New York Law Review

Tag: Becker v. Schwartz

  • Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978 (1984): No Recovery for Wrongful Life Claims in New York

    Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978 (1984)

    In New York, a child born with a disability cannot recover damages in a wrongful life action based on a claim that negligent prenatal testing induced the parents to carry the pregnancy to term.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, born with Down’s Syndrome, sued the defendant hospitals alleging negligence in performing an amniocentesis test on her mother. The hospitals erroneously reported that the mother would give birth to a normal male child, which led her to carry the pregnancy to term instead of aborting the fetus. The plaintiff sought to recover the extraordinary expenses for special care and services she would incur upon reaching majority. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that a cause of action for wrongful life is not legally cognizable in New York, as it requires comparing the value of impaired life to nonexistence.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s mother underwent an amniocentesis test during pregnancy to determine if the fetus had any genetic abnormalities.

    The defendant hospitals negligently reported that the test indicated the mother would give birth to a normal male child.

    Relying on this report, the mother carried the pregnancy to term, resulting in the birth of the plaintiff, who has Down’s Syndrome.

    The plaintiff’s condition will require special treatment and care throughout her lifetime.

    The parents’ claims for damages were time-barred, leaving only the infant’s claim.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the infant’s cause of action.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s decision and dismissed the complaint, relying on Becker v. Schwartz.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an infant born with a disability can recover damages from a hospital for the extraordinary expenses incurred due to the disability, based on the hospital’s negligent prenatal testing that induced the parents to carry the pregnancy to term.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff’s cause of action is one for wrongful life, which is not legally cognizable in New York, as it demands a comparison between impaired life and nonexistence that the law is not equipped to make.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the plaintiff’s cause of action was, in essence, a claim for wrongful life, which New York law does not recognize, citing Becker v. Schwartz. The court emphasized that while the parents might have had a valid claim for their pecuniary expenses if it had been timely brought, the infant’s claim for her own wrongful life was different. Such a claim, the court reasoned, “demands a calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson’s choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence”, a calculation that the law is unable to perform. The court further stated that the argument for allowing recovery based on public policy was better addressed to the Legislature. The court distinguished between the parents’ potential claim for breach of duty, which could have entitled them to recover pecuniary expenses, and the infant’s wrongful life claim, which lacked a legally cognizable injury. This case reinforces the principle that the judiciary is not suited to assess the value of life with disabilities versus no life at all; such considerations are best left to legislative action.

  • Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978): Limiting Liability for Emotional Distress to Parents of Child with Genetic Disease

    Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978)

    A physician’s negligence in failing to diagnose a fetus with a genetic disease does not create a cause of action for the parents’ emotional distress resulting from the child’s birth and subsequent suffering.

    Summary

    The plaintiffs, parents of a child born with Tay-Sachs disease, sued the defendant doctor for negligence, alleging he failed to take a proper genealogical history or properly evaluate it, which would have revealed their heightened risk of having a child with the disease. They claimed that had they been informed of the risk and the availability of testing, they would have aborted the pregnancy. The court held that the parents could not recover for their emotional distress, reasoning that extending liability in this case would create artificial and unmanageable boundaries. The court emphasized the need to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree, even in the face of genuine suffering.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, both Eastern European Jews, consulted the defendant doctor. The doctor failed to take a proper genealogical history or to properly evaluate it. The parents subsequently gave birth to a daughter with Tay-Sachs disease, a degenerative genetic disorder. The parents claimed they would have undergone testing and aborted the pregnancy had the doctor properly advised them of the risk and the availability of tests.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued, alleging the doctor’s negligence caused them mental distress. The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether parents can recover from a doctor for the mental distress and emotional disturbances they suffered as a result of their infant daughter having been born with and eventually succumbing to Tay-Sachs disease, where the doctor was allegedly negligent in failing to diagnose the risk of the disease in utero.

    Holding

    No, because extending liability to the parents in this situation would require an unmanageable extension of traditional tort concepts, leading to arbitrary and artificial boundaries in the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the parents’ suffering but emphasized the need to limit the scope of liability. It noted that while the law seeks to provide redress for injuries caused by negligence, it cannot provide relief for every injury suffered. The court distinguished this case from situations where direct physical or emotional injury results from negligence. Here, the parents suffered emotional distress from witnessing their child’s suffering, not from a direct injury to themselves caused by the doctor’s negligence.

    The court cited Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609 (1969), which denied recovery to a mother traumatized by injuries suffered by her child due to another’s negligence. The court reasoned that extending liability to the parents would create artificial boundaries. For example, the dissent would allow the mother to recover while denying recovery to the father. “The law of liability should not turn on hypertechnical and fortuitous considerations of this type.”

    The court recognized the difficulty in drawing a line if recovery were allowed in this case. “Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree” (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619 (1969)).