a long-form, verified information, not an STI. The court reasoned that requiring personal knowledge would defeat the purpose of the simplified procedure.

  • People v. Langford, 16 N.Y.2d 32 (1965): Sufficiency of Short-Form Indictments and Right to a Bill of Particulars

    16 N.Y.2d 32 (1965)

    A short-form indictment is sufficient if it informs the defendant of the crime charged with enough detail to allow preparation for trial and to prevent double jeopardy, particularly when supplemented by a bill of particulars if requested.

    Summary

    Langford appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the short-form indictment used was insufficient because it did not name the victim. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding the indictment sufficient because Langford could have requested a bill of particulars to obtain more specific information about the charge. The court reasoned that the purpose of the short-form indictment is to simplify the process while still protecting the defendant’s rights, and that the availability of a bill of particulars ensures adequate notice and prevents later retrials for the same crime. However, the court remitted the case for a hearing on the voluntariness of Langford’s confession.

    Facts

    Langford was indicted for second-degree murder. The indictment, drafted in a short-form manner, stated that on or about January 25, 1961, in Suffolk County, he committed the crime of Murder in the Second Degree, contrary to Penal Law, Section 1046. The indictment did not name the victim. Langford was arrested based on information charging him with the murder of Leonora Johnson Langford. At trial, a statement was introduced as part of the People’s case.

    Procedural History

    Langford was convicted of second-degree murder. He appealed, arguing that the indictment was insufficient because it did not name the victim. The appellate court considered the sufficiency of the indictment under New York law. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment to direct a hearing on the voluntariness of Langford’s confession, remitting the case to the County Court for that purpose, and otherwise affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a short-form indictment for murder in the second degree is sufficient when it does not name the victim, provided the defendant has the opportunity to request a bill of particulars for further details.

    Holding

    Yes, because the short-form indictment, coupled with the availability of a bill of particulars, provides sufficient notice to the defendant and protects against double jeopardy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on sections 295-a through 295-l of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorize the short-form indictment. It cited People v. Bogdanoff, which upheld the short-form indictment. The court noted that section 295-g provides that the defendant can request a bill of particulars, and ensuing sections cover the contents and form of the bill. The legislative intent was to allow the bill of particulars to supply necessary details, enabling the defendant to prepare for trial and preventing double jeopardy, especially in cases where the defendant pleads guilty.

    The court acknowledged the constitutional requirement that a Grand Jury must indict a person for infamous crimes. The court cited People v. Berkowitz, which held that the simplified indictment form cannot be used when the District Attorney is uncertain of the crime or facts but can be used where the evidence leaves no doubt of the crime and facts. Here, Langford did not demand a bill of particulars or inspect the Grand Jury minutes, so the court assumed the indictment matched the evidence at trial. The court stated: “The Bogdanoff (supra) and other decisions mean that unless a defendant demands a bill of particulars, in which event only is a bill of particulars required to be furnished unless the Trial Judge of his own motion so orders, it is to be assumed that the crime charged by the Grand Jury is the same as that disclosed by the People’s evidence at the trial.”

    The court also noted that Langford was initially arrested based on information that named the victim as Leonora Johnson Langford. Finding no merit in the other points raised by Langford, the court ordered a People v. Huntley hearing to determine the voluntariness of Langford’s confession.