New York Law Review

Tag: Bail Jumping

  • People v. Coppez, 93 N.Y.2d 248 (1999): Effect of Stayed Bench Warrant on Bail Jumping Charges

    People v. Coppez, 93 N.Y.2d 248 (1999)

    A court’s decision to stay the issuance of a bench warrant for a defendant’s failure to appear on a scheduled court date effectively nullifies that date as a “required date” for the purpose of a bail jumping charge, provided the defendant appears (voluntarily or involuntarily) within 30 days of a subsequent unexcused failure to appear.

    Summary

    David Coppez, charged with felony assault, failed to appear in court on May 31, 1996. The court issued a bench warrant but stayed its execution, adjourning the matter to June 11, 1996. Coppez again failed to appear, and a warrant was issued. He was returned on July 5, 1996. He was then charged with bail jumping. The court dismissed the indictment, reasoning the “required date” was June 11, and Coppez was returned within 30 days. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the stay of the initial warrant nullified May 31 as the “required date” for bail jumping purposes, as the court has the discretion to amend its requirements. The 30-day grace period started on June 11, and Coppez appeared within that time.

    Facts

    David Coppez was released on bail on October 6, 1995, on a felony assault charge, conditioned on his appearance in court on scheduled dates.

    Coppez failed to appear on May 31, 1996, and the court issued a bench warrant but stayed its execution and adjourned the matter to June 11, 1996, for Coppez’s appearance.

    Coppez failed to appear on June 11, 1996, and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.

    Coppez was returned to court on the warrant on July 5, 1996.

    Procedural History

    Coppez was indicted for bail jumping in the second degree.

    He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing insufficient evidence to establish failure to appear on a “required date.”

    The trial court initially denied the motion but, on reargument, dismissed the indictment, concluding the “required date” was June 11, not May 31.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a scheduled court date for a defendant’s appearance ceases to be a “required date” under the bail-jumping statutes when the court stays the issuance of a warrant for nonappearance and adjourns the matter to a future date.

    Holding

    No, because the court retains discretion in scheduling, and can excuse a nonappearance before the end of the calendared date and set a new date.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “required date” in Penal Law § 215.56 implicitly recognizes the calendar court’s discretion in scheduling criminal litigation. The court stated, “Implicit in defining criminal liability under the bail-jumping statutes by utilizing the term “required date” is a legislative recognition of the calendar court’s discretion in the over-all scheduling of a criminal litigation.”

    The Court emphasized the court’s inherent authority to amend its requirements, quoting Judge Cardozo: “To this end, the power to adjourn is a necessary incident to the power to determine.” They highlighted numerous precedents acknowledging a calendar court’s discretionary authority to adjourn matters.

    The Court distinguished the case from People v. Eiffel, emphasizing that while a defendant can purge a nonappearance by appearing within 30 days, a court can also excuse a nonappearance before the end of the calendared date and fix a new date. The Court stated that Coppez’s nonappearance on May 31, 1996, was excused by judicial stay before the passage of the date, it was not a failure to appear on a “required date.” The 30-day grace period started after his failure to appear on June 11, 1996.

    The Court clarified that an unexcused failure to appear is a minimum requirement for a bail-jumping prosecution. Here, Coppez’s appearance on July 5, 1996, was within 30 days of his unexcused failure to appear on June 11, negating the “required date” element of the bail-jumping offense.

  • People v. Smith, 93 N.Y.2d 354 (1999): Admissibility of Negative Identification Testimony

    People v. Smith, 93 N.Y.2d 354 (1999)

    Negative identification evidence is admissible to bolster the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the reliability of that identification is at issue.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of negative identification testimony and the elements of first-degree bail jumping. The Court held that negative identification evidence is admissible to enhance the reliability of an eyewitness identification. However, the Court also found that the defendant was improperly convicted of first-degree bail jumping because the court order requiring his appearance was not explicitly connected to a pending indictment, reducing the conviction to second-degree bail jumping.

    Facts

    Detective Brown, an undercover officer, participated in a buy/bust operation and identified Smith as the “steerer.” Another suspect was apprehended wearing similar clothing to the steerer. Detective Brown stated that this person was not the steerer. Smith was initially released on his own recognizance with a condition to appear. After an indictment, he failed to appear in Supreme Court and was subsequently indicted for first-degree bail jumping.

    Procedural History

    Smith was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance and first-degree bail jumping. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether negative identification testimony is admissible as evidence-in-chief to bolster the reliability of an eyewitness identification.
    2. Whether Smith’s conviction for first-degree bail jumping was proper, given that the initial order to appear was not explicitly connected to a pending indictment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because negative identification testimony is relevant when the reliability of an eyewitness identification is at issue, and it enhances the credibility of the witness’s identification.
    2. No, because the order requiring Smith’s appearance was not explicitly connected to a pending indictment for a Class A or B felony, a necessary element for first-degree bail jumping.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that negative identification evidence enhances the likelihood of an accurate eyewitness identification. It serves the same purpose as other forms of out-of-court identification evidence, such as videotaped lineups or prior descriptions. The Court noted, “[w]hen the reliability of an eyewitness identification is at issue, negative identification evidence can tend to prove that the eyewitness possessed the ability to distinguish the particular features of the perpetrator.”

    Regarding the bail jumping charge, the Court emphasized the specific elements of Penal Law § 215.57, which defines first-degree bail jumping. The critical element missing was a court order requiring Smith to appear specifically in connection with a pending indictment for a Class A or B felony. The initial order was connected to a felony complaint, not an indictment. Since no new securing order was issued after the indictment, Smith could only be guilty of second-degree bail jumping. The Court stated, “[f]irst degree bail jumping is set apart from the lesser offenses in that the court order that the defendant violated must have conditioned his release from custody, or continued liberty, on his appearance in connection with a pending indictment for an A or B felony.”

  • People v. Taylor, 83 N.Y.2d 837 (1994): Infancy Defense and Jurisdiction in Bail Jumping Cases

    People v. Taylor, 83 N.Y.2d 837 (1994)

    The defense of infancy against underlying charges does not automatically divest a court of jurisdiction over a subsequent bail jumping charge, particularly when the defendant misrepresented their age to the court.

    Summary

    Defendant Taylor, initially indicted for drug possession, pled guilty but misrepresented his age to the court. After being released pending sentencing, he failed to appear, leading to a bail jumping charge. The initial guilty plea was later withdrawn upon discovery of Taylor’s actual age (under 16). Despite this, he pled guilty to bail jumping. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the bail jumping conviction, holding that the infancy defense against the underlying charges did not divest the court of jurisdiction over the bail jumping charge, especially considering Taylor’s initial misrepresentation to the court.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on drug possession charges.
    He misrepresented his name and age (claiming to be 19) to the trial court.
    He was released pending sentencing but failed to appear.
    A bench warrant was issued for his arrest.
    He was over 16 at the time he failed to appear for sentencing.
    His guilty plea to the drug charge was withdrawn after his birth certificate revealed he was under 16 when the alleged possession occurred.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted on drug possession charges and pleaded guilty.
    He was then charged with bail jumping in the first degree after failing to appear for sentencing.
    He withdrew his initial guilty plea to the drug charges.
    He pleaded guilty to bail jumping in the first degree.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the bail jumping conviction.
    A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court was divested of jurisdiction over the bail jumping charge once the defense of infancy was raised regarding the predicate criminal charges.

    Holding

    No, because the infancy defense is an ordinary defense that must be raised by the defendant, and the defendant misrepresented his age to the court. The court had effective jurisdiction over him when he committed bail jumping.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that infancy is an ordinary defense that must be raised by the defendant (Penal Law § 30.00 [3]). The defendant did not raise the defense initially and, in fact, misrepresented his age. The Court emphasized that the status of pending felony charges does not automatically nullify criminal liability for bail jumping, citing People v. Eiffel, 81 NY2d 480, 483. The Court considered the theoretical and practical effect of infancy on the criminal proceedings. The defendant’s misrepresentation of his age was a key factor in the Court’s decision, suggesting that he should not benefit from his deceit. The Court’s rationale implies a policy consideration against allowing defendants to manipulate the system by initially concealing their age and then claiming infancy to escape subsequent charges related to their failure to appear. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.

  • People v. Eiffel, 81 N.Y.2d 480 (1993): Predicate Felony Need Not Be Pending for Entire Bail Jumping Period

    People v. Eiffel, 81 N.Y.2d 480 (1993)

    A defendant can be charged with first-degree bail jumping if a Class A or Class B felony indictment was pending against them when they failed to appear in court, even if that felony is no longer pending at the end of the 30-day grace period for appearing.

    Summary

    Eiffel was released on his own recognizance while facing felony charges. He failed to appear for trial, and the trial proceeded in absentia. The most serious charge was dismissed during trial, and he was convicted of a lesser charge. Subsequently, he was indicted for first-degree bail jumping. He argued that because the predicate felony was no longer pending 30 days after his failure to appear, the bail jumping charge should be reduced. The Court of Appeals held that the bail jumping charge was valid because a qualifying felony was pending when he initially failed to appear, regardless of its status after the 30-day grace period.

    Facts

    Defendant Eiffel was arrested and charged with first and third-degree rape, and second-degree sexual abuse. He was released on his own recognizance, conditioned upon his appearance for trial on May 11, 1989. Eiffel failed to appear on the required date. The court held a hearing, found his absence voluntary, and proceeded with the trial in absentia. During the trial, the first-degree rape charge was dismissed for insufficient evidence. Eiffel was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse (a misdemeanor) and acquitted of third-degree rape (a Class E felony). Before sentencing, Eiffel was indicted for first-degree bail jumping under Penal Law § 215.57.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted Eiffel’s motion to reduce the bail jumping charge, reasoning that the predicate felony had to be pending both on the date of non-appearance and at the end of the 30-day grace period. The People appealed. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the first-degree bail jumping charge. Eiffel appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be charged with first-degree bail jumping under Penal Law § 215.57 if the Class A or Class B felony indictment that served as the predicate for the bail jumping charge was no longer pending at the end of the 30-day period following the defendant’s failure to appear.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute requires that a Class A or Class B felony indictment be pending against the defendant at some point in the criminal proceedings, but it does not require that the predicate crime remain pending until the conclusion of the 30-day period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 30-day period is a “grace period” designed to allow defendants to purge their non-appearance. Citing People v. Shurn, 50 N.Y.2d 914 (1980), the court stated that this period limits the scope of the offense, particularly because bail jumping is a “nonintent crime.” The Court distinguished the case from Shurn, where the defendant was arrested within the 30-day period, allowing him to avail himself of the grace period. Here, the charges were resolved within 30 days, but not because of Eiffel’s actions.

    The Court emphasized that Penal Law § 215.57 provides notice that serious sanctions may result from failing to appear. The statute aims to incentivize appearance by imposing a penalty for absconding and potentially frustrating the timely disposition of charges. The 30-day grace period allows a defendant to appear and “insulate” themselves from prosecution. The Court stated, “During this period, the statute focuses on defendant’s appearance before the court, not the status of the predicate charge.” Thus, if a defendant has not appeared at the end of the 30-day period, the elements of the crime are satisfied, regardless of the status of the predicate charges.

    The Court declined to judicially alter the legislative calibration for first-degree bail jumping. It concluded that when a defendant fails to appear, they have unlawfully violated a court order, and the 30-day grace period allows them to purge their nonappearance. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order reinstating the first-degree bail jumping charge.

  • People v. Shurn, 50 N.Y.2d 914 (1980): Construction of ‘Voluntarily’ in Bail Jumping Statute

    50 N.Y.2d 914 (1980)

    The term “voluntarily” in New York Penal Law § 215.57, regarding bail jumping, preserves a grace period, limiting the scope of the non-intent crime and defining when the crime is committed rather than leaving it to the event of arrest.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the inclusion of “voluntarily” in Penal Law § 215.57 preserves the grace period found in predecessor statutes. This limits the scope of bail jumping as a non-intent crime. The majority reasoned that the term prevents determining the commission of the crime based merely on the fortuitous event of arrest. The dissent argued that appearing due to arrest is not voluntary and thus does not satisfy the statute’s requirement. The court favored a construction that provides certainty about when the crime is committed.

    Facts

    The facts of the case are not explicitly detailed in the Court of Appeals memorandum. However, the core issue revolves around a defendant who failed to appear as required and was subsequently arrested. The question was whether his appearance after arrest, but within 30 days, constituted a voluntary appearance under Penal Law § 215.57, thus precluding a charge of bail jumping.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court. The Appellate Division issued an order, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The specific details of the lower court’s ruling are not included in the Court of Appeals’ memorandum, but the central point of contention was the interpretation of the word “voluntarily” in the context of the bail jumping statute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the inclusion of the word “voluntarily” in Penal Law § 215.57 eliminates the grace period present in predecessor statutes, thereby making an appearance within 30 days of a failure to appear, even if prompted by arrest, a bar to prosecution for bail jumping?

    Holding

    No, because the inclusion of “voluntarily” in Penal Law § 215.57 preserves the grace period that existed in prior statutes, thereby limiting the scope of the non-intent crime of bail jumping to instances where a defendant fails to voluntarily appear within the specified timeframe and before arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the inclusion of “voluntarily” was intended to maintain the grace period established in previous iterations of the bail jumping statute. By construing “voluntarily” in this manner, the court ensures that the determination of when the crime is committed is not dependent on the arbitrary timing of an arrest. The court highlighted the need for certainty in determining the commission of the crime. The majority implicitly adopted the reasoning of the Appellate Division, which likely emphasized a more lenient interpretation benefiting the defendant in cases of ambiguity. The dissenting opinion, referencing the dissent at the Appellate Division, argued that an appearance prompted by arrest cannot be considered voluntary. The dissent suggested that the purpose of including “voluntarily” was to provide an opportunity for defendants who fail to appear to rectify their mistake by appearing on their own within 30 days, thus escaping additional punishment. If the appearance is a direct consequence of being arrested, the dissent argued, the requirement of voluntariness is not met, and prosecution under § 215.57 is permissible. The majority’s approach effectively favors leniency and certainty, preventing the possibility of penalizing individuals who eventually appear within a reasonable time, even if prompted by law enforcement action. The practical effect is that prosecutors must demonstrate that the defendant’s appearance was not voluntary in the sense that it was prompted by arrest or other compulsory measures to secure a conviction for bail jumping under this statute.