New York Law Review

Tag: Attorney Ethics

  • Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, 85 N.Y.2d 373 (1995): Standard for Defamation Based on False Statements of Fact

    Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, 85 N.Y.2d 373 (1995)

    In a defamation action based on allegedly false statements of fact, the court must determine whether the contested statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation, giving the language a fair reading in the context of the entire publication.

    Summary

    Michael Armstrong, an attorney, sued Simon & Schuster for libel based on a paragraph in the book “Den of Thieves.” The paragraph described Armstrong’s representation of Craig Cogut, alleging Armstrong presented Cogut with a false affidavit to exonerate another client, Lowell Milken, which Cogut refused to sign. Armstrong claimed the paragraph was false and defamatory. The Court of Appeals held that the statement, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, was susceptible of a defamatory meaning because it implied Armstrong attempted to procure a perjured oath. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

    Facts

    Armstrong represented Lowell Milken and later Craig Cogut, an attorney who worked with Lowell. Cogut was subpoenaed during an investigation of Wall Street dealings. Armstrong prepared an affidavit for Cogut intended to exonerate Lowell Milken. Cogut consulted other attorneys, then signed a revised affidavit. Armstrong then submitted the affidavit to the U.S. Attorney on behalf of Lowell Milken. The book “Den of Thieves” contained a paragraph stating Armstrong presented Cogut with an affidavit containing untrue facts, which Cogut angrily refused to sign, leading Cogut to seek new lawyers.

    Procedural History

    Armstrong sued Simon & Schuster for libel. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the statements were true or substantially true, protected by the “opinion” defense, and the “single instance” rule. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the allegedly defamatory statements in “Den of Thieves” concerning Armstrong’s conduct are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning.

    Holding

    Yes, because viewing the statements favorably to the plaintiff, the statement that Cogut refused to sign the affidavit because the facts weren’t true is susceptible of a defamatory meaning, implying Armstrong deliberately presented a false affidavit for Cogut to sign in order to exculpate Lowell, resulting in Cogut’s angry discharge of Armstrong and the retention of new counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on whether the statements were reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning. The Court emphasized that it must give the disputed language a fair reading within the context of the publication. While defendants argued the paragraph was substantially true, the Court found Armstrong’s claim that he never prepared a false affidavit created a factual dispute. The Court stated, “Viewing the statements at issue most favorably to plaintiff, as we must on a dismissal motion, we conclude that this sentence, in the context in which it appears, is susceptible of a defamatory meaning: that Armstrong deliberately presented a false affidavit for one client (Cogut) to sign in order to exculpate another client (Lowell), resulting in Cogut’s angry discharge of Armstrong and the retention of new counsel.” The Court distinguished this case from defamation by implication, emphasizing that Armstrong alleged false statements of verifiable fact, not merely implications arising from truthful statements. The Court noted that Armstrong bears the burden of proving the alleged falsity. Because the court found the statement was potentially defamatory, the case could proceed.

  • Matter of Lennon v. New York, 439 N.E.2d 398 (1982): Attorney’s Duty to Client vs. Court Order

    Matter of Lennon, 439 N.E.2d 398 (N.Y. 1982)

    An attorney must obey a court order, even if the attorney believes the order is erroneous; the proper course is to object to the order and seek appellate review, not to defy it directly.

    Summary

    This case concerns an attorney who was held in contempt for refusing to follow a court order. The attorney believed the order forced him to violate his ethical duties to his clients. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt order, holding that the attorney’s proper course of action was to obey the order and seek appellate review, not to defy it. The court emphasized the importance of maintaining order in the courtroom and ensuring judicial authority is respected. While acknowledging the difficult position the attorney was placed in, the court ultimately prioritized adherence to the rule of law and the orderly administration of justice.

    Facts

    An attorney from the Monroe County Public Defender’s office, representing an indigent defendant named Lennon, discovered that the chief prosecution witness against Lennon was also represented by the same Public Defender’s office in an unrelated criminal matter. The attorney informed the court about the potential conflict of interest and requested the appointment of independent counsel for the witness. The trial court denied this request and ordered the attorney to proceed with Lennon’s trial. The court prohibited the attorney from questioning the witness about the pending criminal charges, limiting cross-examination to prior bad acts.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ordered the attorney to proceed with the trial under the stated limitations. The attorney refused to conduct the cross-examination as ordered, resulting in a contempt citation. The contempt order was appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the contempt order. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney is justified in disobeying a direct court order based on the attorney’s belief that the order requires them to violate ethical obligations to their client(s).

    Holding

    No, because an attorney must obey a court order, even if the attorney believes the order is erroneous; the proper course is to object to the order and seek appellate review, not to defy it directly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the importance of maintaining order and decorum in the courtroom, stating that “to allow counsel to second-guess the court’s ruling and decide, unilaterally, that it is not to be obeyed would be to invite chaos and undermine the court’s authority.” The court acknowledged the attorney’s dilemma but stated that “[a]n order of the court must be obeyed, irrespective of its apparent validity, unless and until it is overturned by orderly review.” The court reasoned that established legal procedure provides adequate means for challenging erroneous orders. The proper course of action is to make objections, preserve the issue for appeal, and, if necessary, seek a stay of the proceedings. The dissent argued that the trial court’s order so clearly abused its power that the attorney had no reasonable alternative but to disobey. The dissent also noted that the court’s order placed the attorney in an untenable ethical position, forcing him to choose between his duties to two different clients. Justice Kaye, in dissent, argued, “But this concern, however vital, should not cause this court to overlook a rare instance when, as here, a trial court has so clearly abused its considerable power as to leave counsel with no reasonable alternative.” The majority, however, weighed concerns about court authority higher than the lawyer’s ethical quandary.