New York Law Review

Tag: Bench warrant

  • People v. Coppez, 93 N.Y.2d 248 (1999): Effect of Stayed Bench Warrant on Bail Jumping Charges

    People v. Coppez, 93 N.Y.2d 248 (1999)

    A court’s decision to stay the issuance of a bench warrant for a defendant’s failure to appear on a scheduled court date effectively nullifies that date as a “required date” for the purpose of a bail jumping charge, provided the defendant appears (voluntarily or involuntarily) within 30 days of a subsequent unexcused failure to appear.

    Summary

    David Coppez, charged with felony assault, failed to appear in court on May 31, 1996. The court issued a bench warrant but stayed its execution, adjourning the matter to June 11, 1996. Coppez again failed to appear, and a warrant was issued. He was returned on July 5, 1996. He was then charged with bail jumping. The court dismissed the indictment, reasoning the “required date” was June 11, and Coppez was returned within 30 days. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the stay of the initial warrant nullified May 31 as the “required date” for bail jumping purposes, as the court has the discretion to amend its requirements. The 30-day grace period started on June 11, and Coppez appeared within that time.

    Facts

    David Coppez was released on bail on October 6, 1995, on a felony assault charge, conditioned on his appearance in court on scheduled dates.

    Coppez failed to appear on May 31, 1996, and the court issued a bench warrant but stayed its execution and adjourned the matter to June 11, 1996, for Coppez’s appearance.

    Coppez failed to appear on June 11, 1996, and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.

    Coppez was returned to court on the warrant on July 5, 1996.

    Procedural History

    Coppez was indicted for bail jumping in the second degree.

    He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing insufficient evidence to establish failure to appear on a “required date.”

    The trial court initially denied the motion but, on reargument, dismissed the indictment, concluding the “required date” was June 11, not May 31.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a scheduled court date for a defendant’s appearance ceases to be a “required date” under the bail-jumping statutes when the court stays the issuance of a warrant for nonappearance and adjourns the matter to a future date.

    Holding

    No, because the court retains discretion in scheduling, and can excuse a nonappearance before the end of the calendared date and set a new date.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “required date” in Penal Law § 215.56 implicitly recognizes the calendar court’s discretion in scheduling criminal litigation. The court stated, “Implicit in defining criminal liability under the bail-jumping statutes by utilizing the term “required date” is a legislative recognition of the calendar court’s discretion in the over-all scheduling of a criminal litigation.”

    The Court emphasized the court’s inherent authority to amend its requirements, quoting Judge Cardozo: “To this end, the power to adjourn is a necessary incident to the power to determine.” They highlighted numerous precedents acknowledging a calendar court’s discretionary authority to adjourn matters.

    The Court distinguished the case from People v. Eiffel, emphasizing that while a defendant can purge a nonappearance by appearing within 30 days, a court can also excuse a nonappearance before the end of the calendared date and fix a new date. The Court stated that Coppez’s nonappearance on May 31, 1996, was excused by judicial stay before the passage of the date, it was not a failure to appear on a “required date.” The 30-day grace period started after his failure to appear on June 11, 1996.

    The Court clarified that an unexcused failure to appear is a minimum requirement for a bail-jumping prosecution. Here, Coppez’s appearance on July 5, 1996, was within 30 days of his unexcused failure to appear on June 11, negating the “required date” element of the bail-jumping offense.

  • People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71 (1995): Due Diligence and Speedy Trial Rights for Absent Defendants

    85 N.Y.2d 71 (1995)

    To exclude the period when a bench warrant is outstanding from speedy trial calculations under CPL 30.30(4)(c), the prosecution must demonstrate due diligence in attempting to locate the defendant during that entire period; a lack of diligence during any portion of the period renders that portion non-excludable.

    Summary

    Luperon was charged with attempted murder. After his release, he failed to appear in court, and a bench warrant was issued. More than 15 months later, Luperon moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the People’s statement of readiness was untimely. The court addressed whether the entire period the bench warrant was outstanding was excludable, even though there was a 69-day gap before efforts to execute the warrant began. The Court of Appeals held that the 69-day period was not excludable because the police’s subsequent efforts did not retroactively excuse their prior inaction. Because the delay exceeded the statutory limit, the indictment should have been dismissed.

    Facts

    Luperon was arraigned on a felony complaint for shooting his landlord on August 2, 1989, and released on August 4. He failed to appear on September 14, 1989, and a bench warrant was issued. He was arrested on unrelated charges on October 16, 1989, and released again on October 20, 1989, while the Grand Jury had not acted. He was indicted on December 8, 1989, but never received notice of his indictment or an arraignment date. An ex parte arrest order was issued on December 19, 1989. Luperon was not located until October 5, 1990, after being spotted by his former landlady. The People declared readiness on October 26, 1990.

    Procedural History

    Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging the People were unready for 451 days. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. Luperon was convicted of first-degree assault and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the police demonstrated diligence. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People can exclude the entire period a bench warrant is outstanding under CPL 30.30(4)(c) when there was a period of 69 days between the issuance of the warrant and the start of efforts to execute it.

    Holding

    No, because a showing of diligent efforts to execute the bench warrant is a prerequisite to the application of the statutory exclusion. The 69 days of delay between the warrant’s issuance and assignment for enforcement are not excludable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30(4)(c) excludes the period a bench warrant is outstanding if the defendant is absent or unavailable, defined as location unknown with attempts to avoid apprehension, or presence for trial cannot be obtained with due diligence. The Court stated a showing of diligent efforts to execute the warrant is a prerequisite to applying the exclusion. While diligence is a mixed question of law and fact, the Court may inquire whether the fact finder’s conclusions are supported by the record.

    The Court rejected the People’s argument to excuse the pre-assignment delay for “reasonable administrative delay.” The Court reasoned that the “due diligence” standard is flexible enough to consider processing demands where warranted by the facts. The Court clarified they were not holding that time spent processing a warrant is always chargeable to the People.

    The Court held because the People failed to offer any basis for excluding the 160 days of delay during other periods and the 69-day delay between the warrant issuance and assignment, the total unexcused delay exceeded the statutorily permitted time. The Court noted that “[t]hose officials are bound by their oaths of office to make all reasonable efforts to enforce judicially issued warrants.”

  • In re Randy K., 77 N.Y.2d 398 (1991): Juvenile’s Failure to Appear Does Not Automatically Toll Speedy Hearing Requirements

    In re Randy K., 77 N.Y.2d 398 (1991)

    A juvenile’s failure to appear in court, resulting in a bench warrant, does not automatically relieve the presentment agency of its obligation to adhere to the speedy hearing requirements outlined in the Family Court Act, specifically the need to demonstrate good cause or special circumstances for adjournments.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a juvenile’s failure to appear at a scheduled fact-finding hearing automatically waives the statutory requirements for speedy hearings under the Family Court Act § 340.1. The Court of Appeals held that the presentment agency was still obligated to seek adjournments based on good cause or special circumstances, even after a bench warrant was issued for the juvenile’s arrest. The court reasoned that creating an exception for failure to appear would undermine the purpose of ensuring swift and certain determinations in juvenile delinquency proceedings and would improperly shift responsibility for monitoring the case away from the court and the presentment agency.

    Facts

    A petition was filed against Randy K. alleging acts that would constitute robbery if committed by an adult. Randy failed to appear at the initial court date, and a bench warrant was issued. He was brought in on the warrant approximately 150 days later. He failed to appear again for a fact-finding hearing which was also set and a second bench warrant issued. He was brought in on the second warrant months later. The Family Court denied Randy’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of speedy hearing rights, arguing his absence was voluntary. The Appellate Division reversed.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition. The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s decision and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a juvenile’s failure to appear at a scheduled fact-finding hearing and the subsequent issuance of a bench warrant automatically relieve the presentment agency from complying with the statutory requirements of Family Court Act § 340.1 regarding adjournments for good cause or special circumstances.

    Holding

    No, because the Family Court Act § 340.1 mandates that adjournments of fact-finding hearings require a showing of good cause or special circumstances on the record, and there is no exception for situations where the juvenile fails to appear and a bench warrant is issued.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court Act § 340.1 provides specific time limitations for fact-finding hearings, distinct from the general speedy trial provisions for adult prosecutions. The statute mandates that the court must order adjournments and make findings on the record regarding good cause or special circumstances. The court emphasized that “[t]he statute contains no exception from these mandates when the juvenile has failed to appear and is being sought under a bench warrant.” Creating an automatic exception for failure to appear would undermine the goals of swift and certain determinations and proper supervision of juveniles. The Court stated, “Providing for an automatic retroactive adjournment of unlimited duration based solely upon a failure of a juvenile to appear for a hearing and the issuance of a bench warrant would in no way advance the aims of ensuring a swift and certain determination of the proceeding and supervision of the juvenile.” The court rejected the argument that the agency’s failure should be excused because the motion would have been granted, emphasizing the mandatory nature of the statutory protections. The Court further noted the difference between CPL 30.30, which focuses on prosecutorial delay, and Family Court Act § 340.1, which is a true speedy hearing rule, and stated, “[t]he two statutes have ‘very different language, history and purposes.’”

  • People v. Osgood, 52 N.Y.2d 37 (1980): Illustrates the Speedy Trial Right Under CPL 30.30

    People v. Osgood, 52 N.Y.2d 37 (1980)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30, the prosecution must be ready for trial within a specified timeframe, and delays caused by the prosecution’s failure to exercise due diligence in locating the defendant are generally chargeable to the prosecution, potentially leading to dismissal of the indictment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30. Two indictments were filed against Osgood. He moved to dismiss both indictments on speedy trial grounds. He was convicted in the first trial, and pled guilty in the second with the understanding that the sentences would run concurrently. The Court of Appeals found that the delay between filing the indictments and attempting to execute the bench warrant, as well as the delay between the dismissal of the felony complaint and the filing of the indictment, were chargeable to the prosecution. Because the prosecution failed to be ready for trial within the statutory timeframe, the Court vacated the plea and dismissed the second indictment, mirroring its earlier decision to dismiss the first.

    Facts

    Two indictments, No. 5172/72 and No. 1158/73, were filed against the defendant simultaneously.
    Motions were made to dismiss both indictments pursuant to CPL 30.30 (speedy trial grounds).
    The defendant proceeded to trial on the first indictment and was convicted.
    The defendant then entered a guilty plea on the second indictment, contingent on the sentence running concurrently with the first conviction.
    More than six months passed between the filing of the indictments and the first attempt to execute the bench warrant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss both indictments.
    The defendant was convicted after trial on the first indictment and pleaded guilty to the second.
    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction on the first indictment and dismissed it, finding a speedy trial violation (96 AD2d 538).
    The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals regarding the second indictment (No. 1158/73), which he had pleaded guilty to.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the period between the filing of the indictments and the attempt to execute the bench warrant is excludable from the time limitations imposed by CPL 30.30?
    2. Whether the period between the dismissal of the felony complaint and the filing of the indictment provides an independent basis for dismissal under CPL 30.30?
    3. Whether the defendant’s plea should be vacated, given that it was induced by the understanding that the sentence would run concurrently with a conviction that was subsequently set aside?

    Holding

    1. No, because the delay was not excludable under CPL 30.30 as the prosecution did not exercise due diligence.
    2. Yes, because CPL 30.30 requires the prosecution to be ready for trial within a specified timeframe after the commencement of the criminal action.
    3. Yes, because the plea was contingent on a sentence that was subsequently invalidated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the delay of more than six months between filing the indictments and the first attempt to execute the bench warrant was not excludable from the CPL 30.30 speedy trial calculation. This suggests the prosecution did not act with sufficient diligence in pursuing the case. The court explicitly referenced its prior holding in People v. Osgood, 52 NY2d 37, noting that the period between the dismissal of the felony complaint and the filing of the indictment provided an independent basis for dismissal under CPL 30.30.

    Because the defendant’s guilty plea on the second indictment was induced by the understanding that the sentence would run concurrently with the sentence imposed for his conviction on the first indictment (which was later set aside), the court found that the plea must be vacated. The court cited People v. Clark, 45 NY2d 432, 440 in support of this holding.

    Finally, the court reasoned that remittal for further proceedings on the second indictment was unnecessary because the speedy trial motion encompassed both indictments, and the reasons for dismissing the first indictment applied equally to the second. Thus, dismissing the second indictment was the appropriate remedy. The decision emphasizes the importance of prosecutorial readiness and the consequences of failing to meet the statutory speedy trial requirements. The case clarifies that a guilty plea conditioned on a specific outcome in another case can be invalidated if that underlying condition changes.