New York Law Review

Tag: attempted burglary

  • People v. Giles, 11 N.Y.3d 495 (2008): Admissibility of Uncharged Crimes & Limiting Instructions

    People v. Giles, 11 N.Y.3d 495 (2008)

    Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible to show a defendant’s propensity to commit crime unless it directly establishes an element of the charged crime or is relevant to show intent, motive, knowledge, common scheme, or identity; if admitted, a proper limiting instruction is required to prevent undue prejudice.

    Summary

    Dwight Giles was caught attempting to break into a medical office. He possessed a stolen Visa card and a MetroCard purchased with a stolen ATM card, from burglaries he wasn’t charged with. At trial for attempted burglary and possession of stolen property, the prosecution introduced detailed testimony about the uncharged burglaries to prove Giles knew the cards were stolen and intended to commit theft in the medical office. The court provided a limiting instruction but failed to specify the purpose for which the evidence was admitted. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the evidence was admissible for the stolen property charges, the failure to provide a proper limiting instruction prejudiced the attempted burglary charges, warranting a new trial on those counts.

    Facts

    Police officers observed Dwight Giles attempting to pick the lock of a medical office door. Upon confrontation, Giles fled and was apprehended. A search revealed a knife, a Visa card belonging to Frank Ballabio, and a MetroCard. Ballabio’s Visa card had been stolen from his home a week prior, and the MetroCard was purchased with an ATM card stolen from Uri Kaufman six days prior. Giles was not charged with either burglary.

    Procedural History

    Before trial, Giles moved to preclude detailed testimony about the uncharged burglaries. The trial court allowed the testimony but provided a limiting instruction without explaining its purpose. Giles was convicted of attempted burglary, criminal possession of stolen property, and possession of burglar’s tools. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order, reversing the attempted burglary and possession of burglar’s tools convictions and remitting for a new trial on those counts, while allowing the stolen property convictions to stand pending possible resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of uncharged burglaries is admissible to prove the defendant’s intent to commit a burglary and knowledge that property in his possession was stolen.

    2. Whether the trial court’s limiting instruction regarding the uncharged burglaries was sufficient to cure potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Holding

    1. Yes, in part, because the evidence of the uncharged burglaries was relevant to establish the defendant’s knowledge that the Visa card and MetroCard were stolen for the criminal possession charges, but not to prove intent to commit burglary.

    2. No, because the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which it could consider the evidence of the uncharged burglaries, creating a prejudicial effect on the attempted burglary charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that relevant evidence is generally admissible unless an exclusionary rule applies. Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible to show a defendant’s propensity to commit crime. However, the Molineux exception allows such evidence if it helps establish an element of the charged crime, such as intent, motive, knowledge, common scheme, or identity. The Court found that the evidence of the uncharged burglaries was offered to prove Giles’s knowledge that the cards were stolen, which was relevant to the criminal possession charges. However, there was no direct link between the uncharged burglaries and Giles’s intent to commit a burglary at the medical office; the evidence merely suggested a criminal propensity. The Court stated that if the evidence “has no bearing other than to show that defendant is of a criminal bent or character and thus likely to have committed the crime charged, it is excluded” (People v. Dales, 309 NY 97, 101 [1955]). Since the jury was not properly instructed on the limited purpose of the evidence, it could have improperly inferred that Giles was likely to commit burglary because he possessed stolen items, thus prejudicing the attempted burglary charges. The Court emphasized the importance of a limiting instruction to guide the jury on the permissible use of such evidence.

  • People v. Smith, 51 N.Y.2d 376 (1980): Inference of Intent in Attempted Burglary Cases

    People v. Smith, 51 N.Y.2d 376 (1980)

    In cases of attempted burglary or larceny, intent to commit a crime inside a premises can be inferred from the circumstances of the entry, the condition of the premises, and the defendant’s conduct within the premises, especially during widespread looting.

    Summary

    During the New York City blackout of 1977, police officers found Smith inside a vandalized appliance store. The store’s security gate was torn off, and the front window was shattered. Smith was found crouched behind a table in the disarrayed store. He was convicted of attempted burglary and attempted petit larceny. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to prove intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Smith’s intent to commit a crime could be inferred from the circumstances: the store’s condition, the ongoing looting, and Smith’s presence inside the store in a crouched position. This case clarifies how intent can be proven circumstantially in burglary cases.

    Facts

    On July 13, 1977, a city-wide blackout occurred in New York City. On July 14, 1977, at approximately 12:30 a.m., police officers responded to a report of a break-in at the Friendly Frost Appliance Store. The officers found the metal security gate torn from the storefront and the front plate glass window shattered. Inside, the store was in disarray, with televisions and other appliances overturned. Officer Meyer found Smith crouched behind a table in the store’s office. Smith was arrested. No witness saw Smith in possession of any merchandise.

    Procedural History

    Smith was convicted in the Supreme Court of attempted burglary in the third degree and attempted petit larceny. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution had not proven Smith’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The People were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for determination of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People established beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith acted with the requisite intent to commit the crimes of attempted burglary in the third degree and attempted petit larceny, based on circumstantial evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Smith’s intent to commit larceny within the store can be reasonably inferred from the circumstances: the condition of the store (vandalized, looted), the time of night (during a blackout), Smith’s unauthorized presence inside the store, and his crouching position inside the store’s office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that the “moral certainty” standard applies only when a case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. Here, there was direct evidence (the officers’ testimony) placing Smith in the store during widespread looting. Therefore, the traditional “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applies. The court emphasized that intent is rarely proven directly; it is usually inferred from the circumstances. The court stated, “in deciding whether the People met their burden, we are required to say whether, considering the facts proved and the inferences that could reasonably be drawn therefrom, [the fact finder] could conclude that there was no reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit the crimes charged.” The court found that the fact finder could reasonably infer that Smith entered the store with the intent to commit larceny, given the condition of the store, the blackout, and Smith’s position inside the store. The court noted, “Here, defendant was discovered crouched behind a table or desk in the middle of the night in a store which obviously was the target of widespread looting. The security gate was torn from the front of the establishment, and the windows were smashed leaving pieces of shattered glass about the entry to the premises.” The court deferred to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order because intent could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances. Competing inferences, if reasonable, are within the domain of the fact-finders and are not to be disturbed by the Court.

  • People v. Castillo, 47 N.Y.2d 270 (1979): Prejudice from Joined Charges Requires New Trial

    People v. Castillo, 47 N.Y.2d 270 (1979)

    When a defendant is tried on multiple charges arising from separate incidents and some charges are later dismissed due to a substantial possibility of misidentification, a new trial is required on the remaining charges if the evidence and jury instructions from the dismissed charges prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the remaining charges.

    Summary

    Leonel Castillo was convicted of attempted burglary. Prior to this, he faced multiple charges related to two separate incidents. The Appellate Division dismissed counts related to the first incident due to a substantial possibility of misidentification. Castillo argued that the remaining attempted burglary charge was prejudiced by the evidence and instructions related to the dismissed charges, and by evidence of his presence near the crime scene after his arrest. The Court of Appeals agreed that the joinder of the charges prejudiced Castillo, warranting a new trial, because the evidence presented for the dismissed counts influenced the jury’s assessment of Castillo’s intent on the remaining count.

    Facts

    On August 27, 1975, a woman in a Bronx apartment was sexually assaulted and robbed by an intruder. The victim could only describe the assailant as a Black teenage male. Two days later, on August 29, the woman’s father and brother saw a man trying to open their bathroom window from a ledge outside their apartment. Police found Leonel Castillo, who matched the general description, nearby. The father and son identified Castillo as the man on the ledge, and the daughter identified him as her assailant from August 27. Castillo, a 28-year-old Guatemalan native, denied involvement in both incidents, claiming he was on his way to work on August 29 and was home at the time of the August 27 incident.

    Procedural History

    Castillo was convicted on charges related to both incidents. The Appellate Division dismissed the charges from the August 27 incident, finding a substantial possibility of misidentification. The case was remanded for resentencing on the remaining attempted burglary count. Castillo appealed, arguing that the remaining charge was prejudiced by the dismissed charges. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the joinder of the August 29 charge with the counts that were later dismissed as based on a misidentification prejudiced Castillo’s right to a fair trial on the attempted burglary charge?

    2. Whether there was sufficient proof of Castillo’s intent to commit a crime inside the building to sustain the attempted burglary charge?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence and jury instructions related to the dismissed charges prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the remaining attempted burglary charge.

    2. Yes, because the circumstantial evidence, including Castillo’s presence on the ledge and attempt to open the window in the early morning hours, was sufficient for a jury to infer intent to commit a crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the trial was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s effort to link the two incidents, creating a single theme of criminal activity. The evidence from the August 27 incident, which was later deemed unreliable, bolstered the identification of Castillo and provided a compelling argument for his intent on August 29. The trial court’s jury instruction allowed the jury to infer intent based on the August 27 incident, further tainting the proceedings. The Court stated, “if you find that this defendant was, in fact, the perpetrator of the acts alleged to have occurred on August 27th * * * then you may infer from such prior acts on these premises an intent to commit the same or similar crimes on August 29th.” This instruction improperly allowed the jury to consider the inflammatory nature of the dismissed charges when determining Castillo’s intent on the attempted burglary charge.

    The court also found error in the prosecutor’s use of testimony that Castillo was seen “wandering around” in the neighborhood three days after his arrest. This evidence was used to suggest a consistent course of criminality, but it lacked probative value and was prejudicial. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for intent, the Court emphasized that intent could be established by circumstantial evidence. The Court reasoned that Castillo’s presence on the third-story ledge at night, attempting to open a bathroom window, allowed the jury to infer an intent to burglarize the apartment. The Court reasoned, “The presence of the perpetrator, like a cliff-climber, on the third-story ledge of a city apartment complex in the dead of night could hardly lead to any other inference but that a crime was in the offing.“

  • People v. Borrero, 47 N.Y.2d 929 (1979): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence for Attempted Burglary

    People v. Borrero, 47 N.Y.2d 929 (1979)

    Circumstantial evidence, when sufficiently compelling and indicative of intent, can be used to support a conviction for attempted burglary.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for attempted burglary in the third degree. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s presence near a broken-in business at night in a desolate area, his flight from the police, and his attempt to hide. The Court found that this evidence provided ample basis for the trier of fact to infer an attempted burglary, and that the conviction was not tainted by evidence related to possessory crimes for which the defendant’s convictions were reversed on appeal.

    Facts

    Police officers observed Borrero and another individual within five feet of the doorway of a business building on Staten Island. The business was closed for the night, and the area was desolate. As the officers approached, Borrero and his companion fled the scene. They then hid under a nearby car across the street but were quickly apprehended. Upon inspection, the officers found evidence of a forced entry at the door of the business premises.

    Procedural History

    Borrero was convicted of attempted burglary in the third degree, as well as possessory crimes related to burglar’s tools and unlawful possession of radio devices. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions for the possessory crimes. Borrero appealed the attempted burglary conviction, arguing that it was tainted by the evidence related to the reversed possessory crime convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the attempted burglary conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempted burglary in the third degree, despite the reversal of convictions on related possessory crimes.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was ample circumstantial evidence, independent of the possessory crime evidence, from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that Borrero and his companion were attempting to burglarize the building.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The Court emphasized the following facts: (1) Borrero’s presence near the business building; (2) the business being closed for the night and located in a desolate area; (3) Borrero’s flight upon the approach of the police; (4) Borrero’s attempt to hide under a car; and (5) the evidence of a forced entry at the door of the business. The court reasoned that, taken together, these facts provided a sufficient basis for the trier of fact to infer that Borrero and his companion were attempting a burglary. The court distinguished this case from People v. Almestica, 42 NY2d 222. The Court held that the enumerated evidence was adequately independent of that relating to the possessory crimes so that the conviction was not tainted by proof concerning possession of burglar’s tools and unlawful possession of radio devices.

  • People v. Irvin, 43 N.Y.2d 704 (1977): Establishing Probable Cause Based on Circumstantial Evidence

    People v. Irvin, 43 N.Y.2d 704 (1977)

    Circumstantial evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause when it does not directly link the defendant to the crime, and alternative explanations for the defendant’s conduct exist.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for attempted burglary, finding that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence linking him to the crime. While there was evidence of an attempted break-in and that the defendant was present near the scene and fled when approached by police, the court held that this circumstantial evidence, without more, was insufficient to connect the defendant to the specific attempted burglary. The confession of a co-defendant implicating himself in the attempted break-in, which was admissible only against the co-defendant, further highlighted the deficiency of the proof against the defendant.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours, police responded to a call about a possible break-in at a grocery store. Finding no one in front, officers went to the rear of the building where they heard whispering and saw two figures in a nearby yard. When the officers approached, the two figures, one of whom was the defendant, fled. The officers pursued but were unable to apprehend them at that time.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of attempted burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to link the defendant to the attempted break-in and support his conviction for attempted burglary.

    Holding

    No, because the circumstantial evidence failed to directly link the defendant to the attempted break-in and could reasonably be attributed to other innocent explanations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that while the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish that an attempted break-in had occurred and that the defendant was present in the vicinity, there was no evidence directly connecting the defendant to the attempted break-in itself. The court emphasized that the co-defendant’s confession, which explicitly linked him to the crime, was explicitly inadmissible against the defendant. The court further reasoned that defendant’s flight from the police, while normally probative, could be attributed to his being discovered as an early morning trespasser, a less serious offense. Because the evidence was circumstantial and did not exclude other reasonable explanations for the defendant’s presence and flight, the Court of Appeals concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    The court stated, “Any inference which might be drawn from the fact that defendant was found in the back yard two buildings away is not sufficient to meet the requirements for circumstantial proof. His flight, normally a probative circumstance, in this instance could equally well be attributed to defendant’s having been discovered as an early morning trespasser.”

  • People v. Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233 (1976): Proof of Intent for Attempted Burglary

    People v. Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233 (1976)

    In an attempted burglary case, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant not only attempted to enter a premises unlawfully but also possessed the specific intent to commit a crime inside.

    Summary

    Henderson was convicted of attempted burglary. The prosecution presented evidence that Henderson broke into a repair shop. However, the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Henderson intended to commit a crime inside the shop. The Court reasoned that while the act of breaking into the shop suggested a possible intent to commit a crime, it did not definitively establish that specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence could support other possible, non-criminal intentions. This case highlights the requirement of proving specific intent in attempt crimes.

    Facts

    The proprietor of a repair shop was alerted by the sound of breaking glass. Upon investigation, he saw an intruder with shoulder-length hair and a long brown coat. The intruder fled. The police found Henderson’s car in the parking lot with the keys inside and the engine warm. Henderson, a former employee, claimed he left his car for repairs, but this was discredited by witness testimony. The window was broken in a manner designed to avoid the burglar alarm.

    Procedural History

    Henderson was convicted of attempted burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, finding insufficient evidence to prove the element of intent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Henderson, in attempting to break into the repair shop, possessed the specific intent to commit a crime therein.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution did not definitively establish that Henderson possessed the specific intent to commit a crime inside the shop; the evidence presented allowed for other reasonable interpretations of his intent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that to convict someone of attempted burglary, the prosecution must prove not only the attempt to enter unlawfully but also the specific intent to commit a crime inside. The Court acknowledged that while Henderson’s actions suggested a possible intent to commit a crime, it did not exclude other reasonable explanations. The Court stated: “even assuming that the proof established that the defendant had attempted to break into the repair shop, there was a failure of proof that he did so with the intent to commit a crime therein. It is possible to imagine a number of other hypotheses for his actions.” For instance, the Court posited he might have been seeking shelter from the cold or looking for someone. Because the prosecution’s evidence did not eliminate these alternative possibilities beyond a reasonable doubt, the element of intent was not sufficiently proven. The dissent argued the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that Henderson broke into the shop with the intent to steal property, pointing to his inconsistent explanations, the method of breaking the window, and his flight from the scene. The majority, however, insisted on the necessity of proving specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt, even when the defendant’s explanation is deemed implausible. This case underscores the importance of proving each element of a crime, especially intent, with sufficient evidence to overcome reasonable doubt. It serves as a reminder that circumstantial evidence, while probative, must exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.

  • People v. Wachowicz, 22 N.Y.2d 369 (1968): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence for Attempted Burglary

    People v. Wachowicz, 22 N.Y.2d 369 (1968)

    Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction when the hypothesis of guilt flows naturally from the facts proved, is consistent with all the facts, and excludes to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis except guilt.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for attempted burglary, holding that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish his guilt. The evidence showed that the defendant was found near a tavern in the early morning hours with another individual who possessed a pinch bar. The tavern doors showed signs of an attempted break-in, and the pinch bar matched marks on the doors. The court emphasized that while circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, it can be a sound basis for adjudication in criminal cases.

    Facts

    A tavern manager locked the premises at 3:30 a.m., ensuring all doors were secured and undamaged. At 5:30 a.m., police officers, responding to an unidentified call, found the defendant, Wachowicz, and one Morris near the tavern. The defendant and Morris were observed “right next to each other”. As the police approached, Wachowicz took “three or four quick steps” away, while Morris remained still. Morris was found to have a pinch bar in his back pocket. Upon inspection, one of the tavern doors was partially open with damaged hooks, and all three doors showed fresh marks consistent with a break-in attempt using a metal instrument, matching the pinch bar found on Morris.

    Procedural History

    The defendant, Wachowicz, was convicted of attempted burglary. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant participated in an attempted burglary.

    Holding

    Yes, because the circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s proximity to the crime scene, his association with an individual possessing a burglary tool matching marks on the damaged door, and his suspicious behavior when the police arrived, was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as it excluded to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis except guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the stringent standard for convictions based on circumstantial evidence, requiring that the inference of guilt flow naturally from the facts, be consistent with all the facts, and exclude to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis except guilt. The court found that the evidence met this standard. The court emphasized that the proximity of the defendant to Morris, the matching of the pinch bar to the marks on the door, and the defendant’s attempt to move away from Morris when the police arrived, all pointed towards guilt. The court stated: “In the end, it is a question whether common human experience would lead a reasonable man, putting his mind to it, to reject or accept the inferences asserted for the established facts.” The court distinguished this case from others where circumstantial evidence was deemed insufficient, finding that in this instance, “the only reasonable hypothesis to which the facts lead is the one accepted by the jury, that when the police came this defendant had just attempted to break into the tavern.” The court noted that while direct evidence is not always of higher quality than circumstantial evidence, both must reliably support the inferences drawn from the presented facts. They cited previous cases such as People v. Harris and People v. Place to reinforce this principle. The court also referenced Wigmore, who stated that “it is out of the question to make a general assertion ascribing greater weight to one class or to the other” (referring to direct vs. circumstantial evidence). The Court held that the jury was justified in inferring that Wachowicz and Morris were attempting to break into the tavern and that Wachowicz’s actions demonstrated a consciousness of guilt.