New York Law Review

Tag: attempted manslaughter

  • People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 763 (1987): Conviction for Nonexistent Crime is a Fundamental Error

    People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 763 (1987)

    A conviction for a crime that does not exist in the penal law is a fundamental error that cannot be waived, even if the defendant fails to object to the jury charge.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for attempted murder and criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court, without objection from either party, instructed the jury on attempted manslaughter as a lesser included offense. The defendant was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of attempted manslaughter and weapon possession. The New York Court of Appeals modified the appellate division’s order, vacating the attempted manslaughter conviction. The court held that a conviction for a nonexistent crime, like attempted manslaughter in the first degree (as charged), is a fundamental error that cannot be waived, even if the defendant does not object to the jury charge. The case was remitted for resentencing on the weapon possession charge.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on charges of attempted murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

    At the close of evidence, the trial court informed both the prosecution and the defense that it would instruct the jury on attempted manslaughter in the first degree, considering it a lesser included offense of the attempted murder charge.

    Neither the prosecution nor the defense objected to the inclusion of the attempted manslaughter charge.

    The jury acquitted the defendant of attempted murder but convicted him of attempted manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

    Procedural History

    The County Court convicted the defendant of attempted manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction for attempted manslaughter in the first degree, a nonexistent crime under New York law, is a fundamental error that can be waived by the defendant’s failure to object to the jury charge.

    Holding

    No, because a conviction for a nonexistent crime presents error fundamental to the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings proscribed by law that cannot be waived.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that attempted manslaughter in the first degree, as charged in this case, is a legal impossibility, as it involves an attempt to commit an unintentional act. Citing People v. Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602 (1988), and People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150 (1967), the court emphasized the established principle that attempted manslaughter in the first degree is not a recognized crime in New York. Because the crime itself does not exist in the Penal Law, there could not be sufficient evidence to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

    The court distinguished the situation from cases where a defendant pleads guilty to a nonexistent crime in satisfaction of a more serious charge (allowed under People v. Foster) or is convicted of a lesser crime that is not a lesser-included offense but is nevertheless a valid crime (allowed under People v. Ford, 62 N.Y.2d 275 (1984)). In those scenarios, the defendant makes a calculated choice. Here, the jury found the defendant guilty of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, which is not possible when a required element of the crime, such as intending to cause an unintended result, is a legal impossibility.

    The court emphasized that this type of error affects the fundamental fairness and legality of the proceedings and cannot be waived by a defendant’s failure to object. As the court stated, such a conviction “presents error fundamental to ‘the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings proscribed by law’ that cannot be waived.” (citing People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 295 (1976), affd, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)).

  • People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150 (1967): Validity of Guilty Plea to a Hypothetical Crime

    People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150 (1967)

    A defendant may validly plead guilty to a lesser crime, even if that crime is technically or logically inconsistent with the facts, as part of a plea bargain for their benefit.

    Summary

    Foster was charged with first-degree manslaughter. He later pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree manslaughter. On appeal, Foster argued that because manslaughter requires no intent to kill, and attempt requires intent, a plea to attempted manslaughter is a legal impossibility, thus invalidating his conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a defendant can knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty to a lesser included offense, even if logically inconsistent, as part of a plea bargain that benefits the defendant and avoids the risk of a conviction on a more serious charge. This is permissible as long as the plea is made knowingly and voluntarily.

    Facts

    The defendant, Foster, was indicted for manslaughter in the first degree for killing one Thomas Hicks. He initially pleaded not guilty. The defendant then withdrew his not-guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of attempted manslaughter in the second degree. The defendant subsequently appealed the conviction based on the guilty plea, claiming the plea was invalid.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter. He pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of attempted second-degree manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals heard the appeal after the lower courts presumably upheld the guilty plea.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s plea of guilty to a lesser crime of attempted manslaughter in the second degree is invalid when the crime of manslaughter does not require intent, while the crime of attempt does require intent.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant can knowingly accept a plea to attempted manslaughter as part of a bargain that benefits them, even if the crime is technically inconsistent. The court reasoned that such a plea avoids the risk of a conviction on a more serious charge and reduces the potential sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the logical inconsistency between the crime of manslaughter, which requires no intent, and the crime of attempt, which requires intent. However, the court emphasized the practical realities of plea bargaining, stating, “The practice of accepting pleas to lesser crimes is generally intended as a compromise in situations where conviction is uncertain of the crime charged. The judgment entered on the plea in such situation may be based upon no objective state of facts. It is often a hypothetical crime”. The court reasoned that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily accepted the plea to reduce his potential sentence and avoid the risk of being convicted of the more serious charge of manslaughter in the first degree. The court also cited People v. Griffin, noting that a guilty plea “may relate to a hypothetical situation without objective basis”. The court distinguished this case from People v. Brown, where a jury verdict for attempted manslaughter was overturned due to the logical inconsistency. In Foster, the plea was a compromise and a benefit to the defendant, distinguishing it from a jury’s finding of guilt on a logically impossible crime. The court emphasized that a defendant “ought not to be allowed to take the benefit of the favorable charge and complain about it on appeal.” The court found no violation of the defendant’s due process rights since the plea was part of a beneficial bargain initiated by the defendant.