New York Law Review

Tag: Barker v. Kallash

  • Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19 (1984): Recovery Denied for Injuries Sustained During Illegal Activity

    63 N.Y.2d 19 (1984)

    A plaintiff cannot recover for injuries sustained as a direct result of their knowing and intentional participation in a criminal act, if the criminal act is judged to be so serious an offense as to warrant denial of recovery; CPLR 1411 does not abrogate this rule.

    Summary

    A 15-year-old plaintiff was injured while constructing a “pipe bomb” and sued a 9-year-old defendant who allegedly sold firecrackers to the plaintiff’s companions, from which they extracted gunpowder. The lower courts granted summary judgment dismissing the cause of action against the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that public policy denies judicial relief to those injured while committing a serious criminal act. The rule of comparative negligence does not apply when the injury is a direct result of the plaintiff’s participation in a serious criminal act.

    Facts

    George Barker, nearly 15, and two companions made a pipe bomb in Barker’s backyard. The bomb was constructed using a metal pipe filled with gunpowder. Barker obtained the pipe, caps, and drill from his father’s workshop. Barker claimed the gunpowder came from firecrackers purchased by his companions, the Kallash brothers, from 9-year-old Daniel Melucci, Jr. The bomb exploded as Barker was capping it, severely injuring his hands.

    Procedural History

    Barker sued the Kallash brothers for their part in the bomb’s construction, Melucci for selling the firecrackers, and Robert Judge for allegedly selling the firecrackers to Melucci. He also sued the parents of each infant defendant for negligent supervision. The Meluccis moved for summary judgment, arguing that Barker was barred from recovering for injuries sustained while engaged in wrongful or illegal conduct. The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the plaintiff’s conduct to be beyond mere prankish or foolish behavior.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff who is injured while constructing a pipe bomb can maintain a tort action against a defendant who allegedly sold the firecrackers used to make the bomb.

    Whether CPLR 1411, which establishes comparative negligence, permits a plaintiff injured during the commission of a serious illegal act to recover damages.

    Holding

    No, because the public policy of New York generally denies judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act.

    No, because CPLR 1411 does not apply to injuries sustained as a direct result of the plaintiff’s own illegal conduct of a serious nature involving risk of physical harm.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between regulated lawful activities and prohibited activities. A violation of a statute regulating an activity constitutes negligence, subject to comparative negligence principles. However, when a plaintiff engages in activities prohibited by law, courts will not entertain the suit if the plaintiff’s conduct was a serious violation, and the injuries were a direct result. This denial of recovery stems from public policy, not contributory negligence. As the court stated, “[T]he paramount public policy imperative that the law, whatever its content at a given time or for however limited a period, be obeyed”.

    The court emphasized that constructing a bomb is a far more dangerous activity than merely using firecrackers. Although Barker was a minor, he was not so young as to be unaware that building a bomb was wrongful and dangerous.

    Regarding CPLR 1411, the court stated that it abolished contributory negligence, but it did not create a new cause of action for those injured while participating in serious illegal acts. The rule precluding recovery in such cases is based on public policy, meaning that “proof of such an injury would not demonstrate any cause of action cognizable at law”.

    The court directly addressed the argument that this decision was overly puritanical, clarifying that the court was not permitting a criminal to profit from their criminal act, but preventing a person from obtaining legal compensation for injuries directly resulting from knowingly participating in a criminal act. The court reasoned that it will not create a system where one can profit from their own wrong-doing, referencing Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506.

  • Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19 (1984): Limits on Emergency Doctrine Instruction and Driver’s License Cross-Examination

    Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19 (1984)

    The emergency doctrine is not applicable when a party participated in creating the emergency, and the scope of cross-examination on credibility is within the trial judge’s discretion.

    Summary

    In a negligence action arising from a car accident, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the emergency doctrine because the plaintiff participated in creating the emergency. Additionally, the Court held that cross-examination regarding the plaintiff’s failure to renew his driver’s license was permissible solely for the purpose of assessing credibility, and the extent of such cross-examination falls within the trial judge’s discretion. The Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s decisions.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Barker, was involved in a car accident with the defendant, Kallash. At trial, Barker sought a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine to justify his speeding at the time of the accident. The trial court refused this instruction. The defendant’s counsel cross-examined Barker on his failure to renew his driver’s license. The court allowed this questioning only on the issue of Barker’s credibility.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the emergency doctrine as a justification for the plaintiff’s speeding at the time of the accident.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing cross-examination on the plaintiff’s failure to renew his driver’s license.

    Holding

    1. No, because the emergency doctrine has no application where the plaintiff participated in the creation of the emergency.
    2. No, because the trial court allowed the jury to consider the testimony solely on the issue of credibility, and the extent of cross-examination on credibility is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the emergency doctrine, the Court of Appeals deferred to the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff’s own actions contributed to the emergency situation. The Court cited Johnson v. Hickson, 43 NY2d 906, 908, reinforcing the principle that the emergency doctrine cannot be invoked by a party who helped create the emergency.

    As to the cross-examination about the driver’s license, the Court emphasized that such evidence is inadmissible on the issue of negligence itself. However, the trial court explicitly limited the jury’s consideration of this evidence to the plaintiff’s credibility. The Court of Appeals recognized the broad discretion afforded to trial judges in controlling the scope of cross-examination for impeachment purposes, citing Richardson, Evidence, § 500, at p 485. The Court stated, “The nature and extent of the cross-examination on the question of credibility is within the sound discretion of the Trial Judge. and therefore beyond our review”.

    The Court also stated that it reviewed the plaintiff’s remaining arguments concerning prejudicial errors and found them insufficient to warrant reversal.