New York Law Review

Tag: Attempted Robbery

  • People v. Lamont, 24 N.Y.3d 315 (2014): Establishing Intent in Attempted Robbery Cases Through Circumstantial Evidence

    24 N.Y.3d 315 (2014)

    In attempted robbery cases, intent to steal can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances, even in the absence of direct evidence of intent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Jafari Lamont for attempted robbery in the second degree. The court found that the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish that Lamont possessed the requisite intent to steal. The case involved Lamont and an accomplice who appeared armed and masked at the back door of a Wendy’s before business hours. The court emphasized that intent in such cases is rarely proven through direct statements and can be inferred from the defendant’s actions, appearance (masked and armed), and the circumstances surrounding the incident, such as the time of day and the planned escape. The court distinguished this case from one where the evidence supported alternative criminal intents.

    Facts

    At approximately 6:30 a.m., before the Wendy’s was open, Lamont and an accomplice appeared at the rear door of the restaurant, armed and masked. They knocked on the door, but employees did not let them in. When a police officer arrived, the men fled. The officer saw Lamont wearing dark clothing, a black hat, gloves, and a mask, and carrying what appeared to be a handgun. The officer pursued Lamont, eventually apprehending him. The police recovered a black knit hat and glove during the chase, and found a backpack with additional gloves on Lamont. They also found BB guns near the restaurant and in Lamont’s car. Lamont stipulated that he was one of the masked men and was the person who ran from the police.

    Procedural History

    Lamont was convicted of two counts of attempted robbery in the second degree and acquitted of attempted burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish intent to steal. The Court of Appeals granted Lamont leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that Lamont had the specific intent to steal, as required for attempted robbery.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, including Lamont’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances, provided sufficient basis for a rational fact-finder to conclude that he intended to commit robbery.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the standard that a verdict is legally sufficient if any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to conclude that every element of the charged crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that intent is often proven through circumstantial evidence. The court reasoned that Lamont’s appearance (masked and armed) and conduct (knocking at the back door before opening hours, attempt to flee, and possession of getaway vehicle) supported an inference that he intended to rob the Wendy’s. The court distinguished the case from scenarios where other crimes might be inferred. The court cited "[t]he element of intent is rarely proved by an explicit expression of culpability by the perpetrator." Further, the court emphasized that the trier of fact was entitled to conclude that the defendant intended to commit robbery, not some other crime. The Court relied on the principle that intent can be "inferred from the defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances".

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of circumstantial evidence in establishing intent in attempted robbery cases. Prosecutors can use this decision to argue that evidence of a defendant’s actions, appearance, and the context of the crime can be combined to prove intent, even if there’s no direct admission of intent to steal. Defense attorneys must be prepared to argue that circumstantial evidence is consistent with alternative inferences other than robbery, which may create reasonable doubt. This case guides the analysis of evidence in attempted robbery cases and emphasizes the fact-finder’s role in drawing reasonable inferences. The case should also be applied in assessing whether there is sufficient evidence to bring charges in the first instance.

  • People v. Miller, 87 N.Y.2d 211 (1995): Legality of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree

    87 N.Y.2d 211 (1995)

    Attempted robbery in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime because the intent lies in the forcible taking (or attempted taking) of property, and the presence of aggravating factors, such as serious physical injury to a non-participant, elevates the severity of the offense and the punishment.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree after a failed robbery attempt resulted in the victim’s death. The Appellate Division reduced the conviction, arguing that attempted robbery in the first degree is a nonexistent crime because it includes the unintended result of causing serious physical injury. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that attempted robbery in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime. The court reasoned that the intent lies in the forcible taking or attempted taking of property, and aggravating factors, like causing serious physical injury, elevate the severity of the offense. The dissent argued that the enhanced liability requires an unintended result that cannot be attempted.

    Facts

    Defendant and a group of teenagers planned to rob the victim, Grimes, of a bag of clothing. The defendant declared his intent to snatch the bag as Grimes exited a grocery store. The group attacked Grimes, and defendant attempted to grab the bag. Grimes resisted, and during the struggle, a shot was fired, mortally wounding Grimes. The bag was no longer in sight after Grimes collapsed. The jury convicted the defendant of attempted robbery in the first degree.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the defendant’s request to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted robbery in the first degree. The jury convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the conviction to attempted robbery in the third degree, finding that attempted robbery in the first degree is not a legally cognizable crime. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the conviction for attempted robbery in the first degree and remitting the case for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether attempted robbery in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime in New York.

    Holding

    Yes, because the essence of robbery is the forcible stealing of property. The intent lies in the act of attempting to forcibly take the property, and the presence of an aggravating factor, such as causing serious physical injury to a non-participant, elevates the severity of the offense and the punishment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the crime of robbery involves the forcible taking of property. The degree of the robbery depends on aggravating factors. First-degree robbery includes instances where the robber causes serious physical injury to a non-participant. Attempted robbery in the first degree requires the intent to forcibly steal property, and the act of attempting to do so. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Campbell, where the crime at issue, attempted assault in the second degree, included an unintended result as a core element. Here, the intent is the forcible taking or attempted taking, not the unintended injury. The Court stated, “[t]he robber’s conduct is rendered criminal by the forcible taking — or attempted forcible taking — not by an unintended result.” The court emphasized that strict liability attaches to the aggravating circumstance (serious physical injury) rather than the proscribed result (the taking of property). The Dissent argued that attempted robbery in the first degree should not be a cognizable crime as the statute requires forcible stealing and also causing serious injury. The dissent argues that Campbell controls in cases such as this as the enhanced liability turns on the unintended result. The dissent also pointed out that the People could have charged the defendant with felony assault which carries a similar punishment.

  • People v. Di Stefano, 38 N.Y.2d 642 (1976): Admissibility of Unanticipated Evidence from Eavesdropping Warrants

    People v. Di Stefano, 38 N.Y.2d 642 (1976)

    Evidence of crimes not initially sought in an eavesdropping warrant is admissible if the warrant was lawfully obtained, the interception was inadvertent and in good faith, and the warrant is retroactively amended to include the new evidence.

    Summary

    Di Stefano was convicted of conspiracy and attempted robbery based on evidence obtained through an eavesdropping warrant initially targeting other crimes. The warrant was later amended to include the robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the eavesdropping evidence and finding insufficient evidence of attempted robbery. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, holding the eavesdropping evidence admissible because it was inadvertently overheard during a lawful wiretap and the warrant was properly amended. However, the court agreed that the evidence was insufficient to prove attempted robbery under the established “Rizzo” standard.

    Facts

    Police obtained an eavesdropping warrant for Jimmy’s Lounge, targeting organized crime figures involved in bookmaking, gambling, and extortion. The warrant was repeatedly renewed and expanded. During the second renewal period, police overheard a conversation between Di Stefano and Fristachi suggesting a plan to “clock” a messenger. Later, during the third renewal period, additional conversations indicated Di Stefano intended to meet the messenger at the Commodore Hotel. Police visually surveilled Di Stefano but no robbery occurred. The warrant was then amended to include robbery and conspiracy to rob, incorporating Di Stefano’s conversations. The April 6 conversation was referenced in the application through the daily plant report.

    Procedural History

    Di Stefano was convicted of conspiracy and attempted robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the eavesdropping evidence and holding the attempted robbery evidence insufficient. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of crimes not initially sought in an eavesdropping warrant is admissible under CPL 700.65(4) if the warrant is retroactively amended.
    2. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate compliance with minimization requirements for the eavesdropping warrant.
    3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted robbery under the standard articulated in People v. Rizzo, despite the revised Penal Law definition of attempt.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the communications were inadvertently intercepted during a lawfully authorized eavesdrop, and the warrant was properly amended to include the new crimes, satisfying the requirements of CPL 700.65(4).
    2. Yes, because testimonial evidence demonstrated adequate minimization instructions were given, and the defense failed to rebut this evidence or examine the officers.
    3. No, because the evidence did not establish that the defendant was “very near to the accomplishment of the intended crime,” as required by People v. Rizzo, a standard unchanged by the revised Penal Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 700.65(4) essentially grafts the “plain view” exception onto eavesdropping warrants. Just as evidence discovered during a lawful physical search is admissible, so too are communications inadvertently intercepted during a lawful wiretap. The “inadvertence” requirement protects against anticipated discoveries where law enforcement has probable cause and time to obtain a warrant but fails to do so. Here, the authorities lacked probable cause to amend the warrant based solely on the April 6 conversation. The court rejected the argument that the April 6 interception made the April 17 interceptions intentional, finding the latter to be a valid “plain view” discovery. The court emphasized that the daily plant reports, which included the April 6 conversation, were before the judge when the warrant was amended, satisfying the amendment requirement. Addressing minimization, the court noted that the People presented testimonial evidence of adequate minimization instructions. Finally, the court reaffirmed the Rizzo standard for attempted robbery, holding that the revised Penal Law did not alter the requirement that the defendant be “very near to the accomplishment of the intended crime.” The court stated, “A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime”. However, this did not change the Rizzo standard. The court directly quoted United States v Cox: “[W]e uphold the statute on the basis that it demands an original authorization in accordance with the mandate of Berger v. New York…”