New York Law Review

Tag: attractive nuisance

  • Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co., 21 N.Y.2d 447 (1968): Liability for Injuries to Trespassing Children Caused by Volatile Substances

    Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co., 21 N.Y.2d 447 (1968)

    A landowner may be liable for injuries to children trespassing on their property if the landowner knows children frequent the property, the property is easily accessible, and the landowner leaves highly volatile substances accessible to the children.

    Summary

    A 12-year-old boy, Matthew Patterson, was severely burned when he ignited paint solvent he found in an open yard adjacent to the Proctor Paint & Varnish Co. plant. The yard, unfenced and accessible to children, contained cans collecting dripping paint solvent. Patterson, after spilling some of the solvent on his clothes, lit a fire and poured the solvent on it, causing a flare-up that ignited his clothing. The trial court dismissed the complaint, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the company could be liable given the accessibility of the property, the known presence of children, and the presence of a volatile substance. The court reasoned that the rigid application of the trespass doctrine has diminished and that the volatility of the substance presented a question of fact for the jury.

    Facts

    Proctor Paint & Varnish Co. operated a paint and varnish manufacturing plant in a residential area of Yonkers. Adjoining the plant was an open, unfenced yard. Fill pipes on the plant’s outer wall dripped paint solvent into cans placed by the company. The solvent, resembling water, was a flammable liquid with a flash point of 103 degrees Fahrenheit, making it both combustible and explosive. The company knew that children frequently played in the yard.

    On October 29, 1961, Matthew Patterson, 12, and his younger brother entered the yard by climbing over a wall. Matthew picked up a pail of solvent, spilled some on his clothes, lit a fire, and poured the solvent on the fire, resulting in severe burns.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the complaint at the close of the plaintiffs’ case, finding it legally insufficient. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Two justices dissented in the Appellate Division, believing the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reviewed the dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landowner is liable for injuries sustained by a child trespassing on their property when the child is injured by a volatile substance left accessible on the property, where the landowner knew children frequented the property.

    Holding

    Yes, because the landowner left the property open and accessible to children, knew that children used it for play, and left highly volatile substances accessible to them; a case prima facie is made out if a child is thus injured.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized that the rigid application of the trespass doctrine to children injured by dangerous conditions on land had diminished over time. The court distinguished earlier cases that had denied recovery based solely on the child’s trespasser status, citing more recent decisions that had found liability despite the child’s lack of legal right to be on the property. The court emphasized the added element of dangerous volatile substances, noting that the child’s active intervention in igniting the substance did not preclude recovery. Citing Travell v. Bannerman, 174 N.Y. 47 (1903), Kingsland v. Erie County Agric. Soc., 298 N.Y. 409 (1949), and Carradine v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.2d 291 (1963), the court noted that liability had been found in similar cases involving dangerous substances even when the children were trespassing. The court explicitly stated, “The main body of decisions in this court instructs us that the rule today is that if the owner of land leaves it open and accessible to children; if he knows that children use it for play; and if he leaves accessible to them highly volatile substances, a case prima facie is made out if a child is thus injured.” The court found that the volatility of the paint solvent was a question of fact for the jury. The court reversed the dismissal and ordered a new trial.

  • Mayer v. Temple Properties, 307 N.Y. 559 (1954): Liability for Dangerous Conditions to Child Trespassers

    307 N.Y. 559 (1954)

    A landowner can be liable for injuries to even a trespasser, including a child, if the injuries result from an affirmatively created, dangerous condition or trap on the property, especially when the landowner knows children frequent the area.

    Summary

    Frank Mayer, a 12-year-old boy, died after falling into an unguarded opening on a platform behind a building owned by Temple Properties and used in common with another defendant. The platform was accessible to children, who often played there, by crawling under a gate. The opening, normally covered by steel doors, was instead covered with flimsy wood that gave way when Mayer stepped on it. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the defendants created a dangerous trap and were liable for the boy’s death, despite his status as a trespasser. The court emphasized the affirmative act of creating a hazardous condition, the foreseeability of children’s presence, and the deceptive appearance of safety.

    Facts

    The platform, located behind defendants’ building in a congested neighborhood with many children, was accessible via a ladder and by crawling under a gate. The platform had a 4-foot-square opening used for raising and lowering ash and rubbish cans, normally covered by two hinged steel doors. Children frequently crawled under the gate and played on the platform, a practice known to the defendants’ agents, who occasionally chased them away. On the day of the accident, one steel door was open, and the opening was covered by “jerry-built” wood, described as being like orange crate or shipping crate material. Mayer and a friend crawled under the gate and onto the platform. When Mayer stepped on the wood covering the opening, it gave way, and he fell 55 feet to his death.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff, Mayer’s father, sued the defendants for negligence. The case was tried before a Referee without a jury, who found in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants were liable for the death of the decedent, a trespasser, where the death resulted from a dangerous condition affirmatively created by the defendants on their property and where the defendants knew children frequented the area.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendants affirmatively created a dangerous trap by covering the opening with flimsy wood, knew children frequented the area, and the insecure covering gave a deceptive appearance of safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while New York generally follows the rule that landowners owe trespassers only a duty to refrain from affirmative acts of negligence or intentional harm, this case fell within an exception. The court distinguished this case from those involving mere failure to repair or maintain property. Here, the defendants affirmatively created a dangerous condition by knowingly placing a frail wooden covering over a deep hole. The court noted, “Here we have abundant proof of affirmative action by defendants, who ‘changed conditions’ and ‘created new perils there’ by providing an insecure and deceptive covering over the platform opening.” The court also stressed that the defendants were aware that children frequently played on the platform, making the incident foreseeable. The court equated the situation to an “explosive bomb, highly inflammable material, a spring gun, or kindred devices,” stating that creating such a hazardous situation amounted to a “reckless disregard of the safety of human life.” The court distinguished Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 296 N.Y. 154 (1946), where the dangerous condition was a pre-existing condition far removed from public travel, and there was no affirmative act by the defendant. The Court held that the question of the decedent’s contributory negligence was a question of fact, and it was bound by the lower courts’ findings on that issue. Judges Dye and Van Voorhis dissented, arguing the defendants did not violate a duty owed to a trespasser, citing Carbone.