Buffers v. Board of Educ., 60 N.Y.2d 771 (1983)

A statement that an employee was discharged ‘for cause’ can be defamatory if, taken in its natural and ordinary meaning, it is susceptible to a defamatory connotation, creating a question for the jury.

Summary

This case addresses whether the statement that a former employee was discharged “for cause” constitutes defamation. The Court of Appeals held that such a statement is not clearly susceptible to only one interpretation and may be understood by the average reader as meaning that the employee was derelict in their professional duties. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to a jury determination on whether the statement is defamatory. The court emphasized that the understanding of the average reader is the key factor in determining whether a statement is defamatory, and if the statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning, the jury must decide how it would be understood.

Facts

The plaintiff, a former employee, was discharged, and the defendant published a statement indicating the termination was “for cause.” The plaintiff then sued, alleging that this statement was defamatory, untrue, and intended to injure their professional reputation.

Procedural History

The lower court dismissed the defamation cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order by reversing the dismissal of the defamation cause of action, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury determination on the issue.

Issue(s)

Whether the statement that an employee was discharged “for cause” is, as a matter of law, not defamatory, or whether it is for the jury to decide how the average reader would understand the statement.

Holding

No, because the statement that the plaintiff was terminated “for cause” is not clearly susceptible to only one interpretation, and the average reader may interpret it as meaning that the plaintiff had actually been derelict in their professional duties. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to a jury determination of the issue.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a statement is defamatory if it tends to expose a person to public hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or to injure the person in their trade, business, or profession. The court emphasized that the understanding of the “average reader” is crucial in determining whether a statement is defamatory. If the words, taken in their natural and ordinary meaning, are susceptible to a defamatory connotation, it is up to the jury to decide how the statement would be understood. The court distinguished this case from James v. Gannett Co., where the statement was clearly susceptible to only one interpretation. Here, the court found that the statement “for cause” could reasonably be interpreted as an assertion that the plaintiff was incompetent or derelict in their duties. The court cited Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., stating the argument must be tested against the understanding of the average reader and referenced November v Time, Inc. The court stated, “Unlike the statements at issue in James v Gannett Co. (40 NY2d 415), the statement that plaintiff was terminated ‘for cause’ is not clearly susceptible to only one interpretation. The rule is that if the words taken in their natural and ordinary meaning are susceptible to a defamatory connotation, then it is for the jury to decide how it would be understood by the average reader (id., at p 419; 2 NY PJI 708).” Because it could not be said as a matter of law that the average reader would *not* interpret the statement as meaning that the plaintiff had been derelict, a jury determination was necessary. The court cited PJI 3:25 and comment.