New York Law Review

Tag: Awareness of Risk

  • People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677 (2013): Establishing Recklessness Through Speeding and Prior Warnings

    People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677 (2013)

    To prove recklessness in vehicular manslaughter or assault cases involving speeding, the prosecution must demonstrate an “additional affirmative act” beyond simply exceeding the speed limit, coupled with proof that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk.

    Summary

    Patrick Asaro was convicted of manslaughter and assault after a high-speed car crash that killed one person and injured several others. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence to prove Asaro acted recklessly. The evidence showed that Asaro, after drinking and possibly smoking marijuana, stopped his car, revved the engine, accelerated to speeds over 90 mph in a 55 mph zone, crossed a double yellow line, and crashed head-on into another vehicle. Crucially, he had also been warned about speeding on that road earlier that evening and immediately before the crash.

    Facts

    Several hours before the accident, Asaro attended a party where he consumed vodka and beer. He showed off modifications to his car designed to increase its speed and noise. He drove to pick up two individuals from a train station, and on the way back to the party, he stopped in the middle of the road for no apparent reason. Asaro revved the engine and rapidly accelerated to a high speed. A passenger warned him to slow down as they approached a sharp turn. Asaro crossed the double yellow line and collided head-on with another vehicle, killing the driver and injuring the passenger. Witnesses testified to Asaro’s high speed and that he appeared intoxicated. A blood test revealed the presence of marijuana, although a later test was negative. At the scene, Asaro said, “I’m sorry, I only had a few.”

    Procedural History

    Asaro was indicted on multiple charges, including manslaughter, assault, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving. At trial, he moved to dismiss the manslaughter and assault charges, arguing insufficient evidence of recklessness. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted him on most charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Asaro acted with the mental state of recklessness to support convictions for second-degree manslaughter and second-degree assault.
    2. Whether the trial court erred by giving an adverse inference charge regarding lost Rosario material (the accident reconstruction expert’s handwritten notes) instead of striking the expert’s testimony about the car’s speed.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence that Asaro was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk by driving at an extremely high speed after being warned about the danger of the road.
    2. No, because the defendant requested to strike all of the expert’s testimony, not specifically the testimony relating to speed, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying that broad request.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a finding of recklessness requires more than just speeding; there must be an “additional affirmative act.” Here, the court pointed to Asaro’s stopping the car, revving the engine, and rapidly accelerating as such acts. Furthermore, the court highlighted the testimony that Asaro had been warned twice about speeding on that particular road, first earlier in the evening and again immediately before the crash. This established that Asaro was aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it. The court distinguished recklessness from criminal negligence, noting that recklessness requires awareness of the risk, while criminal negligence involves a negligent failure to perceive the risk. The court quoted People v. Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370, 377 (2008), stating the evidence demonstrated conduct exhibiting “the kind of seriously blameworthy carelessness whose seriousness would he apparent to anyone who shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong.” The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to issue an adverse inference charge rather than striking the accident reconstruction expert’s testimony, as the defendant’s request to strike was overly broad. The court emphasized that the defendant didn’t specifically target the speed-related testimony.

  • People v. Lewie, 17 N.Y.3d 348 (2011): Establishing Recklessness in Manslaughter Cases Involving Parental Neglect

    People v. Lewie, 17 N.Y.3d 348 (2011)

    To prove reckless manslaughter against a passive defendant (e.g., a parent) for failing to protect a child from abuse, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, consciously disregarded that risk, and that their actions were a sufficiently direct cause of the child’s death.

    Summary

    Alicia Lewie was convicted of manslaughter for recklessly causing the death of her infant son by leaving him in the care of her abusive boyfriend. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding sufficient evidence that Lewie knew of the abuse and consciously disregarded the risk to her child. The dissent argued that the prosecution failed to prove Lewie was aware of a substantial risk of *death*, as opposed to merely a risk of abuse, and that her actions were a direct cause of the death, particularly since the fatal injuries were internal and not immediately obvious.

    Facts

    Alicia Lewie’s eight-month-old son died from head trauma inflicted by her live-in boyfriend, Michael Flint. During the 45 days leading up to the child’s death, Lewie repeatedly left the child in Flint’s unsupervised care. Evidence presented at trial indicated that Lewie knew Flint was physically abusing both her and her child during that period. The medical examiner determined the fatal injuries occurred within four days of the child’s death. Lewie attempted to treat the child with over-the-counter medications before seeking emergency medical care.

    Procedural History

    Lewie was indicted on multiple charges, including manslaughter and reckless endangerment. At trial, she was convicted of second-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Lewie appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the manslaughter conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented legally sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewie recklessly caused the death of her son by being aware of and consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death when leaving him in the care of his abusive boyfriend.

    Holding

    Yes, because the jury could logically find, based on the evidence, that Lewie knew a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death existed and consciously disregarded it by continuing to leave her son in Flint’s care despite knowing about the abuse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that Penal Law § 125.15(1) requires proof that the defendant “recklessly causes the death of another person.” Recklessness, according to Penal Law § 15.05(3), involves awareness of and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The court found that the jury could reasonably infer Lewie knew of the risk of death. Despite knowing Flint was abusing her child, she continued to leave him in Flint’s care, thus demonstrating a conscious disregard of the risk. The court distinguished this case from *People v. Wong*, where the prosecution failed to prove the passive defendant was aware the abuse created a risk of death without prompt medical treatment. Here, the evidence of Lewie’s awareness of Flint’s abuse was deemed sufficient for the jury to conclude she knew of the risk of death. The dissent argued that the prosecution only proved Lewie was aware of a risk of *abuse*, not a risk of *death*. The dissent highlighted that the fatal injuries were internal and not readily apparent, making it unreasonable to conclude Lewie was aware her child was at a substantial risk of death. The dissent also pointed out that Lewie’s actions in seeking medical care for her son contradicted the claim that she consciously disregarded a substantial risk to his life. The dissent cited *People v. Stewart*, emphasizing the requirement that the defendant’s actions must be a “sufficiently direct cause” of the ensuing death, arguing that this standard was not met in Lewie’s case.