Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 23 N.Y.3d 10 (2014)

An action for attorney deceit under Judiciary Law § 487 is governed by the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1), not the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214(2), because the cause of action existed at common law prior to statutory enactment, even if it originated in English statute.

Summary

Plaintiff Melcher sued defendants, a law firm and one of its attorneys, for attorney deceit under Judiciary Law § 487. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214(2). Melcher argued for the six-year “catch-all” statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1). The Court of Appeals held that the six-year statute of limitations applies because the cause of action for attorney deceit existed at New York common law before the first New York statute governing attorney deceit was enacted in 1787, even if the claim originated in the first Statute of Westminster.

Facts

Melcher brought an action against Greenberg Traurig, LLP and Leslie Corwin for attorney deceit under Judiciary Law § 487. The defendants allegedly engaged in deceitful conduct during prior litigation involving Melcher.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding the defendants were equitably estopped from asserting the statute-of-limitations defense, though agreeing that CPLR 214(2) applied. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to dismiss, finding equitable estoppel inapplicable and the claim time-barred. Two justices dissented, disagreeing on the timeliness of the claim but not addressing equitable estoppel. Melcher appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether an action for attorney deceit under Judiciary Law § 487 is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214(2) or the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1).

Holding

No, an action for attorney deceit is governed by the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1) because liability for attorney deceit existed at New York common law prior to 1787, even if the claim originated in the first Statute of Westminster.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that while Amalfitano v. Rosenberg (12 N.Y.3d 8 (2009)) established that Judiciary Law § 487 did not derive from common-law fraud but rather from the first Statute of Westminster, this did not automatically mean that the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214(2) applied. The Court emphasized that English statutory and common law became New York common law through the Colonial-era incorporation of English law. The Court quoted Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige Ch. 178, 198 (1833), stating that statutes in force at the time of colonization become part of the common law of the colony if applicable. The Court noted that a cause of action for attorney deceit existed as part of New York’s common law before the 1787 statute, which merely enhanced penalties by adding treble damages. Citing State of New York v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 83, 85 (1975), the Court stated that statutes providing only additional remedies do not create new obligations within the meaning of CPLR 214(2). Therefore, even if attorney deceit originated in the Statute of Westminster, liability existed at New York common law prior to 1787, making the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1) applicable. As the court stated, “Statutory provisions which provide only additional remedies or standing do not create or impose new obligations.” Because of this ruling, the court did not address Melcher’s other arguments.