Badr v. Hogan, 75 N.Y.2d 629 (1990)

A party may not introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict a witness’s testimony regarding collateral matters solely for impeachment purposes.

Summary

In this landlord-tenant dispute, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred in allowing defense counsel to cross-examine the plaintiff about receiving public welfare funds she allegedly wasn’t entitled to, and then admitting a confession of judgment as evidence. The Court of Appeals held that admitting the confession of judgment, which contradicted the plaintiff’s denial, violated the collateral evidence rule because the matter was solely for impeachment purposes. The court reasoned that the error was prejudicial because it directly impacted the plaintiff’s credibility, a central issue in the case, thus warranting a new trial.

Facts

Lydia Badr, her husband, and their daughter Dina lived in an apartment rented from Mark Hogan. Dina allegedly sustained injuries due to Hogan’s negligence in failing to repair a broken window in the apartment. At trial, Badr testified that the window was broken and Hogan only covered the hole with cardboard. Hogan testified that the window was not broken before the accident. During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Badr about whether she had received money from the Department of Social Services to which she was not entitled. Badr denied this. Over objection, defense counsel then introduced a confession of judgment where Badr admitted receiving $2,654.50 improperly from the Department of Social Services. Badr admitted signing the document but insisted she was entitled to the funds.

Procedural History

The trial court initially sustained an objection to the line of questioning regarding welfare funds but later reversed its decision and allowed the questioning and admission of the confession of judgment. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, finding that the window was not defective. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing defense counsel to cross-examine the plaintiff about collateral matters (receipt of allegedly improper welfare funds) and admitting extrinsic evidence (the confession of judgment) to contradict her denial, solely for the purpose of impeaching her credibility.

Holding

Yes, because the confession of judgment constituted extrinsic evidence used to contradict the plaintiff on a collateral matter solely for impeachment purposes, which violated the collateral evidence rule and was prejudicial, thus warranting a new trial.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals stated the general rule that a witness may be cross-examined on specific immoral, vicious, or criminal acts bearing on credibility. However, the court emphasized that the cross-examination is discretionary and must show moral turpitude to be relevant. Even assuming the questioning was proper, the court found that the matter was collateral. “It was neither relevant to some issue in the case other than credibility nor was proof of it independently admissible to impeach a witness.” The court distinguished this case from situations where further questioning is permitted to induce a witness to change their testimony, stating, “But further examination of the witness is not what happened here.” Instead, defense counsel introduced extrinsic evidence—the confession of judgment—to directly contradict Badr’s denial. The court stated, “It was error to admit this extrinsic proof for the sole purpose of contradicting her testimony on that collateral issue”. The court also rejected the argument that the confession of judgment was used to refresh Badr’s recollection. Because the confession of judgment was emphasized during the trial and in defense counsel’s summation, the court found the error prejudicial, requiring a new trial. The court concluded that, in light of the emphasis placed on the confession of judgment as bearing on the critical issue of the plaintiff’s credibility, the error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.