New York Law Review

Tag: attempted murder

  • People v. Wells, 7 N.Y.3d 51 (2006): Duplicity in Attempted Murder Charges

    7 N.Y.3d 51 (2006)

    An attempted murder charge is not duplicitous when the evidence shows the defendant fired a gun toward multiple individuals, even if the intended victim is not definitively identified.

    Summary

    Terence Wells was convicted of attempted murder for firing a gun at two detectives. He argued the indictment was duplicitous because the prosecution didn’t prove which detective he intended to kill. The New York Court of Appeals held that the attempted murder charge was not duplicitous. The Court reasoned that the identity of the intended victim is not an element of attempted murder, as the focus is on the intent to kill and the actions taken to effect that intent. The court also addressed a Batson challenge related to jury selection and the denial of a motion to dismiss the jury panel after a potential juror’s comment.

    Facts

    Wells and an accomplice robbed a bakery, killing two people and injuring two others.
    Undercover detectives Weston and Molina, nearby for a narcotics operation, heard the commotion and saw Wells and his accomplice fleeing.
    Detective Weston identified himself and ordered them to stop.
    Wells fired his gun twice in the direction of the detectives as he ran.
    Wells dropped clothing, including a wig containing a handgun, during the police chase before being apprehended.

    Procedural History

    Wells was charged with multiple counts, including first-degree attempted murder of a police officer.
    At trial, Wells moved to dismiss the attempted murder count, arguing it was duplicitous.
    The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Wells of, among other things, second-degree attempted murder as a lesser included offense.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attempted murder charge is duplicitous when the evidence doesn’t specify which of multiple potential victims the defendant intended to kill.

    Holding

    No, because the identity of the specific intended victim is not an element of attempted murder; the focus is on the intent to kill and actions taken to effectuate that intent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Fernandez, stating that because “actual death is not an element” of attempted murder, the “identity of the person whose death” was intended is irrelevant. The court reasoned that the focus is on whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill and took steps toward committing the murder.
    “Under this rationale, the identity of the specific police officer against whom defendant’s murderous intent was directed is not an element of attempted murder in the first or second degree.”
    The court found the jury instructions proper because they allowed conviction if the defendant acted with intent to kill, regardless of which detective was the specific target.
    The court also addressed Wells’ Batson challenge, finding the prosecutor’s reasons for striking a juror (demeanor, fondness for detective stories) were race-neutral. While one comment comparing the juror to a judge was in “poor taste”, it wasn’t facially discriminatory.
    Finally, the court rejected Wells’ argument that the entire jury panel should have been dismissed after a prospective juror’s comment, finding no evidence of substantial prejudice.

  • People v. Salcedo, 92 N.Y.2d 1019 (1998): When Conspiracy and Attempted Murder Justify Consecutive Sentences

    People v. Salcedo, 92 N.Y.2d 1019 (1998)

    Consecutive sentences for conspiracy and attempted murder are permissible when the acts constituting each crime are separate and distinct, even if there is some statutory overlap in the definitions of the crimes.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences for conspiracy and attempted murder. The defendant argued that concurrent sentences were required because the offenses arose from a single act. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the conspiracy was complete when the defendant and his co-conspirators met, armed and prepared, to seek out the victim. The subsequent act of shooting at the victim, missing, and attempting to shoot again, constituted the separate crime of attempted murder. Because these were separate and distinct acts, consecutive sentences were appropriate. This case clarifies the application of Penal Law § 70.25(2) regarding concurrent and consecutive sentencing.

    Facts

    Defendant Jose Salcedo, along with Jose Sorrentini and Chris Claudio, planned to lure Guy Maresca to a deserted area under the guise of a pizza delivery. When Maresca arrived, Claudio attempted to shoot him but missed. Claudio tried again, but the gun jammed, and Maresca escaped. All three men were arrested based on information from Sorrentini, a police informant.

    Procedural History

    Salcedo was convicted of conspiracy in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon. He received consecutive sentences for the attempted murder and conspiracy convictions. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions and sentences. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for conspiracy in the second degree and attempted murder in the second degree, or whether concurrent sentences were required under Penal Law § 70.25(2).

    Holding

    No, the trial court did not err because the acts constituting the conspiracy and the attempted murder were separate and distinct. Therefore, consecutive sentences were permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 70.25(2) requires concurrent sentences only when two or more offenses are committed through a single act or omission, or when one act constitutes one offense and a material element of another. The court distinguished conspiracy from attempted murder. Conspiracy requires proof that the defendant agreed with others to commit a class A felony and that one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the criminal scheme. Attempted murder requires proof that the defendant intended to commit murder and engaged in conduct that tended to effect the commission of that crime. The court emphasized, “the function of the overt act in a conspiracy prosecution is ‘simply to manifest “that the conspiracy is at work” * * *.’ The overt act must be an independent act that tends to carry out the conspiracy, but need not necessarily be the object of the crime.” Here, the conspiracy was complete when the men met, armed and prepared. The subsequent shooting constituted a separate act of attempted murder. Because these were distinct acts, consecutive sentences were appropriate. The court explicitly referenced People v. Ribowsky, 77 N.Y.2d 284, 293, to underscore the relatively low bar for what constitutes an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy. This case demonstrates that even though the ultimate goal of the conspiracy (murder) was the same as the intended crime in the attempted murder charge, the acts were distinct enough to warrant separate punishments.

  • People v. Ficarrota, 91 N.Y.2d 244 (1997): Establishing Accomplice Liability Through Circumstantial Evidence

    People v. Ficarotta, 91 N.Y.2d 244 (1997)

    A defendant can be found guilty as an accomplice even when the evidence of their participation is circumstantial, provided that a rational jury could infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant shared a community of purpose and intentionally aided the principal in committing the crime.

    Summary

    Joseph Ficarotta was convicted of attempted murder and assault based on accomplice liability. The victim, Aiman Badawi, was shot after being lured to a remote location by Ficarotta and Angelo Boccadisi. The prosecution argued that Ficarotta intentionally aided Boccadisi in the shooting. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed for a rational jury to conclude that Ficarotta shared a community of purpose with Boccadisi and intentionally aided in the attempted murder, despite Ficarotta’s alibi. The court emphasized the importance of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

    Facts

    Aiman Badawi was shot and severely wounded. Prior to the shooting, Badawi had a business dispute with Han Ye Yang (Mimi), the ex-wife of Angelo Boccadisi. Ficarotta, Boccadisi’s bodyguard, had previously threatened Badawi on Boccadisi’s behalf. Later, Boccadisi and Ficarotta feigned interest in a business venture with Badawi, luring him to a remote location under the pretense of discussing business. At the location, Boccadisi shot Badawi. Ficarotta gave Badawi calming assurances before the shooting and then left the scene. Badawi testified that Mimi seemed surprised he was still alive after the incident. Ficarotta presented an alibi, claiming he was at his mother’s home at the time of the shooting.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Ficarotta of attempted murder and assault. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence of Ficarotta’s intent or shared purpose. The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ficarotta shared a “community of purpose” with Boccadisi and intentionally aided him in the attempted murder of Badawi, thus establishing accomplice liability under Penal Law § 20.00.

    Holding

    Yes, because viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Ficarotta shared a community of purpose with Boccadisi and intentionally aided in the attempted murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard from People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620 (1983), requiring the evidence to be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. This included Ficarotta’s prior threat to Badawi, the feigned business proposal, Ficarotta’s calming actions immediately before the shooting, his abandonment of Boccadisi at the scene, and his false alibi for both himself and Boccadisi. The court reasoned that the jury could infer from these facts that Ficarotta knew of Boccadisi’s plan to murder Badawi and intentionally participated in the crime. The court emphasized that “Defendant’s false statements are not only evidence of consciousness of guilt of some crime, but also show defendant’s attempts to distance himself from the time and place of the [specific crime at issue].” The court concluded that Ficarotta played a role in setting up the meeting, deceiving Badawi about the business purpose, and distracting him while Boccadisi prepared to shoot him. This was enough for a rational jury to find accessorial conduct. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for consideration of other issues not previously determined.

  • People v. Brown, 83 N.Y.2d 791 (1994): Prejudice from Evidence on Acquitted Charges

    83 N.Y.2d 791 (1994)

    A defendant’s conviction on valid, independent charges should not be overturned on the basis of prejudice stemming from evidence related to charges on which the defendant was acquitted, unless it can be shown that such prejudice nullified the valid conviction.

    Summary

    Alexander Brown was convicted of robbery and attempted murder. The Appellate Division reversed, arguing that the introduction of evidence related to felony murder charges (of which Brown was acquitted) prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the robbery and attempted murder charges. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the introduction of evidence pertaining to a charge for which the defendant was acquitted does not automatically nullify a conviction on other independent charges, unless the prejudice is so great as to deny a fair trial on those charges. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for factual review.

    Facts

    Alexander Brown and an accomplice stole a gold chain. When the victim gave chase, Brown displayed a gun. Brown and his accomplice fled in a car with two other occupants. The victim and a friend chased Brown’s vehicle. The victim broke the rear window of Brown’s car with a baseball bat, and Brown fired two shots in response. Police officers joined the chase, which ended when Brown’s vehicle crashed. Brown then stole a police car. Responding to the report of the stolen police car, other officers collided with an ambulance, resulting in an officer’s death. Brown was apprehended and indicted on numerous charges, including felony murder related to the officer’s death.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Brown’s motion to dismiss the felony murder and first-degree assault counts. After a jury trial, Brown was acquitted of the felony murder and first-degree assault counts but convicted of robbery and attempted murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in denying Brown’s motion to dismiss the felony murder counts and that the introduction of evidence related to felony murder prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the counts on which he was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the introduction of testimony regarding the felony murder count so prejudiced the jury as to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial on separate and unrelated charges for which he was convicted.

    Holding

    No, because prejudice does not nullify an independent, validly secured robbery and attempted murder conviction as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Appellate Division’s ruling that the introduction of evidence related to the felony murder charge, for which Brown was acquitted, automatically prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the robbery and attempted murder charges. The Court found that the Appellate Division erred in ruling “as a matter of law that prejudice nullified an independent, validly secured robbery and attempted murder conviction.” The Court implied that a valid conviction should only be overturned if the prejudice stemming from evidence related to the acquitted charge was so significant that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial on the other charges. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further factual review, implying that the Appellate Division should determine whether the prejudice was, in fact, so significant as to warrant a new trial.

  • People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722 (1992): Jury Instruction on Lesser Included Offense of Attempted Assault

    People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722 (1992)

    A court must submit a lesser included offense to the jury if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without committing the lesser offense and there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater.

    Summary

    Cabassa and Lind were convicted of attempted murder and criminal use of a firearm after a high-speed chase where Lind, a passenger in Cabassa’s car, fired shots at pursuing police officers. The Court of Appeals reversed Cabassa’s conviction because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted assault in the second degree. The Court held that a jury could reasonably conclude that Lind and Cabassa intended to injure, rather than kill, the officers. Lind’s conviction was affirmed because he failed to request the lesser included offense instruction.

    Facts

    Plainclothes officers in an unmarked taxi observed a Cadillac with inoperable taillights driven by Cabassa, with Lind as a passenger. After the officers identified themselves and instructed the occupants to pull over, Cabassa sped through a red light, initiating a high-speed chase. During the chase, Lind fired several shots at the pursuing police vehicle. Cabassa drove towards a roadblock established by uniformed officers while Lind fired at one of them. Cabassa eventually crashed the car, and both were apprehended.

    Procedural History

    Cabassa and Lind were convicted in the trial court of attempted murder and criminal use of a firearm. Cabassa appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted assault and in allowing him to deliver his own summation without ensuring a knowing waiver of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Cabassa appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted assault in the second degree.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting Cabassa to proceed pro se by delivering his own summation without a proper waiver of counsel.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that Cabassa committed attempted assault rather than attempted murder.
    2. No, because Cabassa did not proceed fully pro se, as his counsel remained and participated in the defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a lesser offense must be submitted to the jury if (1) it is actually a lesser included offense of the greater charge, and (2) the jury is warranted in finding that the defendant committed the lesser but not the greater crime. Attempted assault in the second degree is a lesser included offense of attempted murder because one who attempts murder necessarily attempts assault. The critical question was whether a reasonable view of the evidence supported a finding that Cabassa only intended to injure, not kill, the officers.

    The Court reasoned that the jury could have found that Lind was shooting to injure rather than kill, considering the circumstances: the moving target, high speeds, and frequent lane changes. The jury could believe that the intent was to distract the driver, cause an accident, or seriously injure and incapacitate the officers to end the chase. Regarding Cabassa’s intent, a juror could reasonably find that he did not share Lind’s intent to kill, even if Lind had that intent. Therefore, the attempted assault charge should have been submitted.

    The Court distinguished between proceeding pro se, which requires a searching inquiry into the defendant’s understanding of the risks, and merely participating in one’s defense. Since Cabassa’s counsel remained and participated, there was no need for a searching inquiry. While alerting a defendant to the benefits of counsel is preferable before granting limited participation, it is not legally required. The court noted Lind did not request or join Cabassa’s request for the charge down and thus waived the argument for appeal.

  • People v. Perry, 67 N.Y.2d 834 (1986): Necessity of Circumstantial Evidence Charge When Evidence is Wholly Circumstantial

    People v. Perry, 67 N.Y.2d 834 (1986)

    When the prosecution’s case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, the trial court commits reversible error by refusing a defense request to instruct the jury on the nature and use of circumstantial evidence.

    Summary

    John Perry, a parking lot attendant, was robbed by masked gunmen. Police apprehended the defendant, Perry was unable to identify him, and no direct evidence linked the defendant to the robbery. The defense requested a circumstantial evidence charge, which the court initially agreed to provide but then failed to give. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the robbery case against the defendant was wholly circumstantial, the trial court’s refusal to provide a circumstantial evidence charge was reversible error, warranting a new trial on the robbery counts. The court also clarified that attempted murder in the first degree remains a viable charge in New York, despite the invalidation of the mandatory capital sentence associated with the completed crime of first-degree murder.

    Facts

    John Perry, a parking lot attendant, was robbed by three masked, armed men. The robbers tied Perry up and stole a car from the parking lot. Perry freed himself, flagged down a police car, and identified the stolen car. A high-speed chase ensued, and police apprehended two suspects. The defendant, armed, fled into a housing project and exchanged gunfire with pursuing officers. He then entered an auto repair shop, firing at the owner and an officer. After further pursuit, the defendant fired at officers before being apprehended. Perry could not identify the defendant as one of the robbers. The defendant was charged with attempted murder in the first degree, robbery in the first and second degrees, and criminal possession of a weapon.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, robbery in the first and second degrees, and criminal possession of a weapon. At trial, the defense requested a circumstantial evidence charge regarding the robbery counts. The trial court initially agreed but failed to provide the charge and refused to do so when reminded. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case following the Appellate Division’s affirmation.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to provide a circumstantial evidence charge when the case against the defendant on the robbery counts was wholly circumstantial.
    2. Whether attempted murder in the first degree is a nonexistent crime in New York, such that the defendant’s conviction must be reduced to attempted murder in the second degree.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the case against the defendant on the robbery counts was entirely circumstantial, and the defendant requested a circumstantial evidence charge. Refusal to provide this charge was reversible error.
    2. No, because while the mandatory capital sentence for first-degree murder was invalidated in People v. Smith, the substantive crime of first-degree murder, and therefore attempted murder in the first degree, remains viable under Penal Law § 125.27.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Perry could not identify the defendant and no direct evidence connected him to the robbery, the prosecution’s case was “wholly circumstantial.” Therefore, the trial court was obligated to provide a circumstantial evidence charge upon the defense’s request. The failure to do so deprived the defendant of a fair trial on the robbery charges. The Court cited People v. Ford, 66 NY2d 428 and People v. Sanchez, 61 NY2d 1022, as precedent supporting the necessity of a circumstantial evidence charge in such circumstances. Regarding the attempted murder charge, the Court clarified that its prior decision in People v. Smith, 63 NY2d 41, only invalidated the mandatory death sentence for first-degree murder, not the substantive crime itself. As the court stated, “It was the death sentence, not the crime of first degree murder, that we found unconstitutional. Section 125.27 of the Penal Law, therefore, remains viable as a substantive basis for a charge of attempted murder in the first degree.” This clarifies that the elements of first-degree murder, when coupled with an attempt, still constitute a valid crime, even though the ultimate penalty of death is no longer applicable.

  • People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 469 (1989): Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense and Attempted Murder

    People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 469 (1989)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance when sufficient evidence is presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that would allow a jury to find the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance with a reasonable explanation or excuse.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court reasoned that, under the specific circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was sufficient evidence presented to create a jury question as to whether the defendant was acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court also held that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in failing to remit the case for resentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with attempted murder and raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. At trial, the defendant presented evidence concerning his subjective state and the external circumstances as he perceived them. The specific facts contributing to the claim of extreme emotional disturbance are not detailed in this memorandum opinion.

    Procedural History

    The defendant requested a jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the charge should have been given. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the defense was inapplicable to attempted murder. The defendant cross-appealed the Appellate Division’s failure to remit the case for resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People preserved the argument that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance is inapplicable to attempted murder for appellate review.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
    3. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in failing to remit the case for resentencing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the People did not argue against the charge on extreme emotional disturbance based on its inapplicability to attempted murder at the trial level.
    2. Yes, because under the circumstances and viewing the evidence favorably to the defendant, there was enough evidence to present a jury question on whether the defendant was acting under extreme emotional disturbance.
    3. No, because under the circumstances of this case, the Appellate Division’s decision not to remit for resentencing was not an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the People’s argument that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance is inapplicable to attempted murder, finding that this argument was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised at trial. Citing People v. Villani, the Court reiterated that issues not raised at the trial level are generally waived on appeal.

    Regarding the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on extreme emotional disturbance, the Court emphasized the standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence. It cited People v. Casassa, stating that the assessment requires consideration of “the subjective, internal situation in which defendant found himself and the external circumstances as he perceived them at the time.” The Court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant (as required by People v. Moye), concluded that the evidence presented a jury question on the defense.

    Finally, the Court addressed the defendant’s cross-appeal concerning resentencing, holding that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion. The Court cited People v. Cohen, indicating that the decision to remit for resentencing is generally discretionary.

  • People v. Perez, 64 N.Y.2d 868 (1985): Establishing Intent to Kill Through Circumstantial Evidence

    People v. Perez, 64 N.Y.2d 868 (1985)

    Intent to kill, a necessary element for a murder conviction, can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as the defendant’s actions, the nature of the weapon used, and the manner in which it was used.

    Summary

    William Perez was convicted of attempted murder. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Perez intended to kill the victim, Martell. Perez fired a rifle through a locked door immediately after Martell pushed the rifle away. The court emphasized that the shot’s height, the confined space behind the door, and Perez’s motive (preventing Martell from reporting a robbery) supported the jury’s finding of intent to kill. This case demonstrates how intent can be proven through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the defendant’s conduct.

    Facts

    William Perez robbed a patron at Martell’s social club. Martell attempted to disarm Perez, pushing a rifle away from his chest. Martell then slammed and locked a door separating himself from Perez. Almost immediately after, Perez fired the rifle through the locked wooden door. The bullet was fired at approximately four feet high, the same height as vital bodily organs. The area behind the door was narrow, approximately the width of the doorway itself.

    Procedural History

    The defendant, Perez, was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. Perez then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reviewed the submissions and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, upholding the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant, William Perez, intended to kill Martell when he fired a rifle through the locked door.

    Holding

    Yes, because the totality of the evidence, including the defendant’s actions, the nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it was used, and the potential motive, allowed the jury to reasonably infer the defendant’s intent to kill.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that intent to kill can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act. The court highlighted several key pieces of evidence: (1) the shot was fired almost immediately after Martell closed the door, (2) the shot was fired at a height corresponding to vital organs, (3) the space immediately behind the door was very narrow, such that the jury could infer that the defendant assumed Martell was in the line of fire, and (4) the defendant’s motive. The court noted, “As the defendant could have observed, the area immediately on the other side of the door was no wider than the doorway, and the jury thus could have found that defendant assumed that Martell was in the line of fire when he shot through the door.” The court also considered Perez’s motive: preventing Martell from reporting the robbery or frustration that Martell didn’t take the robbery seriously. This provided additional support for the inference of intent to kill. The court emphasized that it viewed the evidence “in the light most favorable to the People,” as is required when reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency. The court concluded that a rational jury could have found that the defendant possessed the requisite intent to kill, even without direct evidence of his mental state.

  • People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427 (1982): Defining ‘Lesser Included Offense’ in New York Criminal Law

    People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427 (1982)

    A crime is only a lesser included offense of another if it is impossible to commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment against the defendant, who was convicted of reckless endangerment in the first degree after the trial court reduced an attempted murder charge. The Court of Appeals held that reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The court reasoned that it is theoretically possible to attempt murder without creating a grave risk of death, a necessary element of reckless endangerment. This decision reinforces a strict interpretation of the “lesser included offense” definition in New York criminal law, requiring impossibility of committing the greater crime without also committing the lesser.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including two counts of attempted murder in the second degree, one count of assault in the first degree, and three counts of criminal possession of a weapon.

    At the close of the prosecution’s case, the trial judge found insufficient evidence to prove intent to kill for one of the attempted murder charges.

    The judge reduced this charge to reckless endangerment in the first degree and dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of reckless endangerment in the first degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether reckless endangerment in the first degree is a lesser included offense of attempted murder in the second degree under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 1.20, subd. 37).

    Holding

    No, because it is theoretically possible to commit attempted murder in the second degree without also committing reckless endangerment in the first degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory definition of “lesser included offense” as defined in CPL 1.20 (subd 37): “When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former, a lesser included offense.”

    The Court emphasized a strict interpretation of this definition, stating, “one crime cannot be a lesser included offense of another if it is theoretically possible to commit the greater crime without concomitantly committing the lesser.”

    The Court applied this interpretation to the case, noting that attempted murder requires intent to kill, while reckless endangerment requires creating a grave risk of death. The court reasoned that an attempted murder could be rendered “innocuous by some circumstance of factual impossibility,” meaning that no grave risk of death would be created. Therefore, a person could commit attempted murder without committing reckless endangerment.

    The court cited People v. Miguel, 53 N.Y.2d 920, to further support its holding, reinforcing the principle that the theoretical possibility of committing the greater crime without the lesser precludes the lesser crime from being a lesser included offense.

    The Court concluded that since reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law, § 120.25) is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law, §§ 110.00, 125.25, subd 1), the defendant’s conviction for the former could not stand after the attempted murder charge was reduced.

  • People v. Dlugash, 41 N.Y.2d 725 (1977): Criminal Liability for Attempt When Completion is Impossible

    41 N.Y.2d 725 (1977)

    A defendant can be convicted of attempted murder even if the victim was already dead when the defendant acted, provided the defendant believed the victim was alive at the time of the attempted act.

    Summary

    Melvin Dlugash was convicted of murder. The evidence showed that Dlugash shot Michael Geller multiple times in the head. Dlugash admitted to the shooting, but claimed Geller was already dead from prior gunshot wounds inflicted by another person, Joe Bush. The trial court instructed the jury on intentional murder and attempted murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence that Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that even if Geller was dead, Dlugash could be guilty of attempted murder if he believed Geller was alive. The court reasoned that the Penal Law eliminates impossibility as a defense to attempt if the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.

    Facts

    Michael Geller was found dead in his apartment, riddled with bullets. The autopsy revealed multiple gunshot wounds to the head and chest from different caliber weapons. Dlugash confessed to police that he, Geller, and Bush were together the night of the murder. Bush shot Geller after an argument. Dlugash then shot Geller in the head and face with a .25 caliber pistol. Dlugash stated that Geller looked dead at the time of his shots. Bush and Dlugash disposed of the weapons. Ballistics evidence confirmed that different guns were used.

    Procedural History

    Dlugash was indicted for murder by the Grand Jury of Kings County. At trial, the prosecution presented Dlugash’s confession and medical testimony that could not definitively determine if Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him. The defense presented expert testimony suggesting Geller could have died quickly from the initial chest wounds. The trial court declined to charge the jury on aiding and abetting but submitted intentional murder and attempted murder. The jury convicted Dlugash of murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment, finding the prosecution failed to prove Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him, and that the uncontradicted evidence showed Dlugash believed Geller was dead. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be convicted of attempted murder when the target of the attempt may have already been dead, by the hand of another, when the defendant made his felonious attempt, but the defendant believed the target to be alive.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Penal Law § 110.10, it is no defense to a charge of attempt that the crime was factually impossible to commit if the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him. Therefore, a murder conviction could not stand. However, the court analyzed whether Dlugash could be convicted of attempted murder. The court reviewed the historical distinction between factual and legal impossibility as defenses to attempt, noting that New York Penal Law § 110.10 eliminates the defense of impossibility in most situations, reflecting the Model Penal Code’s approach. The statute focuses on the actor’s mental state. The court found sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude Dlugash believed Geller was alive when he shot him. This evidence included the fact that Dlugash fired five shots at Geller’s head from close range, and his actions after the shooting indicated a consciousness of guilt. Dlugash’s admissions, particularly his cooperative actions in disposing of the weapons and providing a false alibi, contradicted his later claim of duress or belief that Geller was dead. While Dlugash argued the jury was bound to accept the exculpatory portions of his admission, the court stated the jury could reject those portions if they were improbable or contradicted by other evidence. The court found the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the indictment instead of modifying the judgment to reflect a conviction for attempted murder, a lesser-included offense. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for review of the facts and further proceedings regarding the sentence.