Guzman v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 955 (1987)

A municipality’s duty to maintain its parks and playgrounds in a reasonably safe condition does not extend to preventing bicycle riding on a busy promenade, and the municipality does not assume a special duty to protect individuals from such activity simply by enacting regulations against it.

Summary

The plaintiff sued the City of New York for injuries sustained when struck by a bicyclist on a promenade. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the City did not breach its duty of care. The court reasoned that bicycle riding on a promenade does not constitute “ultrahazardous and criminal activity” that the City has a duty to prevent. Additionally, the court found that the City’s enactment and enforcement of regulations prohibiting bicycle riding did not create a special relationship with the injured party that would give rise to a special duty of care. The City’s duty was to the public generally, not to a specific individual.

Facts

The infant plaintiff was injured when struck by a bicyclist while on a promenade in New York City. The City had regulations in place prohibiting bicycle riding on the promenade. The plaintiffs argued that the City was negligent in failing to prevent bicycle riding in the area and in failing to enforce its regulations.

Procedural History

The trial court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the City breached its duty to maintain its park and playground facilities in a reasonably safe condition by failing to prevent bicycle riding on the promenade.
2. Whether the City assumed a special duty toward the infant plaintiff by promulgating and enforcing regulations prohibiting bicycle riding in the area.

Holding

1. No, because bicycle riding on a busy promenade does not rise to the level of “ultrahazardous and criminal” activity that a municipality has a duty to prevent.

2. No, because by enacting and enforcing regulations for the protection of the general public, the City did not assume a special relationship with the infant plaintiff.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate a duty owed by the defendant, a breach of that duty, and injury proximately resulting from the breach. The court acknowledged that a municipality has a duty to maintain its parks and playgrounds in a reasonably safe condition, including preventing ultrahazardous and criminal activity of which it has knowledge. However, the court determined that bicycle riding on a busy promenade does not meet this standard. The court cited prior cases where the duty to prevent ultrahazardous activity was found when the activity was of a truly dangerous nature. The court distinguished the facts of this case from situations involving truly dangerous activities. The court also addressed the plaintiff’s argument that the City’s failure to enforce its regulations prohibiting bicycle riding created a special duty to the infant plaintiff. The court rejected this argument, stating that the regulations were intended for the protection of the general public, and that the City did not assume a special relationship with the plaintiff by enacting and enforcing them. The court cited the rule that a municipality’s duty to provide police protection ordinarily is not owed to any particular individual but to the public at large. As the court stated, the regulations were “intended for the protection of the general public, defendant did not assume a special relationship toward the infant plaintiff carrying with it a special duty to protect the latter from the prohibited activity.”