New York Law Review

Tag: Attempted Kidnapping

  • People v. Denson, 26 N.Y.3d 163 (2015): Admissibility of Prior Conviction to Establish Intent in Attempted Kidnapping

    26 N.Y.3d 163 (2015)

    Evidence of a prior conviction under the Molineux rule is admissible if it is relevant to establish a material fact other than the defendant’s criminal propensity, and if its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of a prior conviction in a case involving attempted kidnapping. Raymond Denson was convicted of attempted kidnapping in the second degree. The trial court admitted evidence of Denson’s prior conviction for a sex crime involving a child. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the prior conviction was properly admitted as evidence of Denson’s intent, provided that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice. The Court also found that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Denson came dangerously close to completing the crime of attempted kidnapping. This case underscores the importance of the Molineux rule and the balancing test courts must apply when considering the admissibility of prior bad acts.

    Facts

    Denson, who worked at a hardware store near the victim’s apartment, repeatedly offered to take the 10-year-old victim out for ice cream, movies, or ice skating. On several occasions, he approached her and made similar offers, which she rejected. On September 11, 1998, Denson approached the victim in the stairwell of their apartment building, offered her the keys to his apartment and told her if she changed her mind she could come by for ice cream. The victim ran upstairs, feeling frightened, and told her mother, who contacted the police. Prior to trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Denson’s 1978 conviction for sodomy, related to the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, as evidence of his intent. The trial court admitted the evidence after a Ventimiglia hearing, during which expert witnesses testified about the relevance of the prior conviction. The victim and her mother testified about Denson’s behavior. Denson’s estranged wife and her niece testified regarding Denson’s prior abuse of his stepdaughter. The court found Denson guilty as charged, which the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    Denson was indicted on charges of attempted kidnapping in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. Prior to trial, the court held a Ventimiglia hearing to determine the admissibility of Denson’s prior conviction. The trial court admitted the evidence of the prior conviction. Denson was found guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Denson’s prior conviction for a sex crime committed against a child as relevant to his intent in the current offense.
    2. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the conviction of attempted kidnapping in the second degree.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of Denson’s prior conviction, as it was relevant to his intent.
    2. Yes, because the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the conviction of attempted kidnapping in the second degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the Molineux rule, which prohibits evidence of uncharged crimes unless it is logically connected to a specific material issue other than criminal propensity. The court found that the prior conviction was relevant to establish Denson’s intent, which was a material issue in the attempted kidnapping charge. The court engaged in a two-step analysis: First, the court determined that the prosecution identified a material issue, other than propensity, to which the evidence was directly relevant; Second, the court weighed the evidence’s probative value against its potential for undue prejudice. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of prejudice. The court also found that the evidence of Denson’s conduct was sufficient to establish that he came dangerously close to committing the crime of attempted kidnapping.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on applying the Molineux rule. It confirms that when dealing with prior bad acts, courts should carefully analyze if the evidence is relevant to a material issue other than propensity. The court must also balance the probative value of the evidence against the potential for undue prejudice. This balancing test is crucial in determining whether the prior acts should be admitted, and the Denson decision provides an example of how to conduct this analysis. Also, in cases of attempted crimes, the focus is on the actions of the defendant, not the intended victim. Denson emphasizes that an attempted crime requires conduct that moves beyond mere preparation and comes dangerously close to completion of the crime.

  • People v. Fullan, 92 N.Y.2d 690 (1998): Attempted First-Degree Kidnapping as a Cognizable Crime

    People v. Fullan, 92 N.Y.2d 690 (1998)

    Attempted kidnapping in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime when the underlying conduct establishes an attempt to abduct, and the statute imposes strict liability for the aggravating circumstance (death of the victim) that elevates the crime to the first degree.

    Summary

    Fullan hired individuals to kidnap Alpert, who was owed money by Fullan, with the intent to kill him. The kidnapping attempt resulted in Alpert’s death. Fullan was convicted of, among other things, attempted kidnapping in the first degree and felony murder predicated on that attempted kidnapping. The Appellate Division reversed these convictions, relying on a prior case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that attempted kidnapping in the first degree is a cognizable crime because the core crime is the abduction, and the death of the victim is an aggravating circumstance that elevates the crime to first degree, similar to the reasoning in People v. Miller regarding attempted robbery.

    Facts

    Fullan hired Cepeda and Esquilin to abduct Alpert, a business associate to whom Fullan owed $150,000. The plan was to kidnap Alpert, take him to a specific location, and kill him. During the abduction attempt, Alpert struggled, and the gun of one of the perpetrators discharged, hitting Alpert. Esquilin then shot Alpert twice more, killing him. Fullan, who was present, took promissory notes from Alpert’s body.

    Procedural History

    Fullan was tried with Esquilin and convicted of three counts of second-degree murder (including two counts of felony murder predicated on attempted kidnapping and robbery), attempted first-degree kidnapping, and first-degree robbery. Esquilin’s conviction was modified by the Appellate Division, which reversed the attempted kidnapping and related felony murder counts based on People v. Campbell. Prior to Fullan’s appeal, the Court of Appeals decided People v. Miller, distinguishing Campbell. The Appellate Division, without mentioning Miller, granted Fullan the same relief as Esquilin. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals. Fullan cross-appealed, seeking a new trial based on an alleged jury instruction error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether attempted kidnapping in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime in circumstances where the defendant attempts to abduct another person, and that person dies during the abduction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the core crime is the abduction, and the death of the victim is an aggravating circumstance which elevates the severity of the crime to first degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the construction of Penal Law § 135.25(3), which defines first-degree kidnapping, parallels the interpretation given to Penal Law § 160.15 in People v. Miller regarding robbery. The court stated, “[t]he core crime here is undeniably the abduction of another person. It is that to which the culpable mental state adheres. Thus, the conduct tending to effect the abduction constitutes the attempt. The death of the victim need not be intended; that additional attribute is the strict liability aggravating circumstance which elevates the severity of the already egregious crime of kidnapping to first degree.” The court found the logic of Miller controlling and held that attempted kidnapping in the first degree qualifies as a cognizable crime. The court distinguished this case from People v. Campbell, similar to how Miller distinguished itself from Campbell. The court stated, “[t]he logic and rationale of Miller (supra), thus, ineluctably control, and dictate this Court’s further conclusion that attempted kidnapping in the first degree qualifies as a cognizable crime in these circumstances.”