New York Law Review

Tag: automatic standing

  • People v. Andrews, 78 N.Y.2d 88 (1991): Limits of Automatic Standing in Possessory Crimes

    People v. Andrews, 78 N.Y.2d 88 (1991)

    Automatic standing to challenge a search and seizure is limited to cases where the criminal possessory charge is rooted solely in a statutory presumption attributing possession to the defendant; it does not extend to charges based on ordinary constructive possession.

    Summary

    Defendant Andrews was convicted of drug and weapons charges. He sought to suppress evidence, arguing he had standing. The Court of Appeals held that automatic standing only applies when the possessory charge is *solely* based on a statutory presumption. Since the weapon and paraphernalia charges were based on constructive possession, not solely on a statutory presumption, Andrews had to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy in the searched premises, which he failed to do. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, limiting the application of automatic standing.

    Facts

    Police searched an apartment and found controlled substances, a weapon, and drug paraphernalia. Andrews was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminally using drug paraphernalia. The drug charge was based on Penal Law §220.25 (2), a statutory presumption. The other charges were based on constructive possession. Andrews did not reside at the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied Andrews’ motion to suppress for lack of standing. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted for a hearing on the suppression motion. On remittal, the Supreme Court held Andrews had automatic standing to challenge the drug charge but needed to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy for the other charges. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the drug conviction but affirming the others. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the standing issue for the weapon and drug paraphernalia charges.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant should be accorded automatic standing to challenge the search and seizure of the weapon and drug paraphernalia, where one charge (drug possession) was rooted in a statutory presumption, but the other charges were based on ordinary constructive possession.

    Holding

    No, because automatic standing is a narrow exception limited to cases where the criminal possessory charge is rooted *solely* in a statutory presumption attributing possession to the defendant. Since the charges related to the weapon and paraphernalia were based on ordinary constructive possession, the defendant was required to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy in the searched premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the distinction between statutory presumption-based possession and ordinary constructive possession. Citing People v. Wesley, the Court stated that when a charge is based on ordinary constructive possession, standing is available only if the defendant demonstrates a “personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises.” The Court refused to extend the automatic standing exception established in People v. Millan, which applies when possession is attributed solely through a statutory presumption, to cases involving constructive possession based on other evidence. The Court reasoned that expanding automatic standing would undermine the general rule requiring a personal expectation of privacy. The Court quoted People v. Ponder, stating that a defendant must ” ‘establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy’ ” to challenge a search. The court emphasized that the “unfairness… perceived in Millan is not present in cases where a defendant is charged with constructive possession on the basis of evidence other than the statutory presumption”.

  • People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160 (1981): Abrogating Automatic Standing in Search and Seizure Cases

    People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160 (1981)

    New York State abandons the “automatic standing” rule, requiring a defendant to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched to challenge the legality of a search and seizure, even when charged with a possessory offense.

    Summary

    Defendant Ponder was convicted of felony murder, manslaughter, and criminal possession of a weapon. The key evidence was a sawed-off rifle found in his grandmother’s washing machine during a warrantless search. Ponder sought to suppress the weapon, claiming the search was illegal. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Ponder had standing to challenge the search, specifically reevaluating the “automatic standing” rule. The Court abrogated the rule, holding that Ponder needed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in his grandmother’s home to challenge the search’s validity. Because he failed to prove such an expectation, the weapon was deemed admissible.

    Facts

    Joseph Salerno was shot during a robbery. A bystander informed police that she saw Ponder running from the hardware store with a black and silver object protruding from his jacket. Police knew Ponder from prior criminal activity and that he had been apprehended at his grandmother, Louise Ponder’s, residence before. Police went to Louise Ponder’s residence. Two officers found a .22 caliber bullet near the side door. They knocked, and Ponder answered. He pointed upstairs when asked if “Wade” was inside. Ponder fled and was apprehended. Police searched the house without a warrant (believing Mrs. Ponder consented, though she did not), finding a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle in a washing machine in the basement. Ponder later confessed to the crime.

    Procedural History

    Ponder was indicted and convicted of felony murder, manslaughter, and criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing the warrantless search of his grandmother’s home was illegal, and the weapon should have been suppressed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Ponder appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York should continue to apply the “automatic standing” rule, allowing a defendant charged with a possessory offense to challenge a search’s validity without demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises.

    Holding

    No, because New York abandons the “automatic standing” rule, requiring a defendant to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched to challenge the search’s validity under the New York State Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the “automatic standing” rule originated in Jones v. United States, and that New York had previously retained the rule in People v. Hansen. However, the Supreme Court abrogated the rule in United States v. Salvucci. The Court then reevaluated the rule under the New York State Constitution. The Court noted that even in Jones, the Supreme Court stated, “it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he * * * establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.” The Court emphasized that the language of the New York State Constitution mirrors the Fourth Amendment. Since the Supreme Court removed the constraint imposed by Jones, the Court was free to reevaluate the rule. The court found no reason to diverge from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Salvucci and abrogated the rule. Applying this new standard, the Court found Ponder failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in his grandmother’s home. The Court cited People v. Henley, a case where the court denied standing to a brother who sought to suppress evidence based on the illegal detention of his brother, as foreshadowing the present holding.